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Problem
This study examines how the concept of inerrancy of
Scripture presupposes a particular understanding of divine
sovereignty.

Investigation is based on the writings of Carl

F. H. Henry, a contemporary American evangelical

theologian.

Method
This investigation uses case—study approach.

It

consists of a descriptive analysis of Carl Henry's concepts
of inerrancy and sovereignty as individual concepts and the
sense in which the former presupposes the latter.

General

inferences are based on that analysis.
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Results
This study shows that Henry's concept of sovereignty
is an indispensable presupposition in his concept of
inerrancy.

Among other things, sovereignty denotes Gad's

absolute causality,

thereby providing the theological

grounds on which scriptural

inerrancy is predicated.

Conelusions
The concept of inerrancy is best explained in
theological contexts where divine sovereignty is affirmed
and understood

in absolute causal terms.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The idea of inerrancy1 has been a focus of much
discussion in the recent past.3

Discussion often consists

1As a word, "inerrancy" refers to a view of
Scripture which affirms that biblical truth was originally
revealed and written down without error.
The "Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy,"
written by a number of conservative evangelical theologians,
seems to reflect the basic understanding of the term
“inerrancy."
The fourth point in the preamble of the
Articles reads: “Being wholly and verbally God-given,
Scripture is without error or fault in all its teaching, no
less in what it states about God's acts in creation and the
events of world history, and about its own literary origins
under God, than in its witness to God's saving grace in
individual lives" (Norman L. Geisler, e d ., Inerrancy CGrand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1979], 494).
3Mark A. Noll lists twenty—seven books, most of
which have been published since 1979, on the subject of
inerrancy and related issues.
See his article,
“Evangelicals and the Stuay of the Bible," in Evangelicalism
and Modern A m e r i c a . George M a r s d e n , e d . (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans, 1984), 198—9, n. 39.
Another bibliography, more recent and comprehensive
(includes journal articles), is found ir» The Proceed in ~is of
the Conference on Biblical Inerrancy 1987 (Nashville:
Broadman Press, 1987), 543— 54; henceforth referred to as The
Proceedings 1 9 8 7 .
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the importance
of the question of inerrancy was the formation of the
International Conference on Biblical Inerrancy (I C B I ) in the
1970s.
The ICBI has produced two official consensus
statements and, at least, six volumes consisting of
conference papers on inerrancy.
For the 1978 "Chicago
Statement on Biblical Inerrancy," see Geisler, e d .,
Inerrancy. 493— 502.
For the 1982 "Chicago Statement on
Biblical Hermeneutics” and a partial list of books published
by ICBI, see Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus, e d s . ,
Hermeneutics. Inerrancy, and the Bible: Papers rroin
1

r
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2
of debates between conservative evangelical theologians who
defend inerrancy1 and critics who oppose it. Among critics,
there is a tendency to give the impression that inerrancy is
a baseless guiding principle which conservatives use in
reading the Bible.

In other words, inerrancy is depicted as

a merely dogmatic opinion devoid of any meaningful
theological content or context.3
Conservatives have expressed concern over the
failure of many criticisms to take inerrancy seriously as a
theological concept.3

It has also been stated by John

International Conference on Biblical Inerrancy. Summit II
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), S31-7.
1Some of the prominent contemporary advocates of
inerrancy are the executive council members of the ICBI.
They include Gleason Archer, Kenneth Kantzer, James Packer,
Robert Preus, Earl Radmacher, Francis Schaefer, and R.
Sproul.
See Geisler, Inerrancy. Preface.
The association between inerrancy and conservative
evangelicalism has also been observed by Avery Dulles in
Models of Revelation (New York: Doubleday & C o m p a n y , 1983),
37; and Donald K. McKim, What Christians Believe About the
Bible (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1985), 88—89.
3James Barr, for example, describes inerrancy as a
non-intellectual principle to which members of "theologyless" movements feel obliged to subject all the
interpretation of the Bible.
He argues that if the
conservatives have a theology at all, it is “fragmented,
. . . fossilized, . . . and inactive" (Fundamentalism
[Philade. .hia: Westminster Press, 1978], 160— 1).
For similar approaches to inerrancy, see Paul J.
Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture: Problems and
Proposals (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 34—36,
50— 75; and Robert Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible:
Theories of Inspiration. Revelation, and the Canon of
Scripture (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 22—33.
3T h '
entiment is evident in reviews written by
conservatx
iologians on books that criticize inerrancy.
Carl F. H. Henry, for example, writes of Barr's “radical
misconceptions of fundamentalist doctrines and exaggerations
that become misrepresentations, . . . uncritical association
of fundamentalism with conservative evangelicalism,"

r
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Setzer, himself a critic of inerrancy,

that the reason why

many criticisms make little, if any, impact on inerrancy is
because most of the "critical theologians have merely
knocked down a 'straw man'
position undisturbed.1,1

. - . and left the conservative

In view of that fact, Setzer

strongly suggests that to be effective, an analysis of
inerrancy must include an investigation of the
presuppositions on which the idea is built.3

A

presupposition is here understood to denote a premise,

a

concept, or idea that controls, influences, conditions, and
logically comes prior to another.

A presupposition does not

especially in America, and an “importation into the term
'fundamentalism' everything he finds to be odious in
evangelical Christianity" (review of Fundamentalism, by
James Barr, part 1, Christianity Today 22 (June 2, 1978):
23—25).
See also parts 2 and 3 in the same jo u r n a l , 22
(June 23, 1978): 25, and 22 (July 21, 1978): 29-32; and
William W. Wells, "Blasting Bible Believers," review of
Fundamental i s m , by James Barr, Christianity Today 22 (June
2, 1978): 30-34.
Commenting on The Inspiration of Scripture by Paul
Achtemeier, L. Russ Bush writes that the author "comes
close, yet at crucial points fails to grasp the heart of
evangelical m e t h o d s ” (review in Southwestern Journal of
Theoloov 24 [Fall 1982]: 107).
It has also been observed by
Geisler that "despite a claim to the contrary (p. 178),
Achtemeier does not take either the Bible or the
conservative scholars seriously" (review in Bibliotheca
Sacra 138 [April 1981]: 179).
"■John S. Setzer, "A Critique of the Fundamentalist
Doctrine of the Inerrancy of the Biblical Autographs in
Historical, Philosophical, Exegetical and Hermeneutical
Perspective" (Ph. D. d i s s . , Duke University, 1965), Preface,
xxi.
He adds on the same page that "The general
ineffectiveness of the small amount of anti—inerrancy
polemic that critical scholars have produced thus far [by
1965] is due to an unperceptive methodology which permits
them to attack a position the essence of which they do not
sufficiently comprehend" (ibid.).
3Setzer,

"A Critique of Fundamentalist Doctrine,"

104.

r ~
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always surface in the discussions of the idea that it
influences.

It is simply assumed most of the time.1

□ne of the ideas which have been suggested as
constituting a presupposition on which inerrancy stands is
the concept of divine sovereignty.

Various writers have

made direct and indirect allusions to this fact.3
literature,

Survey of

however, seems to reveal at least three reasons

why an additional study on how inerrancy presupposes
sovereignty is needed.

First, the resources available on

the subject consist mainly of short articles which do not
analyze thoroughly the issues involved in the proposition
that the concept of inerrancy presupposes the concept of
divine sovereignty.3

Second,

the few important

contributions available on the subject interpret the
connection between inerrancy and sovereignty in a manner
1For a definition of the term presupposition, see
Josef de Vries, "Presupposition," Philosophical Dictionary.
ed. Walter Brugger and ed. and trans. Kenneth Baker
(Spokane, Washington: Gonzaga University Press, 1972), 320.
3See Randall Basinger and David Basinger,
"Inerrancy, Dictation and the Freewill Debate," Evangelical
Quarterly 55 (July 1983): 177—80; Geisler, "A Response to
Basinger Brothers," Evanoelical Quarterly 57 (1985): 349—
53; D u 11e s , Models of Revelation. 40; Dewey M . Beeg1e , The
Inspiration of Scripture (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1963), 167—9; id., Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1973), 264—7; Clark H.
Pinnock, The Scripture Principle (San Francisco: Harper &
Row, 1984), 100— 5; Setzer, "A Critique of Fundamentalist
Doctrine," 106—76; L. Russ Bush, “The Roots of Conservative
Perspectives on Inerrancy (Warfield)," in The Proceedings
1 9 8 7 . 273—88; D. Clair Davis, "Inerrancy and Westminster
Calvinism," in Harvie M. Conn, e d ., Inerrancy and
Hermeneutic: A Tradition. A Challenge. A Debate (Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1988), 35—46.
3 Ibid.
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that could easily jettison biblical authority.1
few case studies exist on the subject.3

Third, very

Case studies are

generally helpful in that they are more specific and less
likely to make a caricature of others'

views.3

Case studies

are also useful in establishing general patterns in an area
of study so that valid and w e 11-supported inferences can be
made.
This study is based r>n the writings of Carl F. H.
Henry.

The appropriateness of selecting Carl Henry as a

case study arises out of a number of factors.

As a major

contemporary thinker whose contributions in theology cannot
xSetzer, for example, states that " . . . the copies
and translations [of the Bible] are errant" (ibid., 139). He
writes of
. . errors in the overwhelming proportion of
the books that historically have passed as his [ G o d ' s ] word
. . ." (i b i d .).
Further, after citing a list of "errors" in the
Bible, Setzer also writes: "It may by concluded that the
exhibition of these nineteen exemplary apparent
contradictions sufficiently demonstrate that the Bible is
replete with too many confusing and textually insoluble
formal problems to be the totally supernatural product that
fundamentalists believe it to be" (ibid., 283).
It seems to me that with these remarks, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to offer a viable rationale
for affirming a strong biblical authority in matters of
theology, ethics, and Christian experience.
“Apart from a dissertation by John Setzer in which a
complete chapter is devoted to an analysis of the connection
between inerrancy and sovereignty in the writings of
Cornelius Van Til, Edward Carnell, and Gordon Clark, I have
not come across any other case studies on the subject.
See
Setzer, 106—76.
3 In the case of inerrancy, there are various
differences between advocates of this concept and it is not
likely that a general approach to the subject will not
misinterpret certain specific details of some advocates.

f
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go unnoticed (1 Henry is widely recognized as an authentic
representative of an important section of Protestant
Christianity in America,

the conservative evangelicals.3

It

seems safe to assume, on this basis, that to know Henry is
one way of understanding American evangelicalism.3

Henry's

^During the last decade, Carl Henry has received
much attention in scholarly circles.
His magnum o p u s . B o d .
Revelation and A u t hority. 6 vols. (Waco, Texas: Word Books,
1976-B3) has been reviewed in various journals by more than
twenty theologians in America and Europe.
They all
recognize the series as a landmark in conservative
evangelical theology in America.
In addition, more than ten
dissertations have been written or based on Henry's ideas.
Four of these are particularly notable: Larry D. Sharp,
"Carl Henry: A Neo—evangelical Theologian" (n.p., 1972);
Richard Allan Purdy, "Carl Henry and Contemporary
Apologetics: An Assessment of the Rational Apologetic
Methodology of Carl F. H. Henry in the Context of the
Current Impasse between Reformed and Evangelical
Apologetics," (Ph. D. d i s s . , New York University, 1980);
Miroslav M. Kis, "Revelation and Ethics: Dependence,
Interdependence or Independence? A Comparative Study of
Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl F. H. Henry" (Ph. D. diss., McGill
University, 1984); and Thomas Reginald M c N e a l , "A Critical
Analysis of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of Carl F.
H. Henry," (Ph. D. diss., Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, 1986).
aCarl Henry has been referred to as "the honored
dean of evangelical theologians" by Kenneth S. Kantzer,
review of God. Revelation and Authority, by Carl Henry,
Christianity Today 27 (May 20, 1983), 72.
Henry's
biographer, Bob Patterson, describes Henry as the
evangelicals' "outstanding theological spokesman . . . who
best represents the characteristics of evangelical thought
. . ." (Makers of Modern Theological Mind: Carl F. H. Henry
[Waco, Texas: Word Books Publishers 19B3], 18).
Henry has
written about thirty books and edited more than ten others
(see bibliography at the end of this study).
He has also
written numerous articles for symposiums and scholarly
journals.
3The conservative evangelicals in America whom Henry
represents form the moderate right group in the Protestant
movement.
They distinguish themselves from
“fundamentalists" who constitute the extreme right of the
movement.
For the history of the two groups, including
their similarities and differences, see Harold J. Ockenga,
"From Fundamentalism, Through New Evangelicalism, to
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prolific writing also provides new insights that call for a
fresh look at the correlation between inerrancy and divine
sovereignty.1
Evangelicalism," in Evangelical R o o t s , ed. Kenneth S.
Kantzer (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, Publishers, 1978), 35—
46; and Ronald H. Nash, The New Evangelicalism (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1963), 13—32.
For an
analysis of the place that conservative evangelicals occupy
in the religious and social life of contemporary America,
see Richard G. Hutcheson, Jr., Mainline Churches and the
Evangelicals: A Challenging Crisis? (Atlanta: John Knox
Press, 19S1); and James Davison Hunter, American
Evangelical ism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of
Modernity (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1983).
1Henry is mentioned by John Setzer in his study (p.
37, n.) but Setzer assumes that whatever Henry had to say on
inerrancy and sovereignty or the correlation between the two
is sufficiently covered in his analysis of Van Til, Clark,
and Carnell.
However, despite certain basic similarities
between Henry and the three theologians— due to their
orientation in the Calvinistic tradition— Henry is critical
of various aspects of Van Til's and Carnell's theologies in
his major work, which was published more than ten years
after Setzer completed his dissertation.
See, for example,
God. Revelation and Authority. 1:236—8; henceforth cited as
GRA.
Further dissociation of Henry from the theologians
studied by Setzer is made by Richard Purdy who presents Van
Til and Clark as defenders of the traditional Reformed
dogmatics while Henry and Norman Geisler are presented as
evangelical theologians whose methodology is a significant
departure from the traditional Reformed theology (see Purdy,
"Carl Henry and Contemporary Apologetics").
These
differences seem to be important enough to warrant a study
of the same question which Setzer investigated with Carl
Henry specifically in mind.
It cannot be overlooked, however, that Setzer may
have left Henry out of his study due to the fact that
Henry's writings before 1965 were mainly on areas other than
the doctrine of revelation (John Setzer, "A Critique of
Fundamentalist Doctrine," 137).
Investigation seems to
indicate that not until the publication of God. Revelation
and Authority did Henry's contribution to the subjects of
inerrancy and sovereignty become clear.
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a
Purpose of the Study
This study is a descriptive analysis of the concepts
of inerrancy and sovereignty as they are found in the
writings of Carl F. H. Henry for the purpose of determining
how inerrancy presupposes the concept of sovereignty.
Implications of the study are then made on the basis of that
analysis.
Delimitations of the Study
This study has three main delimitations.

First,

the

project is undertaken primarily in the interest of the idea
of inerrancy.

Certainly, both concepts of inerrancy and

sovereignty are analyzed in their own right as individual
ideas in order to make their meanings clear and distinct,
but the final observations and conclusions are made with the
significance of the study to the idea of inerrancy in mind.
Second,

this study is limited to those aspects of

the two concepts which have a bearing on how inerrancy
presupposes sovereignty.

It is recognized that the two

concepts involve much more than can be covered in this
study.

Thus, many related issues are either left out or

briefly mentioned to maintain the thematic coherence of the
investigation.1

Care has been taken,

however,

to ensure

that the observations and conclusions made are in harmony
with the wider scope of the two concepts.
E x a m p l e s of these issues are topics such as
scriptural canon, infallibility, archaeology, historical
criticism, hermeneutics, divine attributes, election,
predestination, foreknowledge, miracles, etc.
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Third,

the study is not intended to validate or

contravene Henry's concepts of inerrancy, sovereignty, or
the connection between them.

In other wards,

this study is

not intended to show if or not Henry's views are correct.
That is a task of future commentators on the subject.
Presently, the evaluation which is included is in connection
with the analysis of Henry's views for the purpose of
determining the nature of the correlation between inerrancy
and sovereignty.
M e t h o d o 1ogv
This presentation is based primarily on what Henry
has written in his six—volume series, God. Revelation and
Au t h o r i t y .*

The scries is a rich resource of Henry's ideas

on inerrancy and sovereignty and represents the most concise
and mature thoughts of Henry on theological subjects.
view of this,

In

I have opted to concentrate an the six volumes

□ue to limitations of time and space.
The idea under investigation in this study,
inerrancy presupposes sovereignty,

i.e. how

is not stated in explicit

AAs stated previously, the series is referred to as
GRA in the study.
The volume number and page reference(s)
follow that abbreviation.
The first volume is a philosophical prolegomenon
that deals with questions of theological method.
In it,
Henry surveys various contemporary approaches to theology
and concludes that the survival of Christianity is dependent
on a clear recognition of propositional revelation in the
Bible.
In vols. 2—4, Henry deals with the doctrine of
revelation while, in the last two volumes he focuses
attention on the doctrine of God.
Henry gives his
exposition on the major doctrines of evangelical faith in
the context of the doctrine of G g H .

F
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terms by Carl Henry.1

If that were the case, the need to

investigate his views in a study like this would be less
compelling.

In view of this fact, a research methodology

has been adopted which aims at making explicit what is
implicit.

First,

it consists of a descriptive analysis of

the two concepts as they are found in GRft.

This stage of

the investigation seeks to make Henry's views clear and
distinct.

Second, methodology includes also an

interpretation of the two concepts from the perspective of
those elements in them and facts about them that point
toward the idea that inerrancy presupposes sovereignty.
Third, an evaluation of the idea that inerrancy presupposes
sovereignty in Henry is made on the basis of the evidence
presented in the first two stages of the methodology.
Overview of Study
This study is divided into five chapters.
present introductory chapter,

After the

two chapters are devoted to a

descriptive analysis of each of the two concepts under
investigation in this study.

In chapter 2, the idea of

inerrancy is examined in terms of Henry's theological
heritage,

the meaning of inerrancy and the place of

inerrancy in the theology of Henry.

Chapter 3 has its focus

on Henry's concept of divine sovereignty.

Brief remarks are

made concerning the background behind Henry's understanding
xEach of the two concepts has several pages devoted
to it in the series (see G R A . 4:162— 21*? for inerrancy and
ibid., 5:307—33 for sovereignty) but nowhere does Henry
state clearly that the two chapters are connected in any
manner.

i
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of this concept.

Particular attention is given, however,

to

the meaning of the concept and its role in Henry's theology.
Chapter 4 is an analytical and interpretive
evaluation of the evidence from the previous two chapters
and other relevant material from Henry's series for the
purpose of clarifying the sense in which inerrancy
presupposes sovereignty in Carl Henry.

In the conclusion,

which is chapter 5, the theme of the study is summarized,
implications of the study highlighted and suggestions made
for further exploration of the questions raised in this
investigation.

It is hoped that this presentation will help

to clarify some of the issues which surround the concept of
inerrancy.
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CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF INERRANCY
The subject which concerns us in this study is the
sense in which Henry's concept of inerrancy presupposes his
concept of sovereignty.

Since the basic question involves a

relationship between two concepts, it is assumed that the
connection requires a clear description and analysis of the
ideas being connected.

In this case, attention is given

first to the meaning and significance of the concepts of
inerrancy and sovereignty as independent ideas in order to
better appreciate and understand the connection between
them.

The present chapter on inerrancy and the following

one on sovereignty are devoted to the clarification of the
two concepts as these are found in Henry's GRA.
The concept of inerrancy is one of the distinctive
aspects of Henry's theology.

Its significance is readily

noticeable in Henry's own words that inerrancy is
"theoretically and practically i m p o r t a n t . I n
a statement,

view of such

the need to investigate the meaning of

inerrancy and the reasons why it seems so important to Henry
cannot be overemphasized.

Undoubtedly,

not everything that

Henry writes about inerrancy can possibly be presented here
^GRA, 4:209.

12
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as t h a t Mould entail

a w i d e r c o v e r a g e of material

int ended in this study.

However,

than is

e f f o r t s are m a d e at saying

e n o u g h on the c o n c e p t to ma k e its core s t r u c t u r e clear.

Discussion on inerrancy is here divided into five
main sections.

The first one is introductory.

It briefly

shows the sources from which Henry draws most of his basic
arguments for inerrancy.

The second consists of an analysis

of inerrancy from the perspective of the basic concepts
which constitute its meaning.
continuation of the second.

The third is, in a sense, a
It further clarifies the

meaning of inerrancy by answering the question of the extent
or scope of biblical inerrancy.

The fourth seeks to set the

concept of inerrancy in the wider context of Henry's
theology and to assess the role which it plays in that
theology.

Finally, a conclusion is made on the basis of

those aspects of Henry's concept of inerrancy which point in
the direction of the purpose of this study.
Inerrancy and Henry's Sources
Henry maintains that inerrancy is not a novel idea
which he or other contemporary evangelicals have created in
the twentieth century.1

For him, inerrancy has always been

the historic position of the church from the earliest to
modern times.2

It was the view held by Jesus and original

1See ibid., 4:367, 369.
2Henry refers to inerrancy as "the historic
commitment of the Christian church" (ibid., 4:367).
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Bible writers.1

Church fathers, and particularly Augustine,

and reformers also viewed the Bible as inerrant.2
Henry,

For

"Christian churches throughout the centuries have

maintained the concept of inerrancy."3
However, while he views inerrancy as an idea
originating in Bible times, Henry recognizes that inerrancy
was not fully developed as a theological concept until a
more recent past.'*

It seems that the reason for this

situation was that before eighteenth century, at least in
America,

inerrancy of Scripture was generally assumed and,

as such, it was not an issue that called for detailed
1Henry states, “The doctrine of scriptural inerrancy
is in fact implicit in the New Testament and in the very
teaching of Jesus, and before that, even in the Old
Testament" (ibid., 4:370).
aHenry does not state that the fathers taught
inerrancy as such, but he argues that their views of
Scripture excluded error in Scripture.
Some of the fathers
on whose views he comments are Clement of Rome (30— 100),
Polycarp (65— 155), Justin Martyr (110— 165), Iranaeus (120—
202), Tertullian (145—220), Origen (185— 254), Chrysostom
(347-407), and Augustine (354—430).
As far as the reformers
(and the Protestant orthodox theologians after them) are
concerned, Henry contends that they were all inerrantists
(ibid., 4:370-2).
3 Ibid., 4:384.
By Christian churches, Henry seems
to mean the Apostolic Church, Roman Catholic Church (until
Vatican II), the Reformers, and "classic evangelicalism.”
See ibid., 4:369—80.
*Henry writes that "While the Reformers emphasize
the authority, power, clarity and self—authenticating nature
of Scripture, they do not delineate any detailed doctrine of
inspiration and inerrancy.
This latter was done by
seventeenth century Lutheran theologians.
In America the
doctrine of inerrancy became influential through L.
G a u s s e n ’s Theooneustia and the teaching of Charles Hodge and
B. B. Warfield and the so-called Princeton School" (ibid.,
4:369).
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descriptions and discussion.1

For Henry,

the rise of

secularizing influence of enlightenment which led to the
undermining of the authority of the Bible motivated
Christian thinkers to see the need for a systematic
exposition and defence of the idea of inerrancy.®

As

evidence seems to indicate, Henry considers the theologians
of the Princeton Theological Seminary, and Benjamin B.
Warfield,

in particular, as the main architects of inerrancy

as a theological concept.3

This brief historical background

AH. D. McDonald states, "Prior to the year 1860, the
idea of infallibly inerrant Scripture was the prevailing
idea" (Theories of Revelations An Historical Study. 1860—
1960 CLondon:
George Allen & Unwin, 1963], 196).
For a
detailed study on how the critical spirit of the modern era
led to undermining inerrancy, see Geisler*, ed., Biblical
Errancv; An Analysis of Its Philosophical Roots (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1981).
See also Peter
Maarten Van Bemmelen, Issues in Biblical Inspiration: Sandav
and Warfield (Berrien Springs, Michigan: Andrews University
Press, 1987), 17-117.
“Henry wonders if it was not during the age of
Enlightenment that scholars "abandoned the tenets of
transcendent divine revelation and special inspiration of
the Bible" (GRA, 4:386).
He agrees with Harold Lindsell
that “The doctrine of biblical inerrancy has been normative
since the days of the apostles. . . . It was not until the
last century and a half that the opponents of inerrancy . .
- have become a dominant force in Christianity" (ibid.,
4 :367 ) .
3See ibid., 4:84, 163, 165, 253.
Henry maintains
that Warfield's concept of inerrancy is impeccable and that
to qualify it is to weaken it (ibid., 4:165).
The
connection between Henry and the Princetonians has been made
also by Donald G. Bloesch, review of G R A . vols. 3 & 4,
Christian Century 97 (April 9, 1980): 414-5; and Alan
Padgett, review of GRA, vols. 1—6, Journal of American
Academy of Religion 52 (Dec. 1984): 7B5— 6.
The foundational role which Warfield played in
formulating the concept of inerrancy is widely recognized.
Roger Nicole, a contemporary advocate of inerrancy, writes,
"Indeed Warfield is one of the most notable and articulate
modern advocates of the doctrine of biblical inspiration and
inerrancy . . . "
See his article, "The Inspiration of

r
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is important for an understanding and appreciation of the
reason why Henry mentions Warfield so frequently in his
expositions on inerrancy.1

Not all of Henry's references to

Warfield are covered here but those deemed significant are
briefly mentioned in the appropriate contexts.
Another important source of Henry's concept of
inerrancy is Gordon H. Clark.3

Henry remembers Clark as

"one of the most brilliant faculty me m b e r s ” during his
College days at Wheaton in Illinois.*

The influence of

Clark on Henry is readily admitted by Henry himself"* and
Scriptures J. D. Dunn versus B. B. W a r f i e l d Churchman 97
(19B3): 19B.
Barr, a critic of inerrancy, remarks along
similar lines that "A conservative evangelical bibliography
will almost certainly have Warfield's name on its list of
authorities for the doctrine of Scripture; and any other
names there are will in all probability have got their
thoughts from Warfield" (Fundamental i s m . 262).
For an
evaluation of Warfield and his colleagues at Princeton in
regard to their role in defending inerrancy from a
historical perspective, see George M. Marsden,
Fundamentalism and American Cultures The Shaping of
Twentieth—Century Evangelicalism 1870— 1925 (Oxfords
Oxford
University Press, 1980), 113— 116.
1The main references to Warfield are in two
consecutive chapters in vol. 4 entitled, "The Inerrancy of
Scripture" and "The Meaning of Inerrancy" (G R A . 4:162—210).
3A partial bibliography of Gordon Clark's
publications (up to I960) is given by Ronald Nash, e d ., The
Philosophy of Gordon H. Clarks A Festschrift (Philadelphias
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1968), 513—6.
Clark's most important essays on Scripture have been
compiled posthumously by John W. Robbins in Gordon H. Clark,
God's Hammers The Bible and Its Critics (Jefferson,
Maryland: Trinity Foundation, 19B7).
3Carl F. H. Henry, Confessions of a Theologians An
Autobiography (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1986), 66—67, 71.
*After expressing his indebtedness to "scholars of
various traditions," Henry writes, “To no contemporary do I
owe profounder debt, however, than to Gordon Clark, as
numerous index references will attest. . . . He has offered

r
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acknowledged by reviewers of God. Revelation, and
A u t h o r i t y .*

It comes as no surprise,

then, that Clark

defends Henry's doctrine of Scripture against those who
criticize it.2

A study of Clark's view on inerrancy is not

intended in this study as that endeavor falls outside the
scope of this study.3

However, as in the case of Warfield,

a few references to Clark are made where it is deemed
appropriate and when a statement from him helps to clarify a
point in Henry.
The Meaning of Inerrancy
"The meaning of inerrancy" is a phrase that Henry
himself uses as a title of one of the chapters in vol. 4 of
God. Revelation, and Authority.-*

In that chapter, Henry

describes the meaning of inerrancy in terms of what
"scriptural inerrancy does not imply" and what "inerrancy
does imply."
positive ones.

There are five negative implications and four
The chapter is then followed by a

“Supplementary Note" which is a reproduction of "The Chicago
Statement on Biblical

Inerrancy" formulated in 1978.

While

helpful comments on many of the chapters.” (GRA., 1:10).
xSee Padgett, review, 785—6; and James Daane, review
of G R A . vol. 3, Reformed Journal 30 (May 1980): 27— 29.
2See Clark, G o d 's H a m m e r . 175—85.
In a critique of
one review of G R A . Clark here writes of "Henry—Clark
position," "Henry—Clark view," and "Henry—Clark defence of
Biblical inerrancy."
He also states that "Henry and I are
in extensive agreement" (ibid., 175, 180, 185).
3The reader is referred to the bibliography of
Gordon Clark cited above for further reading.
'‘GRA, 4:201-19.

Ir
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the task of this section seems to be simplified by the
contents of that chapter, other factors militate against a
mere paraphrase of Mhat Henry writes there.
For one thing,

the chapter does not deal adequately

with the fundamental concepts that underlie inerrancy in
Henry.1

Therefore,

another approach to the meaning of

inerrancy is needed which will bring together the various
significant ideas on inerrancy from that chapter as well as
from other sections in Henry's series.

For yet another

reason, a different approach is demanded by the goals of
this study which are certainly of a different character from
Henry's.

As an apologist, Henry seeks to clarify various

misunderstandings over inerrancy and to vindicate inerrancy
as a logically defensible position.

I am concerned about

the fundamental concepts that sustain inerrancy and the
grounds on which the idea stands.
This section consists of two sub— sections.

The

first one identifies the referent to which Henry applies the
term "inerrancy."

That identification is significant.

It

delimits the discussion in the whole chapter to a particular
referent.

The other sub—section identifies the meaning of

"inerrancy" in Henry.

In that section,

the main ideas which

constitute the concept of inerrancy are described and on
that basis a working definition of the term "inerrancy" is
p rovided.
AThe chapter seems mainly to address various
misunderstandings of the term "inerrancy" (ibid.).

r~
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The Inerrant Referent
Henry states clearly that the term inerrancy is not
to be indiscriminately applied to anything and everything
called Christian Scriptures.1

He distinguishes between

autographs— i.e., original manuscripts of the Bible— and
copies,

or apographs made from original manuscripts,

translations from one language to another, and versions
(variant renderings of the Bible in the same language).a
According to Henry, autographs are the only writings which
have the characteristic of inerrancy.

The reason for this

is that they “have a theooneustic quality."3
words,

In other

the autographs alone were “breathed o u t ” or inspired

by God.-*

Consequently,

the apographs cannot be inerrant

1 Ibid., 4:220.
3 Ibid., 4:231.
3 Ibid., 4:233.
"*Ibid, 4:131.
The Greek rendering, theooneustos. is
used by Paul in 2 Tim 3:16.
It is mostly translated as
"inspired by God"— see, for example, King James Version,
Revised Standard Version, New English Bible, New Jerusalem
Bible.
A few versions translate the word as "God— breathed"—see, for example, New International Version, The Amplified
Bible— a phrase which Henry uses quite frequently.
Linguistically, theooneustos is a compound adjective
comprising the noun theos. meaning God, and the adj'ective
oneustos which is derived from the aorist stem of the verb
oneo. meaning to breathe.
See H. Wayne House, "Biblical
Interpretation of 2 Timothy 3:16," Bibliotheca Sacra 137
(Jan-Mar 1980): 57-5B; C. S p i c q , O.P., Les Eoitres
Pastorales, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1969), 7BB.
Benjamin Warfield made a thorough analysis of the
word theooneustos in defending the view that Scripture is
"God—s p i r i t e d ," "God— breathed," and "produced by the
creative breath of God."
See Benjamin B. Warfield, "Godinspired Scripture," The Presbyterian Review 11:89— 130.
The
article is reprinted as chap. 6 in Warfield's The
Inspiration and the Authority of Bible, ed. Samuel G. Craig
(Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company,

r
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because the term “inspiration" refers not to them but to the
original manuscripts of the Bible.

According to Henry,

apographs are infallible, not inerrant.1
The shift of language from inerrant autographs to
infallible apographs has been pointed to by critics as a
weakness in the inerrancy position.*
an admission, first,

They argue that it is

that inerrancy cannot be proved since

the autographs are no longer extant and, second,
are errors in the Bible which we possess.3

that there

In response,

Henry asserts that the shift in language does not weaken the
inerrancy position.

For him, it is a mere recognition of

1940), 245-96.
Warfield's article has become the standard
interpretation of the word theooneustos for many
conservative evangelicals, Henry not excluded.
See examples
in Gordon H. Clark, The Pastoral Epistles (Jefferson,
Maryland: Trinity Foundation, 1983), 179—05; Edward W.
Goodrick, "Let's Put 2nd Timothy 3:16 Back in the Bible,"
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 25 (Oec
1982), 479-07; Harold Lindsell, The Battle for the Bible
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1976), 34; and
Rene Pache, The Inspiration and Authority of Scripture,
trans. Helen I. Needham (Chicago: Moody Press, 1969), 45—
46.
1GRA., 4:244.
Warfield made the connection between
inerrancy and the autographs in two articles: "The Inerrancy
of the Original Autographs" and "The Westminster Confession
and the Original Autographs," in Benjamin B. Warfield,
Selected Shorter k‘~
’.nos of Beniamin B. W a r f i e l d , e d . John
E. Meeter (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1973), 2:580—
594; henceforth cited as Shorter Writings. He, however,
expressed that the phrase "'the inerrancy of the original
autographs' is not an altogether happy one . . . as to the
entire truthfulness of the Scriptures as given by God"
(ibid., 2:582).
Henry does not express any such caution.
2See Achtemeier, The Inspiration of S c r ipture. 52,
53;
Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility. 156—
8;
Setzer, "A Critique of Fundamentalist Doctrine," 141— 5.
3Achtemeier,

The Inspiration of S c r ipture. 52— 53.

f
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the fact that apographs are not directly inspired by God.*
Further, the fact that these apographs are not inerrant does
not mean that they are errant.3

They still remain

"infallible" in the sense that “the Bible remains virtually
unchanged and its teaching undimned."3

For Henry, what

critics usually call errors in the Bible are not errors as
such but only difficulties which can be resolved when all
the relevant information an the passages in question has
been brought together.'*
1SRfl. 4:233.
What Henry asserts about the apographs
is that they have been "providentially preserved" throughout
the centuries (ibid., 4:247).
3 Ibid., 4:233.
3 Ibid., 4:235.
*Ibid., 4:173.
Henry here refers to Warfield as
having defended this position.
The reference is, possibly,
to an article written jointly by Archibald A. Hodge and
Warfield in 1B61, and recently compiled with other related
articles by Nicole in Inspiration (Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 1979), 40—61.
The particular section in question
here was written by Warfield himself.
In order to buttress this position, Henry adds that
the number of so-called errors in the copies diminishes as
one moves textually in the direction of the lost autographs
(ibid., 4:354).
The view which Henry expresses here is
representative of the position held by most conservative
evangelical theologians.
See, for example, the response and
comments of Gleason L. Archer on twenty alleged errors in
the Bible: "Alleged Errors and Discrepancies in the Original
Manuscripts of the Bible," in Inerrancy. ed. Geisler (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1979), 55—82.
Archer,
like Henry, denies that there are any "genuine mistakes" or
"demonstrable errors" of any sort in the original
manuscripts.
It has even been suggested by James A.
Bollard, a conservative evangelical, that the alleged errors
are a result of textual criticism which is confined to a few
early manuscripts and which ignores thousands of other
manuscripts, each bearing independent testimony to the
inerrancy of the autographs.
See his article, “Re— examining
New Testament Textual—Critical Principles and Practices Used
to Negate Inerrancy," The Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 25 (Dec 1982): 499-506.
The 1978
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Henry also minimizes the difference between the
autographs and the apographs by maintaining that there is a
vital

link between them.1

He contends that the apographs

"Chicago Statement on Inerrancy" by conservative theologians
sums this point well in Article XIV; "We deny that alleged
errors and discrepancies that have not yet been resolved
vitiate the truth claims of the Bible" (Beisler, ed.,
Inerrancy. 497).
^-Undoubtedly, Henry urges evangelicals tc- "put at
least some slight distance between . . . the oldest extant
copies and the autographs" (GRA., 4:232).
For him, "modern
textual scholars themselves disagree over the most reliable
family of available copies; neither the oldest nor the most
prevalent texts available to us from the past can be
considered the final criteria of the original text and
equated with the inerrant autographs" (ibid., 4:235).
He
identifies some of the errors in the copies as "skipped or
duplicated words, misspellings, use of a wrong word due to a
copyist's misunderstanding of dictation, faulty judgment or
memory (recollection of the text in a different form or
insertion of a marginal note into the body of the text)
. . . addition of vowel symbols and punctuation marks . . .
inclusion of grammatical or linguistic updating, and in some
texts even elimination of an apparent incongruity or an
attempted harmonization of passages" (ibid.).
Yet, Henry
asserts, "none of these alterations . . . need involve a
change in theological substance" (ibid.).
Further, despite
"whatever uncertainties copying has contributed" (ibid.,
232), the "text of Old and New Testaments has been preserved
in the copies in a remarkably pure form.
Not a single
article of faith, not a single moral precept is in doubt"
(ibid., 4:232, 235-6).
Before Henry, Warfield had already distinguished
between "autographic codex" and "autographic text" of
Scripture in clarifying the point that, in essence,
inerrancy continue in the copies also.
See Warfield on this
in Shorter W r i t i n g s . 2:583.
Following Warfield's path, Greg
L. Bahnsen explains the "autographic text" as the words of
Scripture and "autographic codex" as the physical document
of Scripture.
He adds, "Loss of the latter does not
automatically entail loss of the former.
Certain
manuscripts may have decayed or been lost, but the words of
these manuscripts are still with us in good copies."
See
his article, "The Inerrancy of the Autographa," in
Inerrancy. e d . Geisler, 172—3.
Henry does not use that
terminology.
However, his statements that "acknowledgement
of error in the copies and translations does not require
insistence on error in the text of Scripture per se" (G R A .
4:253) and that "scribal errors . . . are to be
distinguished from errors in Scripture per se" (ibid.,

F
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are efficacious and authoritative today only because there
once existed inerrant autographs.1

for our present

purposes, Me Mill not folloM this discussion further since
focus is not on infallibility of the apographs but on the
inerrancy of the autographs.

Suffice it here to state that

the shift of language— from inerrant autographs to
infallible apographs— helps to clarify the fact that the
term "inerrancy," as it is used in this study, has the
original autographs as its primary referents.
Mhat Inerrancy Means
To clarify the meaning of inerrancy in Henry, this
section seeks to bring together his main ideas from the
chapter on “The Meaning of Inerrancy" and to correlate these
Mith other relevant data on the subject from the rest of
Henry's series.

Inerrancy is here described as signifying

an attribute of Scripture, a quality of biblical
propositions, an absence of error, and a presence of truth.3
4:358) are perfectly compatible Mith above distinctions.
A c c o r d i n g to Henry, "The promotion of original
errancy [that the autographs erred] . . . encourages
selective and creative rearrangement of the biblical data
that soon frustrate the purpose of Scripture ordained for
the infallible copies.
The affirmation of errant originals
jeopardizes both the epistemological and the evangelistic
utility of the copies and translations because the thesis of
prophetic-apostolic errancy is repeatedly correlated Mith
the superiority of contemporary ecclesiastical gnosis.
All
the infallible functions of confessedly errant copies are
easily subverted once the errancy of the autographs is
affirmed. . ." (G R A . 4:234).
aThese seem to be the most important and
representative significations of the term "inerrancy" in
Henry's theology.
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While .no single definition can do justice to the Mhole range
of significations of the word “inerrancy,"1 a working
definition will be attempted at the end of this section.
Inerrancy as an Attribute of Scripture
For Henry, Scripture is essentially the Word of God
written.

Henry recognizes the fact that this Word was often

spoken before it was written down.
written forms of the Word,

To both spoken and

he accords equal authority.2

But

it is evident that Henry considers the written or
“inscripturated" Word of God as the most significant locus
of God's revelation.3

The reason Henry gives for this point

is that what is written,

in contrast to what is spoken,

a certain "fixity and durability.”-*

It seems,

has

therefore,

■
‘■This is my opinion based on investigation of the
concept of inerrancy in Henry.
Other attempts to define the
word "inerrancy" have also shown that there is no such a
thing as a short and precise definition of the term.
See
Paul D. Feinberg, "The Meaning of Inerrancy," in Inerrancy.
e d . Norman Geisler, 265— 304;
Stephen T. Davis, The Debate
about the Bible; Inerrancy versus Infallibility
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 23—48; and J.
Ramsey Michaels, "Inerrancy or Verbal Inspiration? An
Evangelical Dilemma,” in Inerrancy and Common S e n s e , e d .
Roger R. Nicole & J. Ramsey Michaels (Grand Rapids: Baker
Book House, 1980), 49-70.
3See G R A . 4:32-40.
3The word "revelation" is used in the study to
denote the whole content of knowledge which God has made
available to man through various means.
Further comments on
revelation are given below.
*Henry stresses that "Writing obviously implies a
permanence greater than that of the nonwritten, spoken word"
(ibid., 4:37).
For him, "the written word" has a certain
"fixity and durability" (ibid.).
Further, the "i.:-jt>ired
scriptural writings only transmit the prophetic—apostolic
message in permanent form" (ibid., 4:37—38).
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that for Henry,

the" Bible is the document of revelation and

the inscripturated Word of G o d . 1

It is real and also

objective.3
Consequently,

like any other real object,

is a book which possesses particular attributes,

the Bible
properties,

qualities or characteristics that distinguish it from other
literature.

These attributes include, among others,

perspicuity, efficacy, objective intelligibility,
sufficiency of Scripture.3

To these,

and

inerrancy may be

1Henry views Scripture as "a uniquely inspired
literature" and "a body of inspired writings that possess
divine authority" (ibid., 4:406).
He considers the canon of
Scripture as fixed or closed.
This topic is discussed in a
chapter on canon (ibid., 4:405— 49).
2This emphasis on the "Word of God written" is
sometimes characterized by critics as a kind of bibliolatry—
— book worship.
One of the critics who makes this charge is
Heinrich Emil Brunner who states that inerrancy is a type of
bondage to the text that makes the Bible an idol or a
"Paper— pope."
See his book, Revelation and R e a s o n , trans.
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), 11, 1 B 1 .
See Henry's response to this criticism in G R A . 4:139, 381.
3For Henry, "the prophetic—apostolic writings are
addressed to the people, not to professional theologians
only. . . . A l l things necessary to salvation are lucid even
to the unlearned: to common folk everywhere it yields
unclouded doctrinal and moral norms" (G R A . 4:252—3).
Further, the meaning of Scripture "is clear to the mind of
the ordinary reader" (ibid., 258).
On the basis of an
analysis presented by Kis on Henry in this respect, it
appears that perspicuity of Scripture (general clarity of
biblical contents) has tremendous consequences on Henry's
hermeneutics and his understanding of the significance of
human language in expressing divine realities.
See his
dissertation, "Revelation and E thics,” 268.
Henry emphasizes that "The Word of God is a doubleedged sword (Heb 4:2) that does not return to God short of
accomplishing its task (Isa 55:11)."
He continues to state
that "The efficacy of Scripture is a consequence of the
inerrancy of the autographs and an implicate of the
infallibility of the transcripts."
He refers to "Bible's
amazing vitality and character as a spiritual oasis where
men find God seeking, speaking, commanding and inviting
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added.

Although Henry does not state explicitly that

inerrancy is an attribute of Scripture,

the inference seems

clear enough from the close association that he makes
between Scripture and inerrancy.

Volume 4 is especially

replete with phrases such as "scriptural inerrancy,"
"inerrancy of the Bible," and "biblical inerrancy," all of
which are phrases expressing the attributive status of
inerrancy.

Sometimes Henry describes inerrancy as "a

doctrine" which characterizes the Bible as "error— free" and
disallows “the possibility of error from the text of
Scripture."i
As is the case with other attributes, Henry sees in
inerrancy a term that describes a quality which the Bible
possesses as the Word of God.

It denotes "errorless

transmission of the message that God desired them [sacred
them, where he responds to their penitent pleas and bestows
his healing presence" (GRA. 4:249).
Henry writes of Scripture as "transcendent
cognitive— verbal revelation" which acts as a "carrier of
abjective truth transcending our social location in
history.1* For him, "God has intelligibly disclosed his
transcendent will.
The truth of God can be stated in all
cultures; it does not need to be restated in any culture
except by way of linguistic translation and repetition"
(ibid., 4:53).
Further, one need not be a believer to
understand biblical truth (ibid., 1:229).
For Henry, "Special revelation does not continue
sporadically throughout the post— biblical era; it is once—
for— all" (ibid., 4:276).
Henry considers this attribute as
an important one in maintaining a strong authority of
Scripture.
For him, if the canon is only fluid and not
closed, there can be no fixed meanings of biblical truth and
Scripture would, thereby, stop being the final norm in
doctrine and morals (ibid., 4:95).
1 I b i d ., 4:163, 207.
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writers] to communicate to mankind."1
attributes,

But, unlike other

inerrancy is set apart by Henry as a “governing

epistemological principle."3

Henry makes use of this point

in arguing that inerrancy keeps the interpreter of Scripture
from the temptation of distinguishing what is true and false
in Scripture.3

For him, such an enterprise can only be

subjective and arbitrary since there is no obj'ective
criteria for making the distinctions."*

In other words,

while the other attributes generally explain how the Bible
functions as the Mord of God,

inerrancy is really an

a priori attribute of Scripture.

The commitment to biblical

1 Ibid., 4:207.
3 Ibid., 4:238.
Henry does not consider it
unjustifiable in principle when critics charge that
conservative "hermeneutics is assertedly governed by a
prejudiced a priori, that the Bible is inerrant and that its
errorlessness is to be understood principally as
"correspondence with reality" . . .“ (ibid., 4:173).
What
Henry is opposed to is the idea that conservatives alone
approach Scripture with “an exegetical a priori" and the
implication, therefore, that the conservative approach is
not open but closed to the facts at hand.
For him, “One
approaches Scripture either on the premise that its teaching
is reliable unless logical grounds exist for its rejection,
or on the premise that what the Scripture teaches is errant
unless independent grounds can be found for crediting its
content" (ibid.).
Henry compares inerrancy with the
approach used by "scholars who, affirming a major
explanatory hypothesis in the physical sciences, are
confident that apparent factual conflicts can be resolved
within the context of the theory itself and which only
overwhelming incompatible evidence seriously jeopardizes"
(ibid.).
According to Henry, "No scholar views the
phenomena— whether of Scripture or of nature— in terms of
isolated discrete units; some interpretive framework there
must be, if the data are to be coherent and meaningful"
(ibid.).
See also ibid., 4:191.
3See ibid., 4:238.
"*Ibid., 4:181.
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inerrancy,

Tor m?nry, precedes the reading of Scripture.1

In order to explore the meaning of inerrancy more
specifically,

it is appropriate to discuss Henry's concepts

of proposition, error, and truth.

The folljwing three

sub—sections are aimed at fulfilling that purpose.
Inerrancy as a Characteristic
of Biblical Propositions
Henry understands the contents of Scripture in terms
of propositions.3

According to him,

"a proposition is a

verbal statement that is either true or false; it is a
rational declaration capable of being believed, doubted or
denied."3

Other words which Henry uses in a manner that

appears to make them synonymous with propositions are
sentences, judgments,

truths, statements, and information.-*

Henry prefers the concept of "proposition" to other terms in
1Ibid., 4:173.
a It is Henry's conviction that "revelation is
primarily correlated with communication of propositional
truth" (ibid., 3:417).
S Ibid., 3:456.
*1 b i d ., 3:429, 430; 4:198.
The idea of
"proposition" is an aspect of philosophy called deductive
logic.
See Gary Iseminger, ed., Logic and Philosophy:
Selected Readings (New York: Appleton—Century—Crofts, 1968),
3— 34.
Clark used deductive logic in explicating the truth
of scriptural revelation.
For him, truth is logical and
revelation is propositional in a full logico— philosophical
sense.
See Clark's G o d 's H a m m e r . 24—38, 175—85, and the
second of his three lectures given at Wheaton College, "The
Axiom of Revelation," in The Philosophy of Gordon C l a r k , e d .
Ronald Nash, 57—92.
A historical connection between Clark's
and Henry's use of propositional logic, on one hand, and
Aristotelian logic, on the other, has been suggested by Alan
Padgett, review of G R A . 6 vols., TSF Bulletin 9 (Jan—Feb
1986): 28-29.

s--------i
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describing biblical contents for two main reasons.

One

reason is that other passible alternatives— concepts and
words— are limited in their capacity to bring the truth of
Scripture to the forefront.1

Furthermore,

a proposition is

a universal "minimal unit of public meaning and truth."3
an association of a predicate with subject,

As

it can be

"stated externally in print or verbally, or internally
thought and either volitional ly acted upon or disregarded.1,3
In other words, a proposition is a unit of thought that
conveys a complete, objective, and intelligible logical
meaning .
The implications of Henry's assertion that biblical
revelation is propositional may be seen from a number of
related perspectives.

First,

the contents of the Bible are

all explicable in terms of propositions.3

For Henry,

the

1He states that "If revelation is a communication of
sharable truth, it will consist of sentences, propositions,
judgments and not simply isolated concepts, names and words.
To be sure, concepts and words are instrumentalities of
God's disclosure; divine disclosure is conceptual and
verbal.
But neither a concept nor an unrelated word can be
true or false" (G R A . 3:429— 30).
See also ibid., 3:302;
4:202.

“ Ibid., 4:314.
3 Ibid., 4:282.
^Further discussion of the term proposition is
included in chapter 4.
Meanwhile, the proposition refers to
a logico—verbal unit of thought in Scripture which is
capable of being true or false.
Where a proposition is not
explicit in Scripture, it is at least implicit.
3 It is Henry's view that "The inspired Scriptures
contain a body of divinely given information actually
expressed or capable of being expressed in propositions.
In
brief, the Bible is a propositional revelation of the
unchanging truth of God" (ibid., 3:457).
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presence of anthropomorphisms and literary genres in the
Bible— like poetry,

figurative language and symbolism— does

not vitiate the propositional character of scriptural
contents.4

He maintains that even these genres convey valid

and objective truth in the propositional sense.3
“■Henry clarifies the fact that "While evangelicals
insist that theological truth is true in the same sense that
any and all truth is true, they do not ignore the difference
between literary genres.
To imply that evangelicals are
wooden-headed literalists who cannot distinguish between
literary types is a resort to ridicule rather than to
reason.
No evangelical takes literally what biblical
writers explicitly declare to be figurative (cf. Rev 11:8)
or what biblical writers explicitly declare to be figurative
(cf. Rev 11:8) or what they portray metaphorically as, for
example, the Isaiah statement that 'the trees of the field
shall clap their hands' (55:12, KJV).
In no way can the
claim for the literal truth of the biblical revelation mean
that prose is the only vehicle of truth or, on the other
hand, that truth cannot be conveyed by poetry.
That
Scripture contains metaphors, similes, parables and verbal
techniques such as hyperbole in no way excludes the truth of
what the Bible teaches.
Metaphor is used for drama and
color and not because the truth strains the resources of
prose.
Some literary techniques more than others sharpen
the communication of truth by rousing the imagination,
stirring the emotions, and stimulating the will.
Prose does
not wholly lack such potentialities.
Poetry can usually be
restated in prose form; prose is a kind of linguistic
shorthand for poetic expression.
Such statements as 'the
Lord hath made bare his holy arm in the eyes of all the
nations' (Isa 52:10, KJV) or 'the eyes of the Lord are in
every place' (Prov 15:3, KJV) can with little effort be seen
to mean that Vahweh will accomplish his sovereign purpose
internationally, and that nothing is hid from God's
omniscience” (ibid., 4:109).
This passage summarizes Henry's understanding of the
relationship that exists between truth of Scripture and the
various genres of Scripture.
It seems clear that, for him,
intelligible truth is embedded in all literary types and, if
these genres are not propositional in form, they can be
formulated into propositions.
In essence, Henry seems to
argue that genres are only different means of expressing
truth.
a Ibid.
Henry admits that literary units such as
commands and God's name cannot possibly be referred to as
propositional.
However, they can be formulated into
propositional form.
He explains: "Commandments like 'thou

f
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Second,

by referring to biblical revelation as

propositional, Henry appears to mean that the contents of
Scripture are intelligible or rational
According to Henry,

to the human min d . 1

biblical revelation is not some esoteric

or classified information which only the initiated or the
qualified can understand.2

Any reasonable person—

irrespective of whether or not he is a believer

can

shalt not kill' are indeed imperatives, . . . but their
grammatical form does not cancel the fact that revelation is
primarily correlated with communication of propositional
truth.
Imperatives are not as such true or false
proposition; but they can be translated into propositions
(e.g., 'to kill is wrong') from which cognitive inferences
can be drawn" (ibid., 3:417).
Further, "It is the case that
in the Bible God not only reveals sentences, or
propositional truth, but also reveals his Name, or Names,
and that he gives divine commands.
Such disclosures
assuredly are capable of being formulated propositionally,
but that is something other than expressly identifying them
as propositional disclosure.
Yet even the revelation of
God's name requires a meaning— context for intelligibility;
isolated concepts do not convey truths.
Even were God to
say, 'Moses, my Name is Y a h w e h , ' that would be a
proposition. . . . If it is too much to say that divine
revelation must be propositionally given to be both
meaningful and true, it is nonetheless wholly necessary to
insist that divine disclosure does indeed take propositional
form" (ibid., 3:480— 1).
1Henry states that "divine revelation is a mental
act, for it seeks to convey to the mind of man the truth
about the Creator and Lord of life, and to write upon the
spirit of man God's intelligible holy w i l l ” (ibid., 3:271).
Further, Scriptural truth is "rationally persuasive and
defensible" (ibid., 3:280).
=He stresses that "One need not take a master's
degree in biblical theology, nor even read Greek and Hebrew,
to know the sense of most scriptural propositions” (ibid.,
4:267).
In addition Henry emphasizes that "revelational
truth is intelligible, expressible in valid propositions,
and universally communicable" (ibid., 1:229).
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understand the message of the Bible because it is addressed
to man's rationality

.x

Third, propositional revelation implies that the
Bible contains objective knowledge.

For Henry,

biblicax

truth is not different from any other kind of truth.3
is, rather, genuine information about reality.3

It

In this

sense, biblical contents can be related to other kinds of
truth such as history and science and proved to be
compatible with them.'*
Fourth, by virtue of the propositions being rational
and objective, Scriptural truth is capable of being tested
xHenry argues that "If a person must first be a
Christian believer in order to grasp the truth of
revelation, then meaning is subjective and incommunicable”
(ibid., 1:229).
aFor Henry, “theological truth does not differ from
other truth in respect to intelligibility; therefore, truth
must be rationally cognized if it is to be meaningfully
grasped and communicated" (ibid., 1:228).
3Henry stresses that "Scripture's chief sphere is
God's self— revelation of his own nature and will.
Its
primary concern is therefore theological and e t h i c a l . This
is a very extensive range of authority, to which every other
authority claim is subject" (ibid., 4:42).
Yet, Henry
writes, while it is not comprehensive in its coverage of
"subjects like astronomy, botany, economics, geography,
history, and politics, . . . God's Scripture contains
authoritative teaching about many so-called secular matters
. . ." (ibid.).
In addition, "The Bible constitutes a
propositionally consistent revelation whose principles and
logical implications supply a divinely based view of God and
the universe" (ibid., 4:251}.
*Ibid., 1:237.
It is to be noted that, for Henry,
truth and reality are mutually correspondent. According to
Henry, "truth is held to refer to reality” by those, like
Thomas F. Torrance, who advocate "representational
epistemology," while for him, "truth is itself the realitv"
(ibid., 3:222).
It appears, in that case, that truth is the
verbal extension of reality, while reality is knowable only
in terms of truth.
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for validity and truth.1
proposes for biblical
elements.

The testing procedures that Henry

propositions consist of three

The first element seems to be that biblical

propositions must first be arranged into axioms and theorems
for their meanings to come out fully.3

This task is the

domain of theology which has the mandate to explicate
biblical contents in logical

terms.

Henry writes,

Theology, we shall insist, sets out not simply with God
as a speculative presupposition but with God in his
revelation.
But the appeal to God and to revelation
cannot stand alone, if it is to be significant; it must
embrace also some agreement on rational methods of
inquiry, ways of argument, and criteria for
verification.3
It needs to be pointed out at this juncture that the
dividing line between Scripture and theology in Henry is
very thin."*
The second element is Henry's argument that to test
1 In response to some persons who "think that tests
of revelation or truth are highly inappropriate, and that
human creatures ought to accept the divine without
question,"
Henry states that "tests of truth are wholly
appropriate.
The old Testament required the people to
distinguish prophets from pseudoprophets; Jesus warned of
false Christs (John 5:43); and the early Christians had to
discriminate true from false apostles" (ibid., 1:232).
a Ibid., 1:238— 40.
For Henry, "axiomatization is
simply the best means of demonstrating the logical
consistency of a given system of thought, and showing that
all logically dependent theorems flow from the basic axioms"
(ibid., 1:239).
3 Ibid., 1:14.
■^Despite his observation that there exists a
distinction "between the canonical content of revelation and
systems derived from it" (ibid., 1:240), Henry contends that
“the content of revelation does indeed lend itself to
systematic exposition, and the more orderly and logical that
exposition is, the nearer the expositor will be to the mind
of God in his revelation" (ibid., 1:240— 1).
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biblical propositions for truth, Mhat neeJs to be done is to
test the logical validity of the statements made in
Scripture.1

The point here is that Henry understands

logical validity of a proposition to be a significant
indication that the proposition in question is true.2
Consequently,

he contends that the most critical tool in

testing the truth of any proposition is to apply the law of
non—contradiction.3
A third element in the testing procedures is what
Henry calls the "principle of verification.""*

After

rejecting all other criteria for testing truth as limited
and biased,

Henry proposes that "divine revelation is

Christianity's principle of verification.“a

While divine

revelation refers to a phenomenon larger than the Bible,
Henry makes it clear that at the center of divine revelation
stands Scripture.

He writes,

For revelational

theism, verification rests centrally on

^For Henry, " . . . what is logically contradictory
cannot be true" (ibid., 1:233).
Further, "whatever is
logically contradictory and incapable of reconciliation
simply cannot be accepted as truth" (ibid., 1:174).
3 Ibid.
3Henry maintains that "A denial of the law of
contradiction would make truth and error equivalent; hence
in effect it destroys truth" (ibid., 1:233).
*Henry does not define "the principle of
verification."
However, on the basis of what he writes, it
seems that it is a norm or criteria by which one knows that
some given proposition, idea, or concept is objectively true
(ibid., 1:229— 32).
Henry also refers to this principle as a
principle of falsification or confirmation or a science of
contraries, according to Aristucie (ibid., 1:248).
SI b i d .

F
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authoritative witness [of biblical writers]. . . . The
Old Testament representation that there is no higher
verification appeal than God's word is heightened by New
Testament emphasis on the UJcrd (rheoia): Scripture is an
authoritative witness.1Further,

"what the propnets and apostles teach, and hence

the inspired Scripture,

[is] in any case Christianity's

ultimate principle of verification.
what Henry writes,

. . ."a

On the basis of

it seems that, for him, no humanly

devised criteria can be applied to test the truthfulness of
scriptural propositions.3

In effect, Henry maintains that

the Bible is self-authenticating."*

Thus, Henry concludes

that, on the basis of Bible's own testimony, Scripture is
inerrant in all the propositions that it makes.3
So far, a proposition has been shown to constitute
the minimum unit of logical thought to which Henry attaches
his meaning of scriptural truth.

As a logical element, a

proposition can be subjected to testing procedures which
Ibid., 1:265.
2 Ibid., 1:269.
’According to Henry, “It [empirical test] cannot at
all decide the objective meaning or existence of the
supraempirical. . . . Although given in the context of the
space— time continuum, knowledge of God must be gained— even
if in concrete experience— from its own proper ground, that
is, from God's revelation in his word" (ibid., 1:262).
*Henry argues that "Only because Scripture in fact
has its source and sustaining authority in God does it
confront us as self— authenticating" (ibid., 4:257).
“Henry refers to Warfield in stressing that "the
Bible not only teaches the divine origin and full
inspiration of scripture but also explicitly teaches the
doctrine of verbal inerrancy, thus disallowing the
possibility of error in the text of Scripture" (ibid.,
4:163).
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indicate whether the proposition is erroneous or truthful.
In the next two sub—sections,

the concepts of error and

truth are discussed to further clarify Henry's understanding
of the meaning of inerrancy.
Inerrancy as Absence of Error
in Biblical Propositions
H e n r y 's concept of error is based on his
understanding of a proposition.

As it was earlier pointed

out, Henry conceives a proposition as a logical unit which
is capable of being tested for validity and truth.1

The

criteria which Henry holds to be of vital importance in
testing propositions is the law of non— contradiction.a

This

law is further explained as having two levels: the level of
logical consistency (absence of inner contradiction) and the
level of logical coherence (absence of external
contradiction).3
follows:

The two levels may be described as

The level of logical

test of truth."'*

“consistency is a negative

The implication of this statement is that

this level does not affirm any proposition as being true.
What it does is to disqualify a particular proposition as
ASee pages 28— 29.
2Henry makes a distinction between rational and
empirical criteria for testing truth.
While he gives credit
to “scientific verification" for its contribution to
cc>itemporary civilization, a fact which theology can ignore
only “at its own expense," he, nonetheless, considers
rational verification of truth to be of a higher calibre
than empirical and experiential criteria (ibid., 1:250— 1).
sHenry explains the law of non-contradiction along
with its two le’els (ibid., 1:232— 8).
*1 b i d ., 1:232.

f
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erroneous or false on the basis of the presence of a logical
contradiction in it.*

For Henry, a proposition which is

self—contradictory is logically invalid,
and,

false, or erroneous

therefore, not true.3
The other level is logical coherence Mhich Henry

calls a subordinate test.3

This level checks the

correlation which a particular proposition has with the rest
of reality and life.

According to Henry, one of the

evidences that divine revelatior.

t - i s

its logical

compatibility or coherence with "ail other information,
including empirical data involving chronology, geography,
history, and psychological experience" can be shown to be
compatible with it.4
In view of the two laws, Henry's concept o-f error
may be expressed as follows:

An error is any proposition

which is logically self— contradicting and one which is
incompatible with known facts . bout reality and life.

When

x "Logical consistency is not a positive test of
truth, but a negative test; if it were a positive test,
logical consistency would accredit all views. . . . As a
test, it disqualifies any serious contender whose truth—
claim is characterized by logical contradiction" (ibid.,
235) .
3Henry characterizes error as "what is wrong,
inaccurate, incorrect, mistaken . . . " (ibid., 1:177).
3 Ibid., 1:232.
■*Ibid. , 1:237.
Henry's point here seems to be that,
because all knowledge has one source in God, it is coherent.
If, for some reason, a proposition is shown conclusively to
be incoherent or incompatible with the rest of knowledge,
that would be a clear indication that proposition is false
and not true.
That is the reason why, for Henry, it is
important that biblical truth is shown to be compatible and
coherent with other knowledge.
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Henry refers to Scripture as inerrant,

therefore, he means

that there are no logical contradictions within Scripture or
between the propositions which the Bible makes and other
aspects of reality.
Inerrancy as Presence of
Truth in Scripture
From one perspective,

the above discussion on error

is closely related to Henry's concept of truth.

The absence

of error in a proposition and the compatibility of a
proposition with "all other information" is at the same time
a sign that truth is present.

Truth is the absence of

contradiction and falsehood in a proposition.1
fact,

It seems,

in

that the length to which Henry goes in defending the

idea of an "error— free" Bible is partly attributable to his
desire to preserve the truth of Scripture.3
another perspective,

Yet, from

the mere absence of error in a

proposition does not exhaust Henry's concept of truth.
According to Henry, truth has an ontological status.
is, it is universal and eternal.3

Furthermore,

That

its

existence is not accounted for by mere sense experience or
1 1b i d ., 4:233.
aS ee ibid., 4:170.
3This observation is based on Henry's statements
about truth such as the following: "Truth does not refer to
reality.
It is itself the reality" (ibid., 2:222).
Truth
is "absolute, fixed, definitive, [and] final" (ibid.,
1:168).
"True knowledge . . . means nothing more or less
than truth as God knows and reveals it, and that will
include whatever any philosopher and any scientist says
without need of retraction" (ibid., 1:93).
Truth is "above
all human contingency and change, . . . timelessly true as
the truth of mathematics" (ibid., 3:474).
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logical reasoning.

It is Henry's view that man does not

create or invent truth.1

He only discovers i t ?

Henry categorizes truth into two main types.
type is biblical

(]ne

truth, which includes theological

affirmations derived from it, and the other is knowledge
which man acquires independently of the Bible.3

In one

sense, biblical truth is the same as other truths.
them,

it is abjective,

in another sense,

Like

intelligible, and verifiable.-*

it is different.

certain and divinely authorized. 1,5

But

It is "infallibly
Other truths are,

in

comparison, only tentative and under constant revision.4*

In

this case, Henry seems to elevate biblical truth to a
1 In one chapter in vol. 1 on various theories about
the source of knowledge and truth, Henry discounts
intuition, experience, and reason as origins of truth.
For
him, all truth is a revelation of God (ibid., 1:70—95).
=Henry emphasizes that "The biblical doctrine of
religious knowledge everywhere presupposes man's ability to
reason logically and to understand truth conveyed by God
about himself and reality."
Further, "God is the
revelational source of all truth; revelation is his
disclosed truth and the evoking cause of knowledge.
Reason
is a divinely gifted instrument enabling man to recognize
revelation or truth" (ibid., 4:227—B).
3See ibid.,

1:228; 3:384; 4:109.

'•ibid., 1:228.
“ Ibid.
‘For Henry, science, for example, is "a method of
knowing that accepts nothing as filial (let it be said with
finality!) and stands always ready to revise its findings
(the word findings may itself be less than accurate). . . .
Because of limitations of method, science has so little
basis for fixed and final truth about reality that it must
stand ready to alter every pronouncement it makes and then
to alter that alteration ad infinitum. But Christian
theology has historically identified such affirmations not
as scientific truth, but as dated opinion" (ibid., 1:173).
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position where it alone can be described with certainty as
"absolute,

fixed, definitive, and final."*

From the meaning of inerrancy discussed so far,

it

seems that Henry's idea of inerrancy entails more specific
and fundamental concepts than first meets the eye.
Henry,

For

inerrancy applies to the original autographs only.

It also applies to specific propositions in which all
biblical

truth is capable of being expressed.

propositions are without error and,
divine truth.

More specifically,

hence,

These

they constitute

inerrancy may be defined

as a term which denotes total validity and truthfulness of
the propositions which the Bible explicitly or implicitly
makes about God and the whole of reality.
section,

In the next

this discussion about the meaning of inerrancy is

continued in terms of the extent to which Henry views the
Bible to be inerrant.2
The Extent of Inerrancy
Henry's idea of inerrancy covers all Scripture.3
For him,

partial inerrancy,

if such a thing exists,

is

* Ibid., 1:168.
aHenry quotes two writers in his emphasis of the
pervasive inerrancy of Scripture.
According to him, "John
Wesley's position is clear: 'If there be one falsehood in
that book it did not come from God of truth' (J o u r n a l .
6:117).
Lindsell writes: 'If inspiration allows the
possibility of error then inspiration ceases to be
inspiration' (The Battle for the B i b l e , p. 31)" (ibid.,
1:191) .
3 Ibid., 4:184-5.
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untenable.1

If some aspects of the Bible can be accepted to

be erroneous,

there exists no longer any basis for trusting

anything that Scripture says.3

Thus, Henry maintains that

the Bible is inerrant in all the -^ttsrs that it addresses,
including historical and scientific facts.

He writes,

Verbal inerrancy implies that truth attaches not only to
the theological and ethical teaching of the Bible, but
also io the historical and scientific matters insofar as
they are part of the express message of the inspired
writings.3
This general application of the term "inerrancy” raises
certain issues which Henry both recognizes and attempts to
answer.
One of these issues concerns the coverage of
subjects.

Some critics of inerrancy have argued for a

distinction between essential truths and incidental matters
in the Bible as a means of
inerrancy.-*

limiting the extent of biblical

Henry considers such an approach as self-

defeating since all the matters that the Bible addresses are
inseparably connected with the central message of the
A Ibid.
For Henry, "partial inerrancy" as a term is
as confusing as "partial virginity" (ibid., 4:220, n .).
3Henry contends that "once errancy of the texts is
accommodated, the universe of controversy enlarges.
If
geographical and historical are untrue, why should the
events or doctrines correlated with them be true?" (ibid.,
4:178).
3 Ibid., 4:205.
*Donald G. Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical
Theology. 2 v o l s . : God. Authority and Salvation. (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978), 1:64, 65;
McKim, What
Christians Beli e v e . 82—94; Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and
Infal1ib i 1i t v .
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Bible.*

If the Bible is inerrant, Henry avers, it is so in

all the subject matter that it addresses.3
According to Henry, when the critics charge that
there are errors in the Bible,

they make one of three

mistakes, or a combination of them.

First,

they fail to

recognize that some of the so-called errors are only
apparent and not actual.3

For Henry, a closer study of the

passages in question soon reveals that contradictions can be
harmonized."*

Secondly, Henry maintains that some biblical

propositions are said to be in error for lack of sufficient
information about the subject(s) covered.3
many archeolonfcai

discoveries which have vindicated the

truth of several historical
erroneous.*

He points to

facts previously thought to be

Henry's advice is that none of the errors in

*G R A . 4:1B1.
Henry illustrates this point by
stressing that "Without the assumption that the specifics
are reliable, a great deal of contemporary biblical study
would collapse into confusion" (ibid., 5:329).
In addition,
"not even the narrative details [of Jesus' life and
ministry] can be considered insignificant when it comes to
making a spiritual decision" (ibid., 4:169).
a Ibid., 4:170-1.
3 Ibid., 4:173.
“Henry refers to Warfield in stating that "the
attempt to exhibit harmony [in Scripture] should indeed be
made and earnestly pursued" (ibid., 4:172).
3 In this connection, Henry quotes Roger Nicole to
stress that " ‘a number of these (errors] are so far from
being demonstrable mistakes as to be barely more than
inconsiderable difficulties . . .'" (ibid., 4:354).
‘Henry discusses to some detail some specific
achievements of biblical archaeology which he considers to
be on the side of inerrancy (ibid., 4:316— 367).

i
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the critics'

list has conclusively been proven to be so.1

£3n the other hand, Henry cautions biblical scholars against
harmonizing seeming contradictions if that enterprise
involves overstretching sound methods of biblical
interpretation.

To leave such cases unharmonized is better

than engaging in questionable exegesis.3

Thirdly, for

Henry, critics often forget that the errors they point out
are in the apographs only.3

This means that none of the

errors mentioned by the critics necessarily threatens
Henry's idea of inerrancy.

Thus, Henry maintains a concept

of full inerrancy in spite of claims that there are errors
in the Bible.

Expressed otherwise,

be summarized as indicating that,

the above arguments may

for Henry, an error is not

an error unless it is shown to meet the following criteria:
It must exhaust the exegetical possibilities of the biblical
text;

it must conclusively be proven that all the relevant

information on the subject is not in favor of inerrancy; and
error must be shown to have existed in the original
autographs.
bid . , 4:354.
“ Ibid., 4:172.
30n this fact, Henry approves Augustine's statement
that "'I most firmly believe that the authors were
completely free from error.
And if in these writings I am
perplexed by anything which appears to me apposed to truth,
I do not hesitate to suppose that either the manuscript is
faulty, or the translator has not caught the meaning of what
was said, or I myself have failed to understand it.'
('Letter to Jerome,' B 2 . 3 ) ” (ibid., 4:248).
~It appears from the nature of these tests that
Henry makes it impossible to falsify anything in the Bible.
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Despite the stringent criteria set abave, Henry
disassociates himself from the view which may be called
"absolute inerrancy."1

Henry considers his own view to be

more flexible than "absolute inerrancy" for one main reason.
He states that one should not expect to find "scientific
precision" in the Bible.
imposes modern and,
the Bible.

therefore,

foreign modes of thought on

In clarifying this position, Henry offers two

explanations.
years ago.

For him, such an expectation

First,

As such,

the Bible was written thousands of
its level of technology should not be

expected to be compatible Mith ours.3

Second,

writers often employ "everyday phenomenological

the Bible
language"—

such as sunrise and sunset— which is definitely not meant to
convey scientific facts.3
Henry maintains that inerrancy extends to all the
1G R A . 4:176.
The term "absolute inerrancy" is used
by Millard Erickson in Christian Theoloov (Nashville: Baker
Book House, 1985), 222.
Erickson associates the view with
Harold Lindsell who advocates the view in The Battle for the
Bible (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1976).
According to Lindsell, the truths which the Bible
teaches on any subject are inerrant in the same sense that a
factual statement in chemistry or history is inerrant today.
Lindsell argues that "The Bible is not a textbook on
chemistry, astronomy, philosophy or medicine.
But when it
speaks on matters having to do with these or any other
subjects, the Bible does not lie to us.
It does not contain
error of any kind" (Lindsell, The Battle for the B i b l e . IB).
aG R A . 4:176.
This allowance in Henry effectively
exempts the Bible from the charge that it contains error in
many areas.
Henry lists these areas specifically:
statistics, measurements, historiography, genealogies,
historical data, and cosmological matters (ibid., 4:201).
3 Ibid., 4:109.
This argument is used also by other
conservative evangelical theologians.
See, for example,
Lindsell, The Battle for the B i b l e . 3 7 —38.

r
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subject matter which the Bible addresses.

For him, if the

Bible makes assertions in matters of theology, moral? ,
history, or science,

it does so inerrantly.

However, Henry

cautions against employing inappropriate criteria in judging
certain aspects of truth.

This qualification seems to

strengthen his understanding of inerrancy.
other things,
Scripture,

It shows,

among

that, although Henry's view covers all

it is realistic.

One reason why Henry finds it

preferable to retain the concept of inerrancy by qualifying
it rather than undermine its usefulness through lack of
qualifications is the role which inerrancy plays in Henry's
theology.

In the next section,

attention is given to this

role.
Inerrancy in Henry's Theology
The concept of inerrancy is not an isolated idea in
the theology of Carl Henry.
thought,

Like other aspects of Henry's

inerrancy stands within a web of several related

ideas, all of which are aimed at demonstrating the
comprehensive coherence of his theological structure.1
this section,

In

the question being addressed is the place the

concept of inerrancy occupies in the theology of Henry.

The

answer to this question is sought by first examining in
brief the basic structure of Henry's theological system and
then by assessing the place of inerrancy in that system.
1Henry holds that “Christian theology is the
systematization of the truth—content explicit and implicit
in the inspired writings."
Thus, the task of a theologian
is to present biblical teaching as a "comprehensive whole"
(BRA. 1:238, 239).
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Henry does not define what a system is nor does he
explain the meaning of various technical
in connection with the system.

terms which he uses

But general observations

can be made on the basis of his writings in this r e g a r d .

A

system may be defined as a comprehensive but coherent body
of theological truths in the form of axioms,

theorems, and

other propositions which gives an account of all the reality
there is.*"

Henry recognizes the existence of many

conflicting systems of truth in the modern intellectual
arena.

In his assessment of these systems,

Henry concludes

that "there can be only one system of truth, however many
theoretical models may be constructed."2
system is the one advocated by evangelical

For Henry,

this

theology and one

which Henry himself defends.3
Henry's system consists of axioms and theorems."*
*"This description of a "system" is based on Henry's
statements such as the following: "Christianity supplies
impetus for a comprehensive and consistent interpretation of
reality and it is applicable to all the experiences of life"
(ibid., 1:238); "If rationality and system are intrinsic to
theology, then the arrangement of theological teaching in
axioms and theorems remain a legitimate and ideal goal"
(ibid., 1:240).
A system is variously described as a view, world
view, theory, or explanation of reality.
For a
philosophical explanation of "system," see Fernando Luis
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and
Timelessness as Primordial Presupposition (Berrien Springs,
Michigan: Andrews University Press, 1987), 44.
For a
explanation of various systems and the factors that
constitute a system, see Ronald H. Nash, Faith and Reason:
Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1988), 21— 79.
aG R A . 1:237.
3 I b i d ., 1:241.
"Theorems are general principles which a

?--f
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According to him, an axiom is a "first principle," an
assumption, or a presupposition which is not demonstrable
and from which all other truths and theorems are derived.A
An axiom is self-evident and it is neither verifiable nor
flexible.3

Henry continues to assert that every system of

truth about reality— be it in natural science or in
philosophy— is built on some basic axioms or
presuppositions.3

Accordingly, Henry posits two axioms as

the foundations of his theological system:

the

epistemological axiom and the ontological axiom.^Henry
states clearly that divine revelation is Christianity's
epistemological axiom.9

By this designation he seems to

mean that whatever assertions a Christian makes about
knowledge— its origin, nature, and content— is derived from,
systematician formulates as implicates of
the axioms.
These
do not detain us here as
they are outside the scope of the
present discussion.
See ibid., 1:239— 41.
■
’"This characterization of an axiom is based on
Henry's usage of the three terms— axiom, first principle,
and presupposition. See Henry's usages in G R A . 1:223, 239;
1:219; and 1:230, 231, respectively.
3 Ibid.
Further information on "axiom" as Henry uses
the term can be found in
Kis, "Revelation and Ethics," 228.
See also a lecture by Henry's college mentor, Clark,
entitled "The Axiom of Revelation," 57—92.
“ "Consciously or unconsciously," Henry maintains,
"belief systems rest on fundamental assumptions which
decisively and comprehensively interpret all reality and
life" (G R A . 1:180).
Further, "No historian and no scientist
approaches historical or physical events without
presuppositions" (ibid., 1:261).
■*The epistemological axiom is discussed here while
the ontological axiom is examined in chapter 3.
9GRA.

1:213-24.
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grounded in, and sanctioned by divine revelation.1
For Henry, divine revelation is an essential guide
in all pursuits after knowledge and truth.

It helps man to

see reality from God's perspective without which any
knowledge that man possesses is superficial and distorted.3
It is in this sense that divine revelation is an axiom,

a

first principle, or presupposition in Henry's epistemology.3
Henry views divine revelation as consisting of
general revelation and special revelation.-*

For Henry,

general revelation refers to God's self-disclosure in four
main areas:3 in nature,*

in the mind of man,7

in the moral

1Henry concedes that "biblical writers provide no
extended treatise on religious epistemology.“ However, "on
the basis of revelation and its implications he [the
Christian] can adduce some specific and highly significant
epistemic considerations" (ibid., 1:224).
3 Ibid., 4:205.
3A s mentioned above, the axiom of a system is
undemonstrable. It is self-evident.
These are the grounds
on which Henry refers to his theological method as
presuppositionalist. For him, this designation is not
something to be ashamed of but a source of contentment.
By
recognizing and openly admitting his presuppositions, Henry
maintains that he is being objective and that he is hiding
nothing under the table.
According to him, what he is doing
is the same as what every systematician in every field does.
See Henry's defence of presuppositionalist methodology in
ibid., 1:171, 179, 205, 219-20, 226-36.
*1 b i d ., 2:86.
“Henry lists the four areas in ibid., 2:87.
*Henry refers to Ps 19 and Rom 1:18—20 as biblical
basis for this variety of general revelation (ibid., 2:84).
^According to Henry, the mind consists of two
things: human reason which enables man to be a recipient of
divine revelation (ibid., 2:84) an also the consciousness of
"the existence of God" (ibid., 2:133—4).
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conscience of nan,1 and in "the whole sweep of history.'^
Some of the other terms which Henry uses in reference to
general revelation are "primal revelation"3 and "general
cosmic— anthropological revelation.""*

According to him,

this

general revelation is important for three main reasons.
First,

it is “a presupposition of ongoing individual and

collective existence in all times and places."3

Second,

"Scripture declares it to be the basis of man's morality and
responsibility to God."*

Henry stresses that "rejection of

God's general revelation is what makes men and women
heathen.”7

Third,

"general

revelation is the presupposition

of redemptive revelation.""
The other type of divine revelation is what Henry
refers to as "special revelation."*

This revelation is

"soteriological" or "salvific" in content and purpose.
general revelation,

Like

it is "addressed to the whole world."

But, unlike it, special

revelation is given in specific

1For Henry, the conscience is the "inner, secret,
guilty knowledge of the true God and of his demand for
spiritual submission and moral obedience" (ibid., 2:85).
= Ibid., 2:87, 247-56.
3 Ibid., 2:84.
■•ibid., 2:86.
3 Ibid., 2:85.
"I b i d .
^Ibid., 2:86.
"Ibid., 2:90.
"Ibid.,

2:86.
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historical events.
what special

Henry writes the fallowing regarding

revelation includes:

In redemptive revelation, God discloses himself in once—
for-all saving acts of Judeo—Christian history,
particularly in Israel's exodus from Egypt and the
consequent founding of the Hebrew nation, and in Jesus'
resurrection from the tomb and the consequent founding
of the Christian church.
And he is disclosed in Jesus
Christ the incarnate Logos.
He is revealed, moreover,
in the prophetic— apostolic Word, in the whole canon of
Scripture which objectively communicates in
propositional verbal form the content and meaning of all
God's revelation.1
Both general and special revelation comprise divine
revelation which is Henry's epistemological axiom.

For

Henry,

this axiom is the basis for the Christian world

view.

It "supplies the impetus for a comprehensive and

consistent interpretation of reality.”2
reveal

Not only does it

“knowledge of the ultimate world" and anticipate

“man's future destiny" but it also
exhibits the wonder of the cosmos, the meaning and worth
of individual existence, the purpose of history and the
role of society and culture, the grip of moral values
and the power of love.3
□n the basis of what God has given in his revelation,
therefore, Henry projects the possibility of constructing a
complete Christian e p i s temolagy

.“
*

It is to be noted, however,

that the utility of the

axiom of divine revelation in the construction of a
Christian epistetnology hinges to a large extent on the fact
M b i d . , 2:87.
2 Ibid., 1:238.
3 Ibid.
“•ibid., 1:224.

f
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that Scripture is part of that revelation.

Certainly, Henry

argues that God's revelation is not to be identified
exclusively with the Bible.1"

To do so is to obscure "the

full range of divine disclosure."3

Yet, the role that Henry

accords Scripture in the revelation axiom is central.
him,

For

it is Scripture which “objectively communicates in

propositional verbal form the content and meaning of all
God's revelation."3

In relation to general revelation, the

Bible has a logical priority:

it "republishes the content of

general revelation objectively. "■*

In addition,

"it enables

man to assess fully the revelation in God's created works."3
In relation to God's revelation in history, Scripture
communicates both the "historical act" and "its
interpretation."*

In other words, God's acts in history

would have remained unknown and unintelligible were it not
for the existence of Scripture.
illustrations indicate,

Thus, as these

the Bible plays a significant role

in Henry's epistemological

axiom.

Given the important role that Henry accords
Scripture in his theory of knowledge,

it becomes easy to

understand why he seeks to shield the Bible from any
1 Ibid., 2:80.
“ Ibid.
3 Ibid., 2:87.
'‘Ibid.,

1:223.

3 Ibid., 2:90.
**Ibid . , 2:330.
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suggestion that it is less than a totally reliable source of
objective truth.1
flaws,

For Henry,

if Scripture has any kind of

it cannot be trusted as an obj'ective expression of

"the content and meaning of all God's revelation."*
truth is questionable,

If its

it cannot be expected to play the

role of making known and intelligible other aspects of
divine revelation.

In other words,

to propose that

Scripture is erroneous is to undermine the basis on which
Christian epistemology is founded.3

It is in this context

that Henry proposes the idea of inerrancy as "a governing
epistemological principle."'*

That is, inerrancy guarantees

Scripture's total trustworthiness and this,

in turn,

1Henry explicitly states, "The fact of inerrant
autographs is both theoretically and practically important"
(ibid., 4:209).
3 Ibid., 2:87.
3The major problem which Henry associates with the
view that the Bible has errors is that it "provides no
adequate basis for a sound apologetic.
Only logical
imprecision can begin with errancy and conclude with divine
authority" (ibid., 4:192).
According to him, what "errancy"
does is to "destroy the objective truth of the Christian
religion, trivialize theology, and lead finally to
skepticism" (ibid., 4:193).
*The context in which this phrase occurs is Henry's
response to critics who think that inerrancy is dispensable.
Henry retorts, "But if inerrancy is irrelevant as a
governing epistemological principle, why should any specific
issue of faith and practice be thought beyond the
possibility of apostolic error? . . . To argue that the
modern exegete can trustworthily distinguish what is true
and false in Scripture, even if the inspired prophets and
apostles could not do so, is like swallowing a camel and
straining a gnat" (ibid., 4:238).
These statements seem to
imply that inerrancy is indispensable if the Bible is to
play the role it should in the Christian theory of
knowledge.
The fact that Henry considers inerrancy to be a
"governing presupposition," particularly in hermeneutics
appears to be implied (ibid., 4:173, 191).

f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
establishes the case for a Christian epistemology.

When a

single error is admitted to exist in Scripture, Henry
stresses,

the door is wide open for individuals to find all

kinds of errors in the Bible.

According to Henry, only if

and when Scripture is shown to be totally reliable can it
play the decisive role which Henry accords it in his
theology.3

It is Henry's view chat, without inerrancy, one

is left with “an unstable religious epistemology,"3 and by
implication, a vulnerable theological system.
Conclusion
The case for inerrancy which Henry presents covers a
wide range of areas.

The concept of inerrancy denotes total

reliability of scriptural contents,

the logical consistency

and coherence of the propositions in which biblical truth is
expressed, absence of error and presence of truth in
Scripture as the document of revelation.

As it has been

shown, inerrancy has the original autographs as its referent
1For Henry, "once errancy of the text is
accommodated, the universe of controversy quickly enlarges.
. . . Once biblical inerrancy is set aside, errancy is
readily correlated with much broader spheres of conflict"
(ibid., 4:178).
^Commenting on the "importance of probing the nature
and implications of biblical inerrancy,"
Henry argues, "An
unsatisfactory view of Scripture will soon undermine itself,
if we cannot rely on the gospels and Epistles to tell the
truth, we can say little or nothing about Jesus Christ whom
they represent" (ibid., 4:366— 7).
Further, "Without
persuasive epistemic credentials, Christianity will be
assimilated to the historical approach prevalent in the
modern intellectual world where all events are set in the
context of developmental contingency and any claim to
finality and absolute uniqueness is leveled" (ibid., 1:213).
3 Ibid., 4:366-7.
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since only they bear the quality of being inspired by God.
Although Henry does not espouse absolute inerrancy,
nonetheless,

he,

insists that the Bible is fully inerrant both

in part and in whole.

It has also been pointed out that

inerrancy occupies an important place in Henry's
epistemology and, hence, in his theological system.

A

natural conclusion from these observations seems to be that,
without inerrancy, Christianity has no "epistemic
credentials" since Scripture would thereby be no longer a
reliable interpreter of the revelation axiom.
It is recognized that all

these aspects of inerrancy

cannot be evaluated in full in this study.

Such a task

would demand more time and space than is presently
available.

However,

it is important to conclude thxs

chapter with an assessment of some of the underlying
arguments on which Henry bases his case for inerrancy.
According to investigation,

there are four main arguments

which Henry uses to defend inerrancy.
argument from text of Scripture,
phenomena of Scripture,

These are:

(1)

(2) argument from the

(3) argument from history, and

(4)

argument from the doctrine of inspiration.
First,

Henry maintains that the concept of inerrancy

is supported by Scripture's witness about itself.

He states

that the Bible "explicitly teaches the doctrine of verbal
inerrancy."1

The passages which he cites are 2 Tim 3:16,

1 Ibid., 4:163.
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John 10:35, Rom 3:2, and 1 Cor 2:13.x

Farther investigation

of these passages reveals two points.

The first one is that

the passages do not refer to inerrancy.
reference is indirect and,

If they do, the

therefore, dependent on

subjective factors of interpretation.

The second point is

that Henry himself elsewhere indicates that inerrancy is not
an explicit teaching of Scripture.
implicitly taught,

He writes,

"inerrancy is

logically d e d u c i b l e . and is a necessary

correlate of Scripture as the word of God."2

In fact, Henry

points out that inerrancy may not be a correct biblical
interpretation.

According to him,

While Warfield held that the Bible explicitly teaches
its own inerrancy, he left open the possibility that
inerrancy is not a correct biblical interpretation:
'This evidence is not in the strict sense
"demonstrative;" it is "probable" evidence.
It
therefore leaves open the metaphysical possibility of
its being mistaken.'3
What these statements seem to indicate is that Henry
considers inerrancy to be deducible from Scripture.
However,

the evidence is not conclusive and, as such, Henry

seems hesitant to rest the case for inerrancy wholly on
evidence from Scripture.
Henry's second argument for inerrancy comes from the
phenomena of Scripture.'*

Henry maintains that the phenomena

1These texts are based on the Brief Statement of the
Doctrinal Position of the Missouri Synod which was adopted
by the Lutheran Church— Missouri Synod in 1932, p. 1548
(ibid., 4:168).
2 Ibid., 4:168.

Emphasis supplied.

3 Ibid., 4:168.
*This phrase,

"phenomena of Scripture," is used here

r
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of Scripture vindicates the inerrancy of the Bible.1

He

also does not consider any of the so-called errors in the
Bible to be an error unless it is demonstrated that the
exegetical possibilities of the text are exhausted
harmonization),

(through

that all the relevant data in the text in

question made available, and that error is shown to have
existed in the original autographs.3
Yet, Henry also concedes that scriptural phenomena
is not always compatible with inerrancy.

He recognizes that

some apparent contradictions in Scripture cannot be
harmonized successfully without engaging in "strained or
artificial exegesis."3

Henry discourages such an exegesis

and even states that harmonizing is "a second—order
concern.""*

For him, some passages are better left

unharmonized.

In one instance,

he even considers the appeal

to the original autographs to be, at times, an
oversimplification of some textual problems.

He notes that

"the most troublesome discrepancies occur not in passages
where the biblical

text is in doubt, but rather where the

to refer to the nature of the text of Scripture,
the known facts about scriptural contents.

that is,

LHenry holds that "Harmonizing the phenomena with
biblical teaching is not unimportant as Warfield sees it;
the attempt to exhibit harmony should indeed be made and
earnestly pursued" (G R A . 4:172).
2See ibid., 4:172-3, 316-67.
3 Ibid., 4:172.
*1 b i d .
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text is not in question."1.

Given these observations,

it

seems that Henry does not rest his case for inerrancy mainly
on the phenomena of Scripture.
A third argument which Henry appeals to in support
of inerrancy is history.

Henry refers to inerrancy as "the

historic commitment of the Christian church."3
noted that, in this context, Henry means,

It is to be

by inerrancy, a

belief in the total reliability of Scripture.

In that

sense, Henry is certainly right in stating that the total
reliability of the Bible was always the position of the
church from the biblical times until
critical

the rise of the

theories in the last two or three centuries.3

As

far as inerrancy as a theological concept is concerned,
however, Henry traces its earliest origin to Lutheran
theologians of the seventeenth century in Europe and the
Princeton theologians of the nineteenth century here in
America.
If a d i s t i n c t i o n

is to be m a i n t a i n e d between

inerrancy as a theological concept and total reliability of
the Bible as some scholars appear to suggest,9 it seems that
1Henry illustrates this point by comparing the
difference between Gen 50:4— 13 and Acts 7:16 in regard to
where Abraham bought a burial place (ibid., 4:231—5).
a Ibid., 4:367.
3See H a s e l , Biblical

Interpretation T o d a y . 4— 10.

“*1 bid . , 4:369.
“Van Bemmelen, Issues in Inspiration. 373— 5.
The
distinction between inerrancy as a theological concept, on
one hand, and confidence in the Bible as the word of God, on
the other, seems to be made also by Geoffrey W. Bromiley,

r
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the appeal to church history c.s a supporting evidence for
inerrancy is not very helpful.

Available studies on

inerrancy and history reveal that history can be interpreted
in favor of inerrancy or against it.1
aware of these facts and,

Henry seems to be

therefore, does not rest his case

for inerrancy wholly on history.
The fourth argument which Henry adduces for
inerrancy is the biblical concept of inspiration.

The

affinity that exists between the concept of inerrancy and
inspiration in Henry is particularly notable.

First,

it is

not uncommon to find the words inerrancy and inspiration
combined in a single phrase.
inspiration"

Henry writes of "inerrant

in a manner that suggests a close relationship

between inerrancy and inspiration.2

Second,

in his

"Church Doctrine of Inspiration," in Revelation and the
B i b l e . e d . Carl F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1950), 205-17; and Mark Noll, "A Brief History of Inerrancy,
Mostly in America," in The Proceedings. 198 7 . 9— 25.
1For the view that the Bible and church history are
on the side of inerrancy, see, for example, Carl Henry, e d .,
Revelation and the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1958), and John D. Hannah, e d ., Inerrancy and the Church
(Chicago: Moody Press, 1984).
For the opposite view that
Scripture and history are against inerrancy, see, for
example, Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility;
and Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The Authority and
Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979).
“ ibid., 4:206.
The following statements also shed
more light on this point: "It is no accident that those who
deplore the concept of biblical inerrancy are increasingly
uncomfortable with the doctrine of inspiration as well"
(ibid., 4:192); ". . . inerrant inspiration is what assures
the absence of logical contradictions and verbal
misrepresentations" (ibid., 4:206); and "in all cases
inspiration safeguards the writers from error in
communicating the content of their message" (ibid., 4:207).
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treatment of the subjects of inerrancy and inspiration,

he

discusses inerrancy immediately after his chapter on
inspiration.1

Henry develops his themes in logical

sequences and, therefore,

it is noteworthy that the two

concepts are juxtapositioned in that manner.

Third,

it was

earlier mentioned that the term "inerrancy” is applied in
reference to the autographs for the simple reason that only
they are designated as "inspired.”

According to Henry,

apographs are Infallible, not inerrant.

the

The reason for this

is that they are not expressly said to be inspired in the
Bible.
Henry maintains that inspiration is "a divine
activity."3

For him, inspiration is descriptive of God's

activity in the particular context of revealing himself at
specific times and places and to particular individuals.
the basis of what Henry writes,

On

the basic issue involved in

designating inspiration as a divine activity is an important
one.

In effect,

it raises the question of the nature of

God's activity in the world and how God relates himself with
the world.

The implication of this observation is that in

order to fully understand and appreciate how Henry views
God's activity in inspiration, one has to examine Henry's
views on the nature of God's activity in and relationship
with the world.

Given Henry's systematic and integrative

approach to theological subjects,

it is not likely the case

1See G R A . v o l . 4.
3 Ibid., 4:130.
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that Henry's understanding of haw God acts in inspiration
differs radically from his views on how God acts in other
contexts.

As investigation seems to indicate, Henry's views

on the nature of God's activity in the world are explicated
in his concept of sovereignty.
Accordingly,

the next chapter is devoted to an

analysis of Henry's concept of sovereignty as a means of
bringing to light the basic ideas which underlie Henry's
understanding of the nature of God's activity in the world.
That discussion sets the stage for chapter 4 in which an
attempt is made at identifying the nature of the correlation
between inerrancy and sovereignty in Henry.1
1 It is to be noted that the sequence of topics, from
inerrancy to sovereignty, is dictated by the nature of the
subject and the delimitations of the study.
At first, it
might appear that a discussion on sovereignty should precede
the chapter on inerrancy, given the fact that the case being
advanced here posits the concept of sovereignty as the
"presupposition."
Yet, since the study is undertaken
primarily in the interest of the doctrine of inerrancy, a
clarification of this primary concern takes precedence over
that which it presupposes.
Another support for the present
sequence arises out of the case for inerrancy itself.
As
argued in this chapter, there are pointers in the concept of
inerrancy itself which indicate that inerrancy derives its
main impetus from considerations outside the perimeters of
its meaning and those arguments which constitute its
foundations.

n ~
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CHAPTER III
THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
In chapter 2, Henry's concept of inerrancy was
analyzed in terms of Henry's sources,
concept,

the meaning of the

the role of inerrancy in Henry's theology, and the

arguments which Henry uses as basis for taking the inerrancy
position.

It was also noted that inerrancy is closely

connected with Henry's idea of inspiration.

In Henry's

words,

. ..

"The biblical doctrine of inspiration

connects

God's activity with the express truths and words of
Scripture.1,1
of God,

To understand inspiration fully as an activity

it is appropriate to address first the wider issue

of the nature of God's activity in the world.

One reason

for taking this approach is that, without the wider context
in which specific ideas are set,

it is often difficult to

grasp the full force of Henry's concepts.
As investigation reveals, Henry's ideas on the
nature of God's activity in the world find expression in the
concept of sovereignty.

In this chapter,

the concept of

sovereignty is analyzed descriptively for the purpose of
clarifying Henry's ideas about the nature of God's activity
in general.

After the analysis in this chapter, attention

‘'GRA, 4:144.

61
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is given, in chapter 4, to the issue of how inerrancy
presupposes the concept of sovereignty.
This chapter it is divided into five main sections.
The first is general and introductory.

It is an enquiry

into Henry's theological orientation out of which the
concept of sovereignty arises.

That background leads to the

second section which is on the meaning of sovereignty.
becomes evident in the discussion,

As

the approach used here in

the search for the meaning of sovereignty is neither
beinantic nor linguistic.
of sovereignty.

It is oriented to Henry's theology

The discussion on the meaning of

sovereignty is continued in the section on the extent or
scope of sovereignty,

that is, whether or not Henry's

concept of sovereignty has limits.

This prepares the ground

for the larger issue in section four concerning the place of
sovereignty in Henry's theology.

Finally, a conclusion is

made on the basis of the material

presented in this chapter

and in view of the theme of this study.
Sovereignty and Henry's Tradition
An attempt is made here at setting Henry's concept
of sovereignty in Henry's theological tradition. The
investigation conducted here is not intended to be
exhaustive but to give a bird's-eye view on the sources and
the tradition which lie behind Henry's concept of
sovereignty.

To achieve that goal, a brief survey is made

of the clues which Henry himself gives in God. Revelation
and Authority concerning his intellectual ancestry.
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Henry's theological tradition is not easily
detectible from his series.

One characteristic of Henry's

style of writing is his frequent use of diverse sources of
information to strengthen his arguments.1

This practice

gives Henry's writings an ecumenical orientation.31

In

addition, Henry describes himself as a defender of "historic
Christianity" and "evangelical faith," in particular,3 both
of which terms can be used for wide varieties of Christian
traditions.'*

Yet, the difficulties which these terms pose

1D. B. Knox has checked vol. 6 alone and found that
there are 750 different books quoted and 850 authors
referred to (Review of G R A . vol. 6, Reformed Theological
Review 43 CJan—Apr 1984]s 19).
aAt least two theologians see Henry as a partner in
ecumenical dialogue:
Mark Ellingsen, review of G R A . vol. 4—
6, Dialogue 24 (Winter 1985): 76; and Peter D. Fehlner,
review of G R A . vol. 6, Theological Studies 44 (Dec. 1983):
708.
The former is a Lutheran theologian and the latter a
Roman Catholic.
3 Ibid., 5:34, 136; 1:28, 212.
Henry also refers to
his theology as "revealed theology" (ibid., 1:196, 199),
"biblical Christianity" (ibid., 1:248), and "Judeo—Christian
religion" (ibid., 1:248; 5:136).
*According to George Mar s d e n , the term "evangelical"
is elusive."
He writes that it refers to "anyone who
promotes proclamation of the gospel to salvation through the
atoning work of Christ and has a traditional high view of
Scripture alone as authority."
See his article, "Reformed
and American" in Reformed Theology in A m e r i c a , e d . David F.
Wells (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1985) 2.
Barr adds that an evangelical can be a Calvinist
or an Arminian in his theology (F u ndamenta1i s m . 188).
It appears that the reason why Henry does not
identify himself closely with any specific theological
tradition is because such an identity would jeopardize his
apologetic goal which is aimed at making a wide appeal on
behalf of Christianity. Henry laments the "fragmented
condition of evangelical Christians" and calls for "a
corporate fellowship of believers" with a "vanguard of
scholars to exhibit the truth of revelation with an
intellectual power that confronts non— Christian ideologies"
(G R A . 1:133).
It is in his autobiography where one learns
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in establishing Henry's theological roots are not
insurmountable.
The evidence considered here comes mainly from
Henry's use of sources in his major work, Bod. Revelation
and A u t hority.

In several instances, Henry makes favorable

references to theological positions of John Calvin and
various Reformed Confessions written before 1650.

Among

Calvin's ideas which Henry approves explicitly are Calvin's
aprioristic methodology,1" an emphasis on God's nature rather
than his existence,2 the essential divinity of the Trinity,3
the importance of the doctrine of predestination,'* the
that Henry is a Baptist and that he has been intimately
involved in the interdenominational evangelical revival for
about fifty years (Henry, Confessions of a Theologian. 62—
107, 144ff).
1After surveying various methodological approaches
to theology, Henry endorses Calvin's "apriorism" in an
extended comment.
"Aprioristic methodology" is described by
Henry as the view that a person is born with a certain
fundamental knowledge about God and other principles that
make human life— search for truth, interpersonal
communication, etc.— possible (GRA. 1:334—43).
This seems
to be a basic epistemological principle in Henry.
2 Ibid., 5:135.
Henry here paraphrases Calvin: "What
is God? Men who pose this question are merely toying with
idle speculations.
It is more important for us to know of
what sort he is and what is consistent with his nature."
See The Library of Christian Classics, vol. 20. Calvin:
Institutes of the Christian R e l i g i o n , e d . John T. McNeil,
trans. Ford Lewis Battles [Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1960], I, 2:2.
Hereafter, this resource is referred to as
John Calvin, Institutes. followed by book number in Roman
numeral, and chapter number, and section number in Arabic
numerals.
3G R A , 5:206.
*1 b i d ., 6:76.
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function of the law as a teacher of righteousness,1 emphasis
on universal revelation and “a fractured image of God" in
man after the fall,3 limited atonement,3 and the Holy Spirit
as the source of all truth.'*

In addition to Calvin, Henry

also uses the pre— 1650 Reformed Confessions as definitive
statements on matters of doctrine.
Westminster Confession

Thus, he cites The

(1647) as teaching the foreknowledge

of God3 and Article 12 of the Belgic Confession
the purpose of the doctrine of providence.*

(1561) on

On one hand,

it

may appear as if, in these instances, Henry is merely adding
more sources indiscriminately in order to strengthen his
arguments.7

On the other hand, while Henry writes

1 Ib i d ., 6:253.
“ Ibid., 6:424.
3 Ibid., 6:88, 10O.
*1b i d ., 6:372.
9Ibid., 5:279.
Henry mentions The Formula of
Concord (1576) here as also teaching God's prescience.
This
is rather strange.
Besides being a Lutheran rather than a
Reformed Confession, the view of God's foreknowledge in The
Formula is quite different from that of The Westminster
Confession which is Reformed.
In The Formula, foreknowledge
is not tied to foreordination of particular events.
Compare
The Formula of Concord, XI:2—5 and The Westminster
Confession V:l, 2, Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom
(New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1919), 165— 166 and 612,
respectively.
*GRA. 6:478.
7That is the impression of Paul Helm who, in
reviewing vol. 6 of GRA writes, "Any apt quotation, from
whatever source, is grist to the author's mill.
Thus
extracts from Eulalio R. Bulthazar jostles with those from
Karl Barth, and quotations from Hegel with those from
Harpers magazine" (Churchman 98 C1984]: 74).
A thorough
reading of Henry's volumes reveals a more deliberate choice
and use of the sources than Helm seems to allow.
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approvingly of many ideas from various sources, he also
criticizes other ideas from the same sources.1

In this

regard, Calvin and the pre-1650 Reformed Confessions are an
exception.

The investigation has demonstrated only

approvals of these sources and no criticisms.

Henry's

burden with Calvin and the Reformed Confessions is to defend
their orthodoxy and correct those interpretations of them
which he considers to be misguided.2
among others,

These observations,

have led reviewers of GRA to conclude that

Henry is "deeply steeped in the Calvinistic heritage."3
Given the above observations concerning Henry's
theological heritage,

it is most unlikely that in his

exposition of the concept of sovereignty,
deviate,

at least significantly,

Henry will

from his tradition.

In the

next section, Henry's understanding of sovereignty is
explored with his theological background in mind.

No

1One example here is James Barr
the author of
Fundamental ism— whose ideas Henry uses (GRA., 4:10, 17, 132)
but whom he also criticizes sharply (ibid., 4:121—30, 144—
50, 329— 35).
Another example is the Seventh—day Adventists.
Henry commends them for teaching creationism and praises
scholarly contributions of Adventist scholars like Edwin
Thiele and Gerhard Hasel (ibid, 6:149; 4:360— 1, 466— 7).
But
he also criticizes them for honoring "Ellen G. White on a
level with inspired prophets" (ibid., 4:204).
“Henry considers Karl Barth (1886— 1968), Emil
Brunner (1889— 1966), G. C. Berkouwer (1903— ), Jack B. Rogers
(1934— ), and a host of other modern theologians as
unorthodox interpreters of the Reformed faith (ibid., 6:91—
97) .
3E1lingsen, review, 75, 76.
See also reviews by
John Eddins (Perspectives in Religious Studies 11 C19B4]:
73); Knox (19, 20); and Padgett (785-6).
Eddins, after
remarking that Henry's theology is "a slightly modified
Calvinism," hastens to add that Henry "defends a Calvinistic
doctrine of God with vengeance" (73).
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thorough comparative study is intended between Henry's ideas
and those of the Reformed tradition since such a task lies
outside the scope of this investigation.
appropriate,

But, where

brief comments are made in assessing the extent

to which Henry reflects the influence of his tradition on
specific aspects of the concept of sovereignty.
The Meaning of Sovereignty
Henry's understanding of sovereignty is primarily
found in a chapter entitled "The Sovereignty of the
Omnipotent God."A

The following descriptive analysis of the

concept is based on the ideas in that chapter and other
relevant ideas in the rest of GRA.

In this section the

meaning of sovereignty is analyzed in terms of what the
concept signifies.
Henry's usage of the word "sovereignty" may be said
to include five significations:
power,

independence,

lordship and causality of God.

freedom,

These significations

have been carefully chosen as best representing what Henry
means by the term "sovereignty."

Since the focus of the

study is the relationship between sovereignty and inerrancy,
the selected significations are described and analyzed in
view of that focus.
First, divine sovereignty stands for the
independence of God in his existence.3

God is self—

XGRA. 5:307-33.
=Henry refers to God's independence in terms of
God's a s eitv. a term which, according to Henry, means that
God has "life from and by himself in independent freedom"
(ibid., 5:69).

r
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sufficient and his being and life have their origin only in
himself.1-

He is not dependent on anything outside himself

for anyth i n g .a

In fact, if everything turned into

nothingness, God Mould still exist."*
Second, sovereignty points to the freedom of God in
his decisions and activity.
necessity.'*

God does nothing out of

The creation of this particular world,

choice of Israel as the people of the covenant,

the

the

salvation of sinners and other things that God does are a
result of the free will of God.

Had he chosen to do so, he

would have created a different type of a world or chosen
another nation as his people.0

In other words, God is

sovereign in the sense that he can do anything, anytime, and
anywhere as he sees fit.*

Yet, Henry cautions that God's

1 Ibid.
2Henry asserts that God is "independent of all
compulsory relations to anything and anyone outside himself"
(i b i d ., 6 :37).
3 Ibid., 5:69.
In stressing this point, Henry argues
that one of the major flaws in process philosophy is its
refusal to view God in terms other than his relationship
with the world (ibid., 5:68).
The same idea is expressed by Reformed theologians as
follows: "It is independence by which in being and operating
God depends on no one else but possesses for himself an
essence sufficient to make him a se in essence and also in
operation, so that everything outside him depends upon him
in existing and in operating" (Heinrich Heppe, Reformed
Dogmatics. rev. and e d . Ernst Bizer, trans. G. T. Thompson
[London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950], 63).
"*GRA.

5:317.

°Ibid .
*Arthur Pink, a Reformed theologian, describes God
similarly as being "free to decree or not to decree, and to
decree one thing and not another" (The Attributes of God

r
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freedom does not lead him to do unreasonable things.A

God

has not only a logical mind but also a personal Mill and a
good character.

These factors are the ground from which the

freedom of God springs.3
Third, God's sovereignty signifies divine p o w e r .3
Henry views this power as that energy which God possesses
and which he manifests in various ways if and when he
chooses.'*

For Henry,

it is not a blind force but,

like

divine freedom, an aspect of God which is grounded in God's
mind,

personality and character.®

For purposes of clarity,

Henry distinguishes between God's inherent power and
manifest power.4

The latter is revealed to us through the

self— revelation of God in Scripture and through what God
CSwengel, Pennsylvania: Reiner Publications,

1964],

11).

xG a d 's action is "rationally consistent and
intrinsically good" (G R A . 6:274).
3Henry states that "God's will or nature implies
certain limitations on his actions . . ." (ibid., 5:319).
Further, "God’s own activity is a free divine activity,
grounded in, yet not necessitated by, his nature (ibid.,
317) .
3The word "omnipotence" generally conveys this
notion of power
unlimited power.
The term is avoided in
the discussion because its exact meaning in Henry is
ambiguous, despite its frequent mention.
At times it is
synonymous with sovereignty.
At other times, it means just
power as it is described in the third signification of
sovereignty.
Compare, for example, Henry's usage in ibid.,
5:308 and page 311 in the same chapter.
"*Ibid. , 5:314, 317.
®Ibid.
A Ibid., 5:316, 317.

E--I
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does,

has done and has promised to do in the future.1

Divine acts such as creation, preservation of the universe,
and redemption are examples of manifest power of God.3
Fourth, Henry refers to God's lordship over all
nature and history as another aspect of divine sovereignty.
In this connection, Henry views God as King, Monarch, Judge,
Administrator, and Governor of the universe.3

The titles

are not idle terms since behind them lie the notions of
independence,

freedom, and power of God which make his

lordship an actual reality.

God is lord by virtue of his

creatorship and continual preservation of the universe.'*
is the highest power there is anywhere.3

He

For Henry, God is

1Henry stresses that it is on the basis of manifest
power that we can speak of God's inherent power (ibid.).
This emphasis corresponds with Calvin's idea of omnipotence.
Calvin writes, "And truly God claims . . . omnipotence— not
the empty, idle, and almost unconscious sort that the
Sophists imagine, but a watchful, effective, active sort,
engaged in ceaseless activity.
Not . . . a general
principle of confused motion . . . but one that is directed
toward individual and particular motions" (Institutes. I,
16:3).
aGRA. 5:308.
Were we to classify the
significations, inherent power would be listed alongside
God's independence and freedom as these characteristics
describe God as he is in himself whereas manifest power
.vould be classified together with God's lordship and
causality as these aspects are descriptive of God's
relationship with the world.
3Henry uses all these terms for God
6:67; 27; 15; and 36, respectively).

(ibid.,

5:309;

* Ibid., 5:316, 317.
3Ibid., 5:318.

F
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“the sovereign Lord of the cosmos,

. . .

lord and judge of

the whole space— time processes."1
The ideas of independence, freedom, power, and
lordship of God define or qualify the concept of
sovereignty.

But they do not spell out haw God actually

exercises his sovereignty in the world.

In other words,

if

God is the highest Power and the supreme Lord in the
universe,

in what way are these divine properties effected

in the world?

The answer to this question seems to lie in

Henry's idea of divine causality which also signifies divine
sovereignty.
The word “causality" is itself not one of Henry's
favorites.

Henry uses it mostly to show that the papular

meaning of the term belongs to "conjectural philosophy of
religion, and not to the Bible.,,at

However, Henry does not

consider the term “causality" to be one that can easily be
dispensed with.

He writes,

Causality is a complex subject in the theological no
less than in the physical realm, but to simply dispense
with it in order to advance personal factors creates as
many problems as it solves.3
While,

in one instance, Henry states that the notion of

causality brings confusion, he also stresses that "to do
%

1Ibid., 6:27.
Calvin also holds that "the universe
is ruled by God, not only because he watches over the order
of nature set by himself, but because he exercises especial
care over each of his works" (Institutes. I, 16:4).
aGRA. 5:153.
3 Ibid., 6:93.

r
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without causality seems to invite ambiguous s y n o n y m s . F o r
him, creation is certainly not a "mechanistic causal
reality," but it involves, nonetheless, divine causation
whereby God voluntarily reenacts constantly his presence and
power.2

In addition, Henry notes approvingly that in the

Synod of Dart,

"causal categories" are used "to describe

God's sovereign work."3

One of the reasons why Henry

retains the idea of causality in his theology seems to be
his belief that God's relations with man and the world are
"causal” in nature.-*

For him, God is a “divine principle

immanent in all reality . . .

a spiritual— rational-moral

shaping force at work throughout cosmic existence and all
historical events."3
Henry distinguishes between God's causality and the
causality of creatures.

He refers to God as the "ultimate

cause of all that is,"*" the "sovereign causal creator of
all,"’3' the "independent personal cause of the universe,”"
the "metaphysical Absolute,"* the “fundamental power of
Ibid., 6:49.
Ibid.
Ibid., 6:90.
Ibid., 6:42,
Ibid., 3:202
Ibid., 6:37.
Ibid., 5:332
Ibid.
Ibid.
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creation,

the cause of existence,"1 the "chief causal

principle,"= an "operative reality who impinges on the whole
universe to the very limits and details of man's daily
life,"3 and the "one and only creative causality in the
universe and in history."-*
In addition to divine causality, Henry also believes
in the existence of "ongoing causes"3 which he also refers
to as "causality of nature."**

In one instance, he even

mentions "secondary causes" in a manner that closely
identifies them with the finite causal agents.7

Elsewhere,

the causality of nature bear the designation "agency of
creatures."*
On the question of the relationship between the
causality of God and the causality of creatures, Henry's
position may be outlined as follows:

First, Henry maintains

that God's relationship with the world does not imply that
God is ontologically continuous with the world.

For him,

the world is not necessary to God's being, neither is it a
1 I b i d ., 5:333.

= Ibid., 6:64.
3 I b i d ., 5:149.

*Ibid., 6:232.
3Ibid., 6:49.
*“Ibid . , 5:311.

’’Ibid., 6:49.
•ibid.,6:84.
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mode of God's being or a phase of divine life.*

Henry holds

that God transcends the world in a manner that makes his
contact with the world both objective and external.3
Second, God is not impersonal or blind but personal and
intelligible in his relationship with the world.3
divine causality is voluntary,

Third,

that is, free and without

internal or external necessity on the part of God.-*
According to Henry,

"God's own activity is a free divine

activity, grounded in, yet not necessitated by his nature."3
Fourth, divine causality is teleological

in perspective.**

Henry maintains that God "is now purposely at work not only
in the religious sphere but also in the realm of socio
political,

scientific and economic spheres."3

Further,

"Christ is advancing the eternal good of believers
throughout the entire space— time process.""

Fifth, Henry

understands the relationship between God's causality and
that of the creatures in terms of "concurrence."
"concurrence"

The word

is used by Henry in a context where its

presence is by no means incidental.

The passage in which

xHenry considers such views to be closer to
pantheism than to his own (ibid., 6:39).
= I b i d ., 6:40.
3 I b i d ., 6:331-3.
*1 b i d . , 6:49.
3I b i d ., 5:317.
"I b i d . , 6:50, 303-4, 492-513.
3 1 b i d ., 6:505.
"Ibid.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75
the word occurs reads as follows:
God is not a divine being who acts only behind, outside
or between cosmic and historical processes; he is
present in these processes and works in them. The
universe does not exist without his support and
concurrence. God both acts on the events of nature and
history from without and is purposely and meaningfully
engaged within the universe as well.*
Although Henry

leaves many questions unanswered about

causality,3 his usage of the word "concurrence" in

the above

context provides a basis for understanding his views on the
relationship between God's causality and the causality of
the creatures.
First,

the word "concurrence," in its dictionary

meaning, suggests association, cooperation, and union or two
or more agents in producing a single effect.3
xIbid., 6:48.

In applying

Emphasis supplied.

3Henry is extremely cautious about using the
language of causality which entails referring to God as the
First Cause and the agency of the creatures as secondary
causes.
He is certainly against using the phrase First
Cause for God.
Even the phrase "secondary causes" is used
very advisedly (ibid., 6:49).
The problem which this
caution on the part of Henry poses is that there are no
statements in Henry's series showing clearly how God's
causality relates itself with the causality of the
creatures, a distinction which Henry certainly makes but one
which has also to be made on the basis of certain statements
here and there.
Perhaps the reason for Henry's caution is
that Henry, as an apologist, seeks to appeal to a wide
evangelical constituency and if he came out strongly on
causality, chances are the the appeal could be diluted.
Yet, the possibility of explicating Henry's views on the
nature of the relationship between the two causalities
exists despite these obstacles.
There are a few key words
and ideas which Henry uses which unmistakably link him with
the traditional Reformed dogmatics where the relationship is
more explicit.
In this section., the few links which Henry
provides are mentioned as a way of clarifying the
relationship.
’According to Webster's Third New International
Pictionarv. the word "concurrence" denotes, among other

r
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the word to the relationship between God and the creatures,
it seems that "concurrence" denotes that the activity of God
and that of the creatures are not merely simultaneous but
also harmonious.

Further,

the implication is there that

one agent cannot produce an effect without the active and
contributary involvement of the other.

In the present case,

this implication applies only to the creatures since God
does not always act in conjunction with the creatures.1
Second, the word "concurrence"

links Henry directly

with the traditional Reformed dogmatics™ where
"concurrence," or concursus. stands for a specific
things, "agreement or union in action, combination of power
or influence," and "cooperation."
The verbal root, "to
concur," means "to act together to a common end or to
produce a single effect," while the adjectival derivative,
"concurrent," is defined as follows: "occurring, arising, or
operating at the same time often in relationship,
conj'unc t i o n , association, or cooperation; acting in
conj'unction: marked by accord, agreement, harmony, or
similarity in effect or tendency" (see Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, e d . Philip Babcock Gove
(Springfield, Massachusetts: Merrian—W e b s t e r , 1 9 B 6 ), s.v.
"concurrence," "concur," and "concurrent."
1 It was
previously mentioned that God's activity is
free and independent of any compulsory relations with the
world.
This leaves concurrence as a necessary condition for
the activity of the creatures only since, unlike God, they
are not free to act independently.
=As used in
this study,
the phrase
"traditional
Reformed/Calvinistic
dogmatics/theology" refers
to
the
theological
position
of John Calvin and
his
followers.
Since that tradition
has many
varieties today,
I have
in
mind
particularly those schools of
thought which make no
allowance
for
independent or uncaused
activity of
the
creatures.
For
a description of the four major schools of
thought in Reformed theology,
see David Basinger, "The New
Calvinism: A Sheep in Wolves' Clothing," Scottish Journal of
Theology 39
(November 1986): 483—99.
My understanding
of
the term
"traditional" school excludes the fourth school in
Basinger's scheme.

r
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theological concept.1

According to Johannes Heideggerus, a

Reformed theologian who lived around 1700,
Concurrence or cooperation is the operation of God by
which He cooperates directly with the second causes as
depending upon Him alike in their essence as in their
operation, so as to urge or move them to action and to
operate along with them in a manner suitable to a first
cause and adjusted to the nature of second causes.2
As this statement indicates,

the word "concurrence"

is used

in the context of the relationship between God as a first
cause and the creatures as second, or secondary causes.

It

is not insignificant to note that Henry, too, sets the word
"concurrence" in a context where he discusses the notion of
causality,

raises "the question of how God acts in the

world" and "injects himself into the ongoing causes," which
Henry advisedly also calls "secondary causes."3

What this

fact implies is that the meaning of the word "concurrence"
as Henry uses it can be illumined by the way traditional
Reformed theologians understood the relationship between
God, as the primary or the First Cause and second or
secondary causes.
For both Henry and Reformed theology,

the

AGiven Henry's theological tradition— Reformed or
Calvinist as argued at the beginning of this chapter
and
the theological importance of the word "concurrence" in
traditional Reformed theology, it seems that Henry's usage
of the term, particularly in the context of the passage
cited above, is neither accidental, coincidental, or
incidental.
Rather, its mention is a deliberate effort on
Henry's part to clarify the manner in which God, "the one
and only creative causality" (G R A . 6:232) relates himself to
the activity of the creatures.
^Johannes Heideggerus, quoted in Bizer, 258.
3GRA, 6:48-49.

UT”
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relationship in question is characterized by three main
features.

First,

the activity of God and that of the

creatures constitute not two separate, different, or
contradicting activities but a single activity.

In other

words, what may be referred to as an act of the creatures is
at the same time an act of G o d
Second,

.x

"concurrence" consists of not natural

laws,

maintenance of existence, or general guidance by God
primarily but a direct,

voluntary, and "constant reenactment

of God's presence and power" in each and every activity of
the creatures.2

The point here is that the creatures, evsn

^According to Henry, "The Psalms frequently speak of
the operations of nature as the very operations of deity:
thunder is God's 'voice,' lightnings 'his a r r o w s , '
earthquakes 'his doings.'
Without dwelling on secondary
causes the biblical writers here attribute the phenomena of
the creation directly to the creator" (ibid., 6:48—49).
Similarly, Johannes Heideggerus writes that "concurrence is
simultaneous" in the sense that God "produces one and the
same action along with the second cause, so that the action
of the first and second cause is one" (Johannes Heideggerus,
quoted in Bizer, 260).
2 Ibid., 6:49.
For Henry, God "acts not only behind,
outside or between cosmic and historical processes" but "is
present in these processes and works in them. . . . God both
acts on the events of nature and history from without and is
. . . engaged within the universe as well" (ibid., 6:48).
Further, Henry states that "God is no less implicated in the
falling of the rain than in the resurrection of the
Redeemer" (ibid., 6:15).
As far as the Reformed dogmaticians are concerned on
this point, the following statements seem to be
representative:
"But this cooperation of God must not be
conceived as a mere maintenance of natural forces, or the
mere setting up of a natural and moral law, or as the
effecting of an indifferent, general movement, to be
determined first of all by the creatures themselves, or as
an activity of God different from the activity of the
creatures and only coinciding temporally with it, working
not upon the creatures themselves but only upon their
activity.
On the contrary it is an activity of God such
that by it God directly and predeterminedly grasps the
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with their God—given capacities to act, are impotent until
and unless God "immediately" causes them to act in a certain
w a y .1
powers of the creatures and so arouses them to activity in
their natural way that the activity of the creature is God's
own action" (Bizer, 258-9).
Further, “This cooperation is
not to be placed (1) either in sheer preservation of
strength to work, (2) or in the giving of some law natural
or moral, by which all things act oroorio m o t u . (3) or in a
general, indifferent movement, to be determined by the
creatures, like the inflow of the sun, as is claimed by the
Jesuits. Socinians. Remonstrants. (4) or in the simultaneous
act of God distinguished really from the action of the
creatures, by which God in no wise inflows into creatures,
but only into their actions— but in all creatures' direct—
as regards power and what underlies, by a previous,
predetermining method not of time but of order
impulse and
move to action, so that in this way the action of creator
and creature is really the same, merely differently named"
(Johannes Marckius C1690], quoted in Bizer, 259).
^According to Johannes Heidegerrus, God's part in
the "concurrence" is "direct, not because He alone operates
alone without the application of any second cause, but
because between God's action and the result there is no
intervention of creaturely efficacy, which touches the
result more nearly than God.
God does not merely so assign
and preserve to the creature a faculty and power of action,
that the creature meantime emits an action or produces an
effect close at hand and directly, while God does so solely
by the medium of the power which He gave and preserves to
the creature;— on account of the nature of the creature's
dependence He attains to every action and result of the
creature directly.— Hence 'all things' are said to have been
done 'through Himself," i.e., by this direct and proximate
power as first cause Rom 11:36 (of him and through him and
to him are all things)” (Johannes Heideggerus, quoted in
Bizer, 260.
The language of the Reformed dogmaticians, if
Heideggerus is a theologian to go by, seems to make the
connection between God's causal role in the activity of the
creatures quite clear.
That role is immediate and direct
and the natural capacities of the creatures are only
instruments through which that role is actualized.
Although Henry does not use the word "direct" in
describing God's relationship with the results of creatures'
activity, he makes statements which unmistakably suggest
that he concurs with the views expressed in the above
passage.
The following statements are particularly
e n 1ightening:
"for theism nothing happens that God does not
foreknow and foreordain" (GRA, 5:280);

r
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Third, God's causality comes logically prior to the
causality of the

creatures and, therefore,

it is

determinative of

the effects of the "concurrence." It is

not the case here that the causality of the creatures is
totally cancelled in terms of the creatures themselves
deciding and acting voluntarily,

but that their decisions

and actions are causally preceded by God's prior causality.
This idea seems to be the basis
as God's decree,

of Reformed doctrines such

predestination or foreordination,

foreknowledge, and election,

all of which Henry affirms.1

"it is the purposing will of God, and not
omniscience, that governs the certainty of events" (ibid.);
"God has so sovereignly disposed the course of the
universe and of history that even the severest hostility to
his will instrumentally displays and promotes his
sovereignly redemptive plan" (ibid., 5:330);
"If God can foreknow human decisions and acts before
their psychological self-determination, and can do this
compatibly with man's free will, then why should divine
foreordination be considered any less compatible?" (ibid.,
5:2 B 4 );
“God's foreknowledge is a predeterminative
knowledge” (ibid., 5:285);
"Scripture contravenes the claim that divine nondetermination is necessary for human freedom and
responsibility, for God's foreordination includes even such
events as fallen man's rejection and crucifixion of Jesus
Christ . . . " (ibid., 5:284).
xThe force of these doctrines is expressed in the
following statements from Reformed dogmaticians (Henry's
statements which seem to come closest to the position of the
dogmaticians are also included):
".
. the object of the divine decree is not the
abstract order of the physical, moral and saving
dispensation in the abstract which is present in the world
and in God's kingdom of grace, but the concrete existence
and life of the world and of individual men with their
complex o t causes and effects" (Bizer, 142).
Henry writes that "In biblical theology everything
that God does is the outworking of his sovereign decree.
In
this respect man is no different from the stars or the sands
of the sea; that humans stand at a definite place in history
is no more an accident than that the planets move in their

r~
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The essence of these doctrines is that there is no decision,
action, event, circumstance, or destiny of a creature in the
universe which is not predetermined by God.

As Henry

orbits ar.d that the nations have their given bounds" (G R A .
6:78).
"Predestination is G o d 's decree by which He has
appointed rational creatures from eternity to fixed limits
beyond this temporal and natural life, they to be led
thereto by fixed means likewise foreordained from eternity"
(Amandus Polanus [ 1 6 2 4 ], quoted in Bizer, 154).
According to Henry, "predestination is but a part, a
particular phase of God's decrees" (G R A . 6:478).
He states
that this doctrine may not be the easiest one to proclaim
from the pulpit but the fact is that "the Bible itself
thrusts upon us this theme of divine predestination" (ibid.,
6:76).
For Henry, the word "predestination" is synonymous
with the word "foreordination" (ibid., 6:80).
"Gad's foreknowledge is that knowledge by which God
is signified as foreseeing and foreknowing from eternity
everything that is said to be future, as far as we are
concerned" (Amandus Polanus [1624], quoted in Bizer, 75).
Further, "Since as the actuosity of the divine Being
foreknowledge is the proof of God's nature over against the
world, it is determinative . . . " (Gulielmus Bucanus [1609],
75.
Henry asserts that "what creaturely minds grasp in
their time sequences God knows immediately as a
comprehensive totality; his decree to create a specific
universe involves knowledge of all its eventualities and
possibilities" (G R A . 5:277).
For him, "God's foreknowledge
is predeterminative knowledge" (ibid., 5:285).
"We define the election in question as God's eternal
and immutable decree, by which from the entire human race
that had fallen by its own fault from primaeval integrity
into sin and destruction He elected a fixed multitude of
individual men, neither better nor worthier than the rest,
of His sole good pleasure, to salvation in Christ Jesus, and
resolved to give them to His Son to redeem, and by a
peculiar and effectual mode of operating to bring them to
living faith in Himself and to a sure perseverance in the
same living faith, and that for a proof of His gracious
mercy and for the praise of His glorious grace" (Leiden
Synopsis, quoted in Bizer, 163).
Henry writes of God "in his love electing some
undeserving human beings to salvation" and in justice
"redemptively passing over others who are equally
undeserving" (G R A . 6:107).
He maintains that election is
not a "class election" but election of particular
individuals (ibid., 6:104— 7).
Like other doctrines
mentioned above, the doctrine of election stresses God's
prior choice in both the existence and destiny of creatures.

r
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writes,

"For theism, nothing happens in time that God does

not foreknow and foreordain."1

Even in regard to man, Henry

asserts that,
everything that can be predicated of man whether his
existence and continuance, or his responsible decisions
and deeds and final destiny, finds its necessary
presupposition in a divine reality beyond himself.3
In view of the above discussions, it seems that the
word “concurrence," as Henry uses it, has a specific
theological connotation.

Not only does it denote

cooperation of divine and creaturely causalities but it also
signifies total dependence of creatures on God for any and
all given aspect(s) of their existence.

The significance of

this fact for the concept of sovereignty cannot be
overemphasized.
kingship,

Basically, sovereignty means rulership,

lordship over a domain.

passive but an active quality.
over some d o m a i n .

Sovereignty is not a

One exercises sovereignty

While the range of possibilities of how

one exercises sovereignty is certainly very wide,

the case

which Henry seems to present suggests that God exercises his
sovereignty in the universe in a comprehensive and yet
detailed manner.

For Henry, God does not rule the world by

merely allowing or permitting creatures to decide and do
what they will.

Through his causal relations with the

world, God exercises his sovereignty by directly causing the
creatures to do what he both foreordains and foreknows.
such, divine sovereignty is a term which has far— reaching
‘GRA , 5:280.

3 Ibid.
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As

effects on how Henry views God's activity in the world.
From the above survey,

it seems that without the

ideas of God's independence, freedom,
causality,

lordship, power, and

the concept of sovereignty lacks specificity of

reference and the dynamics which make it functional as a
term that expresses God's authority in the universe.

Yet,

if the discussion were to stop here, Henry's concept of
sovereignty would only be partially understood.

A need

exists of showing the extent to which God is sovereign in
the universe.

In the next section,

an attempt is made at

describing the absolute nature of God's sovereignty in
Henry's writings.

This description includes some examples

of Henry's application of the concept of sovereignty to
specific aspects of his theology.
The Scope of God's Sovereignty
Henry states explicitly that "God's sovereignty is
absolute."1

This means that there is nothing anywhere in

the universe which does not have its origin or cause in the
sovereignty of God.

All things exist or happen because God

both originates them and controls their activity.3

The

sphere or the domain in which God exercises his sovereignty
is limitless in both time and space.

Since the complete

1 Ibid., 6:107.
’These ideas are expressed by Henry in various ways
he describes God as "absolutely sovereign" (ibid., 6:67),
One "whose sovereign purpose fashions and governs
everything" (ibid., 6:133), the One who "governs and
determines all limits of possibility for himself and the
universe" (ibid., 5:319), and One whose sovereignty is both
"universal and eternal" (ibid., 5:308).
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scope of God's sovereignty in Henry cannot be covered here
as that would entail going beyond the goal of this study,
three specific areas have been selected to demonstrate the
consistency with which Henry maintains his concept of
absolute sovereignty.

These areas also help to bring out

some aspect of sovereignty which have not been covered so
far.

The areas themselves are the problem of evil, and

providence.
The Problem of Evil
Henry recognizes evil as a formidable problem for
theism and atheism alike.1

Fortunately, Henry observes,

Bible is not silent about the subject.

the

It accepts and

confronts "the horrendous reality of sin and pain in moral
and physical evil."3

The context in which this problem must

be accepted and confronted, Henry suggests,
philosophical or theoretical.

For him,

is not

"Not even theistic

arguments can fully vindicate God's righteousness in the
face of human evil" on theoretical grounds alone.3
recommendation, rather,

Henry's

is that evil is "a religious

dilemma" whose solution can be found only in revelation and
scriptural doctrine of eschatology
Henry deals with evil in terms of "natural and moral
A Ib i d ., 6:282.
3 Ibid., 6:284.
3 Ibid., 6:282.
■*1bid . , 6:282,

299.
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as
evil."1

He does not see any evil as gratuitous (meaningless

or unwarranted) as that would imply lack of purpose in some
aspect of a providential universe.3

In actual exposition of

his views on evil, however, Henry does not appear to make a
distinction, at least a clear one, between moral and natural
evil.

In that case, both types of evil are here explained

together.
The question which seems to concern Henry most is
that of the origin of evil.

Before giving his own views,

he

first denies certain proposed solutions to this problem.
According to him, evil is not "an essential aspect of finite
and creaturely existence*'3 or an "imperfection either in the
created substance of the world or in the created nature of
man."'*

In other words, evil is not an "ultimate

metaphysical principle as is good."3

As God created it, the

universe is "unconditionally good and hence free of
intrinsic evil."*

Henry states that, originally,

“all

angels were morally good on the basis of divine creation."7
In addition, when God declares in Genesis that the created
universe is "very goo d , ” he "underscores its intelligible
‘■Ibid. , 5:312.
a Ibid., 6:291.
3 Ibid., 6:239.
*Ibid., 6:294.
“ Ibid.
**Ibid. , 6:124.
^Ibid., 6:233.
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order, moral perfection and aesthetic beauty,
excellence."1

in short,

its

If evil were a metaphysical necessity, Henry

argues that there would be no "hope for any sure triumph
over it" and God's victory over it would imply "eliminating
the finite and the creaturely."3
Henry is also opposed to the idea that man's will or
man's desires are the source of evil.3

In this regard,

Henry raises the objection that an appeal to man as the
source of evil ignores "satanic and demonic influences in
human affairs."'*

For Henry,

not in, but beyond man."3

"evil's ultimate source lies

Other theories on the origin of

evil which Henry rejects are those which view evil in terms
of "divine deficiency,"

"cosmic inevitability,"

"evolutionary necessity,"

"intrinsic historical disorder,"

"human illusion," and "psychiatric aberration."*
Henry points to Satan as "directly or indirectly
'ibid., 6:252.
Henry conceives God's goodness as
consisting of the three qualities: rational, moral, and
aesthetic perfection which are then reflected in the things
that God creates and/or declares to be good— like the
original creation (ibid., 6:252-3).
=*Ibid., 6:239.
3Henry does not indicate whether or not the will and
desires are identical.
He deals with them in two separate
contexts.
But his exposition of each of the two concepts
seems to suggest that the will and the desires refer to the
same thing (ibid., 6:244-5, 272— 3).
*Ibid., 6:272.

See also ibid., 6:244— 5.

“Ibid., 6:270.
* I b i d ., 6:284.
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responsible for a terrible trail of terror and shame."1

He

describes Satan as "a living power hostile to God and
external to man."2

In Genesis, Henry observes,

"the origin

of human sin" is connected with the serpent as the one who
“occasions human apostasy."3

After Adam fell through

Satan's deception, Henry states that "the sin principle"
which resulted in "human sinfulness" flows representatively
through Adam to all persons in the totality of their being,
and conditions both their individual acts and community
life."*

Yet, Henry hastens to add that, although Satan is

responsible for a lot of evil in the world,

he is not to be

posited "as if he were a rival deity unsubject to Elohim."3
According to Henry,

"the Bible nowhere teaches that world

history is outside God's control and directed by the
devil."

.

Although Scripture attributes "some of the radical

evil in the world to satanic forces," Henry explains,

these

forces are themselves bound by "God's creative power and
will."'2'

It is Henry's view that Satan is not "a principle

of primordial evil" and that "God uses Satan s acts to
Ibid., 6:249.
Ibid., 6:245.
Ibid., 6:244-5.
Ib i d ., 6:248.
Ibid., 6:249.
Ib i d .
I b i d . , 6:274.
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Henry emphasizes the fact that "Everything that comes from
God, beginning with his work of creation,

is good."A

For

Henry, Gad declared his creation to be good because he
"brings the good with him; he is himself the source of the
g o o d .I,a

Elsewhere, Henry writes,

"To be sure,

in speaking

of God as good, we mean that he is the creator and sustainer
of what we call good in the creatures."3

The original

creation is something which God desired and became its
author and creator.

In that case,

the original creation was

good and perfect in all dimensions.
As concerns evil, God's relationship with it is only
causal.

On the same page where Henry states that God is the

"cause of the factors in the created universe which we
consider evil," he also makes it clear that God is not the
author of sin,

that evil is not an aspect of God, and that

"sin is the antithesis of the divine and of the truly
godly."1*

Thus, sin and evil exist because God caused them

to be but since they do not reflect his goodness and
perfection, God is not their author.
In explaining the fact that not all that which has
God as its "cause" reflects his goodness, Henry writes,
God can be an ultimate cause of evil . . . without
himself being an aspect of evil, or of evil being an
aspect of him as its cause.
God created giraffes, but
A Ibid., 6:252.
a Ibid., 6:133.
3 Ibid., 6:257.
“ Ibid., 6:294.
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he is not a giraffe, nor are giraffes aspects of God.x
These statements seem to indicate that,

for Henry, God is

the cause of evil despite the fact that evil is not
reflective of God's character or goodness.

Another point to

note in this context is that Henry does not consider evil to
be something which God merely permits to exist.
view, Henry argues,

Such a

is essentially "incipient dualism" as it

suggests that, apart from God,
reality in the universe.

there is another source of

In fact,

it questions the

sovereignty of God.3
Another matter that Henry addresses is the divine
rationale for the existence of evil.

Henry here appeals to

the idea of God's freedom in his sovereignty.

He states:

Although God had sufficient reason for creating the
present universe, he might indeed have created a
different one, or even two or more dissimilar universes.
. . . The transcendent God's freedom is what accounts
for space— time realities.3
Henry here seems to imply that a world in which evil exists
is one which God freely chose to create and it should be
accepted as such.

Thus, Henry demonstrates that God remains

sovereign even in the face of evil.

Not only is God the

cause of evil but he is also its Judge who intends to
eradicate it in the end-time.
*Ibid., 6:294.
3 Ibid., 6:295.
3 Ibid., 6:78.
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Providence
Henry considers providence as the doctrine which
underscores the fact that the "time-space universe” is not
metaphysically ultimate" but "entirely contingent,
moment upon God."1

moment by

Providence is to be distinguished from

creation in that, although both are "works of divine
omnipotence," creation is "an already accomplished activity"
of God which antecedes and anticipates what God subsequently
"freely sustains, universally governs, and deploys for
special redemptive ends."3

It is this subsequent

preservation of what God created which is the arena of God's
providence.
In his explication of God's providence, Henry
distinguishes between universal providence and special
providence.

Henry refers to the two aspects of providence

also in terms of "universal dominion" and "special covenant
dominion."3

Universal or general providence is the dominion

which God "exercises over all creatures."4

It stands for

the idea that the "all— perfect omnipotent One fulfills his
divine purpose in creation and redemption by ordering both
nature's movements and human affairs.1,3

It implies that God

is "nature's everpresent ground and administrator" who
1 Ibid., 6:455.
3 Ibid., 6:456.
3 Ibid., 6:457.
■*Ibid.
3Ibid., 6:7 B .
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exists "perpetually in providential relationship to man and
the world."1

For Henry,

"God is no less implicated in the

falling of the rain than in the resurrection of the
Redeemer . 1,3
Special or particular providence affirms that "God
works out his purposes not m e r e l y

in l i f e ’s generalities but

in the details and minutiae of life as well."3

It relates

to "personal experiences" and "life's peculiarities."-*
Henry writes:

"Since all things fall within God's purview,

even seemingly chance events should be considered divine
providences."3

Yet, special

on God's people.

providence has its focus mainly

For Henry, "God's special providence

selectively for the good of all who trust him."*

He adds,

"God promises the

overruling benevolence of sovereign

providence not to

rebellious and impenitent

to his people."7

However,

works

worldlings but

this emphasis is not to be

understood as implying that the "rebellious and impenitent"
are outside God's providence.

In this respect, Henry

stresses that "God's providence . . . embraces even the acts
1 1b i d ., 6:15.
3 Ibid.
3 I b i d ., 6:459.
*1 b i d .
3 Ibid . , 6:459.
* 1 bid . , 6:461.
3 Ibid . , 6:460.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94
of those who rebel against his purposes."4'

Within the

categories of universal and special providence,

then, Henry

affirms "God's a l 1—comprehending providence."3

The goal and

purpose of God's providence may not yet be achieved till the
final

"climactic consummation"

at the "end of time" but it

seems clear that, for Henry, nothing, even in the present
world,

falls outside God's providence.
One question which naturally arises in view of God's

providence is the place of human freedom in the whole
scheme.

Henry's main exposition on human freedom is given

in the context of abjections against the idea that "God
ordains the entire course of world and human affairs."3
According to Henry,

the critics charge that "comprehensive

divine foreordination is inconsistent with human freedom."'*
In response, Henry affirms that "God preserves man's
responsible moral agency and that divine election in no way
transforms human beings into robots."3

Further,

he states

that "God preserves relative freedom and independence of
creatures."*

He even dismisses "secular theories of

determinism that eclipse human moral responsibility."7"
41bid., 6:461.
= Ibid.
3 Ibid., 6:84.
■•ibid.
s Ibid.
•■Ibid., 5:311.
7 Ibid., 6:84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95
However,

Henry explains that the human freedom he

has in mind is a qualified type of freedom.
does not have,

nor

For him,

"man

has he ever had, the freedom to decide

and act in a manner that contradicts all his indicated
decisions and deeds."1
as "the Pelagian

Henry describes this sort of freedom

'liberty of indifference. '1,2

as "arbitrary," "unpredictable,"
and random,"

He views it

"unrestrained," "capricious

"abnormal and subrational .1,3

that kind of freedom, Henry argues,

The fault with

is its insistence on

"man's ability in each action to totally reverse his course
and be today the living contradiction of all that he was
yesterday.

. . ."■*

For Henry,

"That sort of

'free will'

would make responsibility impossible."9
Mhat Henry proposes is a view of human freedom which
is compatible with divine foreordination.*

That freedom has

xIbid.
What Henry seems to emphasize in this
sentence is the fact that human decisions and actions are
predictable.
His concern here is not so much that God
predetermines human decisions and actions as to refute the
“libertarian" view of freedom where it is possible for man
to decide and act in a manner that contradicts all present
causal factors in the experience of deciding and acting.
For Henry, "indicated decisions and deeds" are theoretical
possibilities based on certain "givens" and which are later
confirmed by actual decisions and deeds.
=Ibid.
3 1bi d .
'‘Ibid.
9 Ibid., 6:84-85.
*Henry uses this term as a synonym for
predestination (ibid., 6:80).
For Henry, the two terms
denote God's unconditional determination beforehand of all
circumstances that prevail and all events that take place
anywhere in the universe (ibid., 5:277—80; 6:76—78).
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the following characteristics:

First, it excludes divine

coercion.

Henry states clearly that "God does not force man

to sin."1

Second,

According to Henry,
what they d o.,,=

it consists of "voluntary choice."
"Human beings voluntarily choose to do

This sense of freedom, Henry maintains,

is

perfectly compatible with divine foreordination and
foreknowledge.3

He writes,

"The fact that God has

foreordained human choices and that his decree renders human
actions certain does not therefore negate human choice.”"*
For Henry,

"If humans voluntarily choose to do what God

foreknows to be certain,

then the conditions of voluntary

human agency are fulfilled."3

In fact, Henry adds,

"We do

not choose because God has determined our choices.'"*
It is significant to note that Henry affirms both
human "freedom" to choose and act and God's providence and
foreordination at the same time.

The language which Henry

uses can be particularly misleading in this respect if care
is not exercised in interpreting what Henry means by the the
term "freedom."
traditional

In addition, Henry does not always use the

terminology of Reformed theology— such as the

"bondage of the will" and "reprobation" of some to eternal
JIbid., 5:283.
Z Ibid . , 6:85.
3 Ibid., 5:280.
"*1bid . , 6:85.
3 Ibid., 5:282.
*1 b i d .
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damnation.

Instead, he uses expressions Mhich many non—

Calvinists would find quite acceptable— such as "relative
independence of creatures,"1 "man's responsible moral
agency,"

"responsible free agency of man"2 and man's

voluntary decisions and actions.3

Yet, Henry's language

should not be understood as indicating that he is no longer
a Reformed theologian.

It is to be noted that,

in his

treatment of human freedom, nowhere does Henry suggest that
man can choose contrary to what God both foreordains and
foreknows.

For Henry,

human choice and activity is

essentially an effect or a result of a decision and action
which God has previously taken.

This point is illustrated

by Henry in the following statement:
Jesus'

"While confession of

name is and must indeed be human decision and choice

. . . its very possibility reflects Yahweh's prior choice."*
Further,

"God's foreordination includes even such events as

fallen man's rejection and crucifixion of Jesus Christ,
events for which mankind is held responsible."3
Consequently, Henry maintains that "God's decree renders
certain not only good acts but wicked acts as well."*

xIbid. ,

That

5:311.

3 Ibid., 6:85.
3 Ibid., 5:282.
*1 b i d ., 6:83.
3 Ibid., 5:284.
**Ibid., 6:86.
The meaning of this statement seems
to be that God makes the occurrence of the said acts
unconditional.
the same page, Henry also writes that
"the certainty of events that God decrees includes man's

On
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being the case, Henry concludes that, in God's causal
relations with the world, man is not different from the nonmoral world.

Henry writes:

Everything that God does is an outworking of his
sovereign decree.
In this respect, man is no different
from the stars or from the sands of the sea; that humans
stand at a definite place in history is no more an
accident than that the planets move in their orbits and
that the nations have their given bounds.1.
It seems to me that, on the basis of Henry's views
on the relationship which God has with his creatures in
general and with man in particular, Henry's position is best
described as a form of "compatibilism" or "soft
determinism."

According to John Feinberg,

"compatibilism"

is a way of relating God's sovereignty and human freedom in
a manner that shows that they are compatible.

He states

that "genuinely free human action" is "compatible with
nonconstraining sufficient conditions which incline the will
decisively in one way or the other."3

Feinberg goes on to

explain that "compatibilism" is a form of determinism which
affirms both the Calvinistic doctrine of divine sovereignty
sinful no less than righteous acts" (ibid.).
See also
ibid., 6:461.
For Henry, God's foreordination of an evil
act is not itself evil" (ibid., 5:315).
As the Reformed
dogmatician, Johannes Heideggerus expressed this point,
"between God's action and the result there is no
intervention of creaturely efficacy, which touches the
result more nearly than God" (Johannes Heideggerus, quoted
in Bizer, 260).
x Ib i d ., 6:78.
3John S. Feinberg, "God Ordains All Things," in
Predestination and Free Hill: Four Views of Divine
Sovereignty and Human F r e e d o m , e d . David Basinger and
Randall Basinger (Downers Grove, Illinois: Interversity
Press, 1986), 25.
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and the idea that humans are free.1

The two main

characteristics of this view are that human decisions and
actions are "causally determined" but that they are free in
the sense that God's causation is nonconstraining.3

On the

basis of Henry's views analyzed in this chapter, the
conclusion seems to be in place that the term
"compatibilism" adequately expresses Henry's concept of the
relationship between God's sovereignty, on one hand, and
human decisions and actions, on the other.
So far,

the meaning of sovereignty inHenry has been

discussed in terms of what the concept signifies and the
extent to which it is absolute.

An equally important aspect

of the concept is the place which it occupies in Henry's
theology.

Such

a setting helps to underscore the overall

importance of sovereignty in Henry's thought.
following section,

In

the

this setting is analyzed and its

significance in Henry's theology described.
Sovereignty in Henry's Theology
The concept of sovereignty is not an isolated idea
in the theology of Carl Henry.

Like other aspects of

Henry's thought, sovereignty stands within a web of related
ideas, all of which are aimed at demonstrating the
comprehensive coherence of Henry's theological structure.
In this section,

the question being addressed is the place

which the concept of sovereignty occupies in the theology of
A Ib i d ., 22, 24.
3 Ibid . , 24.

i
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Henry.

The answer to this question is sought by examining

sovereignty in two related contexts:

its place among the

attributes of God and in the wider context of Henry's
theology.
Sovereignty as an Attribute of God
Henry describes sovereignty as one of the attributes
of God.1

Attributes are characteristics that define the

nature of God.3
omnipresence,

They include such qualities as omniscience,

omnipotence,

love, wisdom,

immutability, etc.3

By placing sovereignty among these attributes, Henry lays
significant theological weight on the concept.

He thus

implies that the concept is not a mere inference from other
considerations but a subject that deserves to be treated
like other important biblical teachings.'*
’"GRA, 5:295.
3Henry refers to attributes also as properties and
perfections.
He does not think that there are any
meaningful differences between the two words (ibid., 5:99).
’Nowhere in the series does Henry give a complete
list of the divine attributes.
He only writes of two kinds
of attributes: communicable and incommunicable (ibid.).
This classification has been used traditionally by Reformed
theologians.
See Heinrich Heppe, Reformed D o g matics. 60—
64.
However, those properties of God which Henry
considers to be important are specifically referred to as
attributes and they are discussed in individual chapters in
G R A . vol. 5.
These attributes are: personality (chap. 7),
Spirit (chap. iO), infinity (chap. 11), timelessness (chap.
12), omniscience (chap. 14), immutability (chap. 15),
sovereignty (chap. 16), and rationality (chap. 17).
*Those theologians who view sovereignty as an
inference from other teachings of Scripture consider
sovereignty as so comprehensive a concept that to place it
among the attributes somehow limits its coverage.
See James
Montgomery Boice, The Sovereignty of God (Downers Grove,
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While he counts it among the attributes, he also
distinguishes sovereignty from them.

Henry stresses the

fact that "without it all other attributes of God lose their
efficacy."1
others.

This qualification has two implications, among

First, despite Henry's assertion that no attribute

is higher or more important than others,3 it seems that
sovereignty can be exempted from that requirement.
Certainly, Henry chooses his vocabulary carefully so that
there is no obvious contradiction between his assertion that
the attributes are equal and his reference to sovereignty as
having a logical priority over other attributes.3
Illinois:

InterVarsity Press,

1978),

Vet,

it

150.

*GRA. 5:295.
3Henry emphasizes the "equal honor that Scripture
bestows on all God's attributes" (ibid., 6:136).
sOn one hand, Henry considers all attributes to be
equal (ibid.).
On the other hand, he also makes certain
statements which, properly interpreted, tend to support the
idea that sovereignty is a fundamental attribute.
Consider
the following statement: "Even if one does not consider
sovereignty the fundamental divine attribute, without it all
other attributes of God lose their efficacy" (ibid., 5:295).
In another passage, Henry uses the word
"omnipotence" to express the same idea: "It is indeea divine
sovereignty that permeates the Bible narrative- whether one
turns to the creation, incarnation or final judgment.
If
one considers the omnipotence of God as foundational, then
all other divine attributes or activities express that
omnipotence as applied to different historical situations"
(ibid., 5:325).
That the word "omnipotence" here is
interchangeable with the word "sovereignty" is supported by
three considerations.
First, the sentence preceding the one
in question is the first in the paragraph and it clearly
indicates that the subject which the author has in mind is
sovereignty.
Second, the chapter where the passage occurs
is entitled, "The Sovereignty of the Omnipotent God."
Third, Thomas licNeal , in his dissertation on Henry's concept
of God, observes that "Henry links the notions of God's
sovereignty and omnipotence together" (A Critical Analysis
of the Doctrine of God, 180).
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seems clear that the least which can be said about
sovereignty is that,
among equals.
Second,

for Henry,

it is the first attribute

It is definitive of the other attributes.
the distinction which Henry accords

sovereignty among the attributes seems essentially to
disqualify it as an attribute.

Although as a general rule,

an attribute must be shown to hp compatible with other
attributes in order to maintain coherence within one's
concept of G o d ,x it appears unusual to qualify one
attribute, as Henry does with sovereignty, so that a
relative independence of the other attributes is precluded.
If without sovereignty "all the other attributes lose their
efficacy,"3 it would appear that Henry has not quite
established sovereignty as "one of" the divine attributes.
To me,

it seems that sovereignty is given the status of an

attribute mainly for systematic purposes.
divine attribute,

That is, as a

the concept of sovereignty is not an

appendage to systematic theology but a proper Christian
dogma.

Otherwise,

its significance transcends the role of

an ordinary attribute.
Furthermore,

sovereignty is a key concept in Henry's

understanding of the nature of God.

Without it, none of the

other aspects of the nature of God have any significance.
It needs to be pointed out here that,

for Henry,

the

1See Nash, The Concept of G o d . 12— 13.
3GRA, 5:295.
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attributes of God and his essence are identical.A
fact is understood,
implied

When this

it becomes easier to appreciate the

logic that if a concept is significant in the

description of the nature of God, it is so also for the
whole doctrine of God as far as Henry is c o n cerned.
case,

In this

this means that if sovereignty is a fundamental

"attribute" in the nature of God,
for the whole doctrine of God.

it is equally significant

This theological weight of

the concept of sovereignty has, of necessity,

tremendous

consequences when it comes to Henry's view of God's
relationship with the world.

In fact, Henry maintains that

"God's sovereignty is an aspect of his ontology, and it is
God in his total being who decrees, and does so freely,

that

is, free of all external constraints.1,2
Sovereignty in Henry's Theological System
In chapter 2, it was mentioned that Henry sets his
ideas in the context of his theological system.

It was also

observed that his system consists of two main axioms—
epistemological and ontological,
After discussing
now

remains

theorems and propositions.

the epistemological axiom in chapter 2, it

for us to focus attention on the ontological

axiom.
Henry clearly states that "the triune God is
1Henry states clearly that attributes "are identical
with the divine essence and serve more fully and precisely
to define God's nature" (ibid., 5:132).
= Ibid., 6:9*?.
Henry conceives God's decrees to be
those relations which God has with realities outside himself
(i b i d ., 6:80).
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Christianity's basic ontological axiom."A

In other words,

for Henry, God is Christianity's ontological first principle
or presupposition.

Further evidence shows that by referring

to God as the "ontological" axiom, Henry means that God is
the ground of all existence and One in whom everything has
its being.

Henry maintains that "God is the source of all

substance and structures of existence, metaphysical ground
of the true and the good."3
In view of what was mentioned previously concerning
sovereignty as an attribute,

the case for the significance

of sovereignty in Henry's theological system may be stated
as follows.

Henry distinguishes sovereignty as the single

most important attribute of God.

That being the case,

sovereignty must logically be considered to be a very
significant concept in Henry's doctrine of God since God's
nature and his essence are identical and both constitute all
that can be asserted about God.

From these observations,

it

appears that if an axiom is a basic element in Henry's
theological system, and God is the ontological axiom,

then

sovereignty must be considered a concept of vital importance
in that system.3
Henry,

In fact, it seems safe to infer that,

the concept of sovereignty,

for

along with its

*Ibid., 1:219.
3 1b i d . , 6:67.
3Henry himself seems to support this conclusion when
he writes that "God's sovereignty is in fact an aspect of
his ontology, and it is God in his total being who decrees,
and does so freely, that is, free of all external
constraints" (ibid., 6:99).
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significations,

plays a significant presuppositional role in

the whole structure of his system.1
Conclusion
In this chapter, Henry's concept of sovereignty has
been analyzed in terms of Henry's tradition, the meaning of
the concept,
theology.

its scope and also its place in Henry's

It was pointed out at the beginning that the

investigation is done for the purpose of analyzing Henry's
views on the nature of God's activity in the world.
such,

As

this evaluation has its focus mainly on those aspects

of the concept which are descriptive of that phenomenon.2
1That the concept of sovereignty plays a key role in
Henry's theological system is not by any means a strange or
new approach to theology.
The concept of sovereignty has
been affirmed by other Reformed theologians as an
interpretive principle in theology.
Ben A. W a r b u r t o n , for
example, writes, "The one rock upon which Calvinism builds
is that of the absolute and unlimited sovereignty of the
eternal and self—existent Jehovah" (Calvinism; Its History
and Basic Principles. Its Fruits and Its Future, and Its
Practical Apolication to Life CGrand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans, 1955], 63).
See also H. Henry Meeter, Calvinism:
An Interpretation of Its Basic Ideas, vol. I: The
Theological and the Political Ideas (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1939), 31— 38;
William K. B. Stoever, "The
Calvinist Theological Tradition," in Encyclopedia of the
American Religious Experience: Studies of Traditions and
Movements, v o l . I I . e d . Charles H. Lippy and Peter W.
Williams (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 19B8), 1039;
Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God (Grand Rapids: Baker
Book House, 1930); James Montgomery Boice, Foundations of
the Christian Faith, vol. 1: The Sovereignty of God (Downers
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1978); and John Murray,
Calvin on Scripture and Divine Sovereignty (Philadelphia:
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1960), 55— 71.
2A full assessment of the concept is not intended
here as that involves more issues than the purpose of this
investigation allows.
It should be remembered that the
issues raised in this chapter have been debated for
centuries and a study of this size cannot hope to do deal
adequately with the whole question.
Those aspects of the

f
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Henry views divine sovereignty as signifying God's
independence, freedom,

power,

lordship, and causality,

divine sovereignty is,

therefore,

a complex of other

attributes that underlie God's authority and ability to act
as he pleases.

For Henry, sovereignty is the most important

divine attribute.
their efficacy.

Without it, all other attributes lose
This being the case, and in view of the

significance which Henry attaches to the doctrine of God ,x
it is not surprising that sovereignty plays a definitive
role in Henry's theology.

Because the concept of divine

sovereignty describes the basis and the nature of God's
action in the world,

it necessarily follows that divine

sovereignty surfaces in many contexts.
Divine sovereignty is the perspective from which
Henry understands many theological problems.
is the problem of evil.

One of these

For Henry, God causes evil because

he is the only one who can ultimately cause anything.
causes all the decisions and

actions of man.

Gad

Those who are

"God's people" may have special favors from God but all
human decisions and actions,
are caused by God.3

be they righteous or wicked,

Another issue which the concept of

sovereignty illumines is the

concept of providence.

It is

concept of sovereignty which are deemed significant for the
objectives of this study are briefly mentioned.
1When asked in an interview what doctrine he thought
to be most important, Henry rc;-Ii_'d that the doctrine of God
is the most fundamental (Butler D. Hochstedt, "An Interview
with Carl F. H. Henry," TSF Bulletin 10 (Mar— Apr 19Q7): 17.
3 GRA. 5:280, 312; 6:83, B 6 , 461.
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Henry's view that the place of every individual person or
thing in the world and in history is definite and certain
because God so provides.1

The natural processes,

operate under direct command of G a d .3

too,

Gad's sovereignty is

implicated in the rainfall as it is in the resurrection of
Christ.3

For Henry,

any suggestion that any thing in the

universe is caused by some agent other than God is
"incipient dualism."'*

In essence, divine sovereignty

denotes God as the absolute causal agent throughout the
universe and no creature, man included, can act contrary to
what God makes certain through his causality.3
For our present purposes,

it is of particular

importance that Henry understands divine sovereignty in
terms of causality,

among other significations, and that

this causality is absolute.

The connection being made here

x Ib i d ., 6:78.
= Ibid.
3 Ibid . , 6:15.
*1 bid . , 6:295.
3Jack W. Cottrell admits that the "Bible certainly
speaks of God's ability to turn a person's heart and actions
(e.g., Ps 16:1; 21:1), and it gives many examples (e.g.,
Gen. 50:20; Exod 10:20; Ezra 1:1).
The Calvinistic fallacy,
however, is to generalize from these particulars and to
assume that they are paradigms for the way God works in
every decision without exception."
See Cottrell's article,
"The Nature of the Divine Sovereignty," in Clark P i n n o c k ,
e d ., ft Case for Arminianism. 113.
*The word "absolute" is used here and in the study
as a whole to signify the fact that there is no aspect of
reality and existence which does not have God as its direct
cause, including the decisions and actions of free moral
agents like human beings.

r~
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

108
between sovereignty and causality is one in which causality
is not merely a qualifier in the concept of sovereignty but
the means by which God exercises his sovereignty.

For

Henry, sovereignty is not some general concept of God's
authority and rulership in the universe where created agents
are free to decide and act independently to some degree.
Rather,

the notion of divine sovereignty entails a very

specific description of the exact manner in which God rules
the universe and how he guarantees effectiveness in his
exercise of authority in the world.

On the basis of the

connection between sovereignty and the idea of causality,
there are three inferences which can be drawn from that
fac t .
First, God exerts his sovereignty by himself being
the ultimate,

independent, causal principle in the universe.

Henry does not leave any room for anyone or anything other
than God himself to independently originate,

create, or

cause any thing, any event, or any condition, even evil
itself.

This means that the chief cause for any given

aspect of created reality is external
constitute that reality.

to the agents that

For Henry, God is not

ontologically continuous with the world and it is in that
sense that his causality must be considered to be objective
and external

to the world and the agents that constitute it.

Second, divine sovereignty implies absolute certainty
and unconditionality of the events and circumstances which
God intends to cause to exist.

In this respect, Henry

states that God's decrees "eventuate with certainty" and

r
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that "all history reveals the certainty of events decreed by
God."1

It is Henry's view that

If God's plan achieve what he did not purpose, if parts
of it conflicted and competed, if his purpose itself
requires constant revision, then God would be neither
all-wise nor all-powerful.
G o d ’s decrees will eventuate
with certainty whether they come to pass solely by his
own causality or through the agency of his creatures.
. . . All history reveals the certainty of events
decreed by God.3
The meaning of these statements seems to be that the "causal
chain"

between God and the created universe is so necessary

that God's decisions and actions cannot be qualified,
modified,

or changed by any factors or considerations

outside God.

For Henry, not even human freedom is capable

of affecting the certainty of God's decrees.
Third, divine sovereignty implies that the decisions
and actions of created existents are not,

indeed cannot be,

in competition with or opposed to God's decisions and
actions.

G o d ’s actions and those of nature are harmonious

ar.d compatible.
"concurrence."

To expresses this idea, Henry uses the word
For him,

"The universe does not exist

without his [God's] support and concurrence."3

It is to be

noted that, while Henry emphasizes the logical priority of
1 1bid . , 6:04 .
3 Ibid.
It is to be noted that in this passage,
Henry does not place the causality of God and that of the
creatures on the same level. The phrase, "or through the
agency of his creatures," seems to suggest that the
creatures do not have an independent causality running
parallel to Gao's.
The role of the creatures is that of
agency and instrumentality through which God may choose to
effect his plans and purposes.
3 I bid., 6:48.
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Gad's activity in this "concurrence" or "compatibilism," he
does not thereby eliminate the relevance and significance of
the activity of created agents.

In fact, Henry considers

the activity of the creatures to be "voluntary."1

What

Henry teaches is that "the operations of nature" are at the
same time the "operations of deity."a
The material

presented in this chapter has focused on

Henry's concept of sovereignty in general

terms.

It

consists of an analysis of how Henry views the nature of
God's activity in the world.

In chapter 4, an attempt is

made at examining the sense in which Henry's concept of
sovereignty is a presupposition in his concept of inerrancy.
xThis is best illustrated by Henry's concept of
human freedom which is discussed in this chapter under
"providence."
Freedom of activity here is not the
"libertarian 'freedom of indifference'" but "freedom of
voluntary choice" and activity (ibid., 6:84— 5).
3 Ibid., 6:49.
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CHAPTER IV
SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRESUPPOSITION
IN THE CONCEPT OF INERRANCY
In chapters 2 and 3, attention has been focused on
clarification of Henry's understanding of inerrancy and
sovereignty as individual concepts.

Each was described and

analyzed in terms of Henry's sources for the concept,
basic meaning of the word,

the

the scope covered by the concept,

and its place in Henry's theology.

An evaluation Mas also

made of each for the purpose of highlighting those aspects
that point in the direction of this study.

The analysis

made in regard to the concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty
thus far makes possible the investigation of the proposition
that "sovereignty is a presupposition in Henry's concept of
scriptural inerrancy.-1
It M a s observed in c h a p t e r s 2 and 3 that the terms
i n e r rancy and s o v e r e i g n t y e n c o m p a s s several c o n c e p t s and
that these co n c e p t s e x i s t in logical c h a i n s M i t h other
ideas.2

Thus, d i s c u s s i o n on hoM i n e r rancy p r e s u p p o s e s

AThis propositional phrase expresses the central
focus of this chapter.
It appears in the discussion in two
forms: “sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy" and
"inerrancy presupposes sovereignty."
Both forms are used
interchangeably in this study.
^Inerrancy represents such ideas as logical
consistency and coherence of biblical propositions, absence
111
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sovereignty cannot be limited only to the dictionary
definitions of the two words.

It must include other related

ideas also.
In keeping with this guideline,
is divided into two main sections.

the present chapter

The first section,

entitled "Primary Considerations," is devoted to those ideas
and concepts which are related to sovereignty and inerrancy
in an effort to establish fundamental principles on which
the proposition,

"sovereignty is a presupposition in

inerrancy," is predicated.

The second section examines how

Henry applies those principles in his understanding of the
process of inspiration.

It is in this context that specific

observations are made on how Henry confirms the proposition
that "inerrancy presupposes sovereignty."

The two main

sections of the chapter are fallowed by a conclusion which
highlights the main concerns of the chapter.
Primary Considerations
The first task in this chapter is to lay the
foundation on which the proposition,

"Henry's idea of

inerrancy presupposes his concept of sovereignty," seems to
be established.

It is a search for basic principles which

underlie that proposition and which make it metaphysically
significant.

One important consideration in this respect is

of error from and truthfulness of scriptural contents.
It
is closely associated with Scripture, the doctrine of
revelation and the structure of Henry's epistemology.
Sovereignty signifies G o d ’s independence, freedom, power,
lordship, and causality.
It is connected with the nature of
God as a divine attribute and it plays a vital role in
Henry's ontology.

F
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the -fact that both sovereignty and inerrancy belong to
realms of meaning which have no obvious relevance to each
other.

One way of expressing the distance between the two

is to view sovereignty as belonging to the realm of ontology
and inerrancy as belonging to the realm of e p i s temology.1
Another way of expressing the same distance is to describe
sovereignty as an aspect of the supernatural God while
inerrancy is a characteristic of Scripture, something which
belongs to the natural world.3
These distinctions help to clarify what is involved
in examining the proposition that “inerrancy presupposes
sovereignty."
proposition,

Before considering the specific nature of the
therefore, one must determine if there is a

possibility of relating such diverse realms of reality as
epistemolagy and ontology in Henry's writings.

If the realm

of ontology (being), and the concept of God, on the one
hand, and the realm of epistemology (knowledge) and the
‘•That is, sovereignty attaches to the realm of
“being" while inerrancy attaches to the realm of
“knowledge.“
Allusions to the relevance of these broad
philosophical categories were made in previous chapters.
As
it is pointed out later, ontology and epistemolagy are not
separable.
The categorization made here is for the sake of
argument and clarification of Henry's ideas.
aHenry also considers these distinctions as
necessary categories in philosophical and theological
argumentation.
For him, “However difficult may be a precise
definition of nature, such definitions are essential to any
resolution of the issues in debate. . . . Judeo—Christian
theology declares the universe— the cosmos and the whole
world of creatures— to be God's creation.
It distinguishes
God as the uncreated Creator of all else, and hence as
supernatural; the term nature, by contrast, applies to
everything derived from God.
No part of the created
universe is to be considered supernatural“ (G R A . 6:13).
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concept of what belongs to nature, on the other, cannot be
shown to be related in any manner, there remains little,
any, hope that the proposition,

"inerrancy presupposes

sovereignty," can be affirmed.

In other words, the

if

proposition in question involves, at a primary level, a
relationship between ontology and epistemology, being and
knowledge, and God and the w o rld.1
Henry's ideas which are considered here to be
"primary considerations" in the discussion are: God's
epistemological sovereignty, God's ontological sovereignty,
and the concept of divine Logos.

It is to be noted that the

notions of epistemology and ontology have been mentioned
briefly in chapters 2 and 3 in connection with Henry's
theological system.

In this chapter,

these notions are

further clarified with more attention being focused on their
relevance to the proposition under investigation.

Henry's

concept of divine Logos is discussed for the first time.
However, as the investigation seems to reveal,

its novelty

lies more in its integrative role in Henry's metaphysics
than in its constitutive meaning.
God's Epistemological Sovereignty
Henry's concept of sovereignty has definite
implications on Henry's epistemology.

In this study,

the

1In dissertation, Fernando Canale has shown
convincingly the absolute necessity of relating together
ontological and epistemological frameworks in the
construction of theological systems.
He considers it naive
to fail to see the relationship between them.
See A
Criticism of Theolooical Reason. 27— 51.
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phrase "epistemological sovereignty" is used to express
Henry's view that
God's sovereignty requires the confession that all
existence and all knowledge have their ultimate source
in the divine Logos.
Truth is truth because God thinks
and twills it; in other words, truth depends on the
sovereignty of God.x
It is Henry's view that God is the "ultimate explanation of
the rational structure of the world and m e n ”a and that “the
fixed orders of created existence,

both rational and moral,

are God— given .1,3
From what Henry writes,

it appears that God is

sovereign in respect to moral and rational order in the
universe.

By moral structures, Henry makes reference to

ethical categories and all other factors which make the
moral experience of man possible.'*

All these have their

*~G R A . 5:334.
Although the phrase itself,
“epistemological sovereignty,“ occurs in connection with
Henry's depiction of self—conceptions of the secular man
(ibid., 5:315), it is used in this study in reference to God
since the context in which the phrase occurs suggests that
"epistemological sovereignty" is a divine prerogative which
man wrongly assumes to be his.
It is to be noted also that Henry's epistemology is a
broader subject than what can possibly be covered in this
section.
But a number of important ideas are embedded in it
and these need to be taken into account if the validity of
the presuppositional premise of sovereignty in the concept
of inerrancy is to be demonstrated.
“ Ibid., 5:350-1.
3 Ib i d ., 6:2“ '?.
*These categories include “God's revealed commands
and principles" which form “the core structure of biblical
ethics," “man's moral understanding, . . . his created
relationship both to the sovereign God and to moral
imperatives which man even in his unbelief retains through
the imperishable cognitive links of reason and conscience .
. . moral categories implanted by creation, . . . the voice
of the sovereign holy Lord both in general and in special
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source and ground in God.1

Henry especially emphasizes the

fact that it is God who originates and defines both good and
evil as moral referents.3
Closely related to moral categories is the rational
content and order of the universe which is also a dimension
of God's sovereignty.

The rational categories refer to laws

of logic, mathematical structures,
other natural

laws.3

laws of language, and

Of special significance to Henry is

the ■'logical" distinction between truth and falsity.

For

Henry, what is true is also logically consistent and valid.*
He laments the loss of this distinction in modern theology,
a fact which he attributes to the influence of secular
philosophy.

As a result of this loss, theology is deprived

of its goal and content, and truth is relativized.9
revelation"

(ibid., 6:252, 256).

xAn incisive study of the divine origin of Henry's
ethics has been done by Miroslav Kis.
See especially
chapter 9 of his dissertation, "Revelation and Ethics," 275—
326.
Commenting on the origin and ground of Henry's ethics,
Kis observes that "from its transcendent source, Christian
ethics gains an eternal and absolute quality.
Its content
and sanction and dynamic and goal are derived from G o d ”
(ibid., 277).
aGRA. 6:296, 84.
3 Ibid., 5:319-25.
*Henry emphasizes that “The Christian religion is
wholly on the side of rational method of determining whether
or not conditions necessary to truth of any statements are
met" (ibid., 1:266).
Further, "Logical consistency is a
negative test of truth and coherence a subordinate test"
(ibid., 1:232).
9After criticizing “the absurdities of dialectical
theology," Henry writes that "what is logically
contradictory cannot be true.
A denial of the law of
contradiction would make truth and error equivalent; hence
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Gad's sovereignty also extends to aan's moral and
rational powers.
God.1

According to Henry,

these originate from

They are dependent on their giver in the sense that

they recognize but do not create the moral and the rational
concents of the universe.3

It is God alone who defines,

creates, and maintains the moral and rational order in the
universe.

In this sense, Henry maintains the concept of

sovereignty in the origin, nature, and experience of
knowledge.
One of Henry's ideas which appears to form the
backbone of his concept of epistemological sovereignty of
God is the notion that reality is rational.3

Although Henry

does not actually define what reality is, his repeated
mention of a triad of elements— God, man, and the world'*—
seems to suggest that those three entities constitute the
in effect it destroys truth"

(ibid., 1:233).

^According to Henry, "man was divinely made with
rational and moral aptitudes for intelligible communion with
his maker and for the joyous service of G o d ” (ibid., 1:227).
3 Ibid., 225-6.
3This idea is developed in the rest of this sub
section.
There are, however, specific statements in Henry
which point in that direction.
Three examples can be used
as illustrations:
For Henry, truth, which we have seen to
be a rational category, does not refer to reality.
"It is
itself the reality" (ibid., 3:222).
Henry also calls for an
"awareness of the meaning of God as the revelationally given
reality that certifies the rational coherence of created
reality" (ibid., 3:170).
Further, "the logical law of
noncontradiction is necessarily and objectively true, and
hence integral tc the real world" (ibid., 3:229).
354-5,

*For a few examples,
388.

see ibid., 2:95; 5:347, 350,
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main referents of his concern when he uses the term
r eality.1
God is Rational
Henry maintains that God is rational.3

He further

states that God's rationality consists of laws of reason and
logic, which are the framework of the divine mind and the
way God thinks and acts.3

For Henry,

these laws are also

conceivable in terms of propositions.’
*

Accordingly, God's

mind consists of propositions or “self-evident truths" which
God, by virtue of his omniscience,
and in all their relationships.3

knows in their totality
Henry does not consider

rationality to be an independent system of impersonal
to which everything in the universe,
subject.*

Rather,

is

it is an intrinsic attribute of God which

is as eternal as God himself.7
proposes,

including God,

laws

therefore,

On this basis, Henry

that because reason,

laws of logic, and

‘Angels are another dimension of reality which Henry
mentions (ibid., A s 229-50).
Our* exclusion of this dimension
is primarily due to the fact that angels are not an
immediate concern in the present discussion although much of
what is asserted here is equally applicable to them.
“For a fuller treatment of the idea by Henry, see
ibid., 5:334-58.
3 Ibid., 5:334.
*1 b i d ., 5:336.
3 I b i d ., 5:336-7.
‘Henry writes that "constancy [referring to logical
laws in the universe] does not imply an ontological or
logical or moral order independent of Gad to which God must
conform . . .” (ibid., 5:319).
7 Ibid., 5:334.
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propositianal truth are the stuff out of Mhich God's mind is
n a d e , 1 they have an ontological

status.a

For him, they are

neither created by God3 nor produced by man's thinking
process.'*

Rather, their existence is grounded in the very

essence of G o d .3
Man Is Rational
The transition from God's rationality to the
rationality of man and the world is fairly straightforward.
If rationality signifies the way the divine mind works,

it

is reasonable to expect that the activities which God
engages himself in and the creatures which he makes reflect
God's rational nature.**

Man, above all,

rationality more than other creatures.7
Mbid.,

reflects God's
That is so because

5:334-5.

3 It is Henry's view that the "biblical emphasis an a
rational Creator . . . elevates the role of reason and the
laws of logic to timeless significance" (ibid., 5:342).
For
the ontological status of truth and reason, see ibid.,
5:351, 354, respectively.
3Henry quotes Gordon Clark in stressing that "'the
laws of reason may be taken as descriptive of the activity
of God's will, and hence dependent on it though not created
as the world has been created.*" (ibid., 5:335).
* "Human reason is a divinely fashioned instrument of
recognizing truth; it is not a creative source of truth"
(ibid., 1:225).
“ "God's rationality is the ultimate explanation of
the primacy and ubiquity of rational structure in the
created world of men and things . . ." (ibid., 5:350— 1).
*■"The rational God fashioned both the mind of man
and the intelligible world to harmonize with each other"
(i b i d ., 5:347).
3 "Endowed with more than animal perception, gifted
in fact with a mode of cognition not to be confused with

i
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man i s . not has, the image of God.x

Henry argues that the

image refers to rational, moral, and spiritual capacities of
m a n .a

It is worthwhile to note that although Henry

considers all the three powers as equally important,

he

accords a logical priority to man's faculty of reason.3

It

is man's reasoning capacity, Henry contends, which acts as
the basis for the meaningfulness of man's morality and
spirituality.*

This is a result of Henry's doctrine of the

fall which excludes human rationality from the consequences
of sin.®

According to him, the fall affected m a n ’s

sensation, man Cis] . . . able to intuit intelligible
universals; as a divinely intended knower, he was able to
cognize within limits the nature and structure of the
externally real world" (ibid., 3:168).
Further, "The image
of God in man facilitates his cognitive transcendence of
nature and the linguisticization of cognitive capacity"
(ibid., 3:346).
x Ibid., 5:382.
The exact meaning of this emphasis
in Henry is not clear.
The context of the statement,
however, seems to suggest that Henry is here trying to show
how “ontologically resemblant" man's mind is to God's mind.
Henry quotes William Clarke approvingly: “The differences
between God and man are differences between beings that are
essentially resemblant."
Henry adds that "the nous of God
is not a mental faculty wholly different in kind from the
nous of mankind in its content.
Man not merely has the
image of God but is the image of God" (ibid.).
aHenry refers to these qualities as "a cohesive
unity of interrelated components that interact with and
condition each other" (ibid., 2:125).
3 "But in contemplating a divine image in man, it
should be clear that the rational or cognitive aspect has
logical priority. . . . Only if man is logically lighted,
and not simply morally or spiritually involved independent
of intelligent, can he be meaningfully aware of responsible
relationships to Sod and other selves and to the cosmos"
(ibid., 2:125-6).

M bid.
’Henry views man as "still capable," after the fall,

r
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philosophical orientation but not his thinking mechanism.1
Had the latter been affected, Henry holds that there Mould
be no longer any basis for God's communication with man and,
consequently, man's salvation.3
The World Is Rational
The manner in which the world is rational is less
clear in Henry.

The reason for this, according to him, is

that the

Bible does not reveal the order

of the universe.3

However,

there are some indications that Henry is not

willing to leave the rationality of the world to what anyone
might wish to imagine.

First,

it is Henry's view that laws

of logic (especially the law of noncontradiction) and
mathematical structures are "integral to the real world.""1
For him,

it is this assumption which opens the possibility

of correlating

and harmonizing "the mind of God,

the mind of

"of intellectually analyzing rational evidence for the
truth— value of assertions about God" (ibid., 1:227).
1Henry elucidates this point by referring to Gordon
Clark: "Clark distinguishes sin's noetic effect on the
content of man's thinking, that is, on his philosophical
premises, from its effect on mental activity or the
components of logic and reason.
Whereas sin affects man's
psychological activity and hinders his ability to think
correctly, it does not affect the laws of valid inference"
(ibid., 2:135-6).
3 Ibid 3 1bid. , 5:3GB.
''Ibid., 3:229.
Henry views God as having "willed
moral and mathematical distinctions in the creation of the
universe . . ." (ibid., 5:319).
Further, "the certainty and
universality of logic and mathematics establish a priority
for insight into the nature of ultimate reality" (ibid.,
5 :3 8 8 ) .

F
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man and the rationality of n a t u r e ” with each other.1
Second, despite his methodological differences with Thomas
Aquinas*

five proofs for God's existence, Henry appeals to

the cosmological argument in asserting that the world is not
haphazard but full of pattern and design.3
holds that there is order in history.3

Third, Henry

Events in the world

are not isolated accidents but parts of a teleological plan
which God will complete at the end of history.*
observations,

Given these

it seems clear that although Henry confesses

his ignorance on whether the rationality of the world is
mathematical or teleological,9 he has some definite
suggestions to make in that respect.
Rationality and Sovereignty
The idea that "reality is rational” is what gives
substance to Henry's concept of G o d ’s epistemological
sovereignty.

Henry's understanding of rationality,

Mbid.,

as

5:347, 388-

aHe makes it clear that his rejection n-f the
cosmological argument does not require a rejection of "the
relevance of reason to theological realities" as the
neoorthodox theologians do.
Ibid.
He dismisses also as
secular "the notion that nature is haphazard, history
intrinsically unpredictable, all events unique" (ibid.,
2:284).
In addition, he appear to identify himself with the
view that the real world is "objectively ordered and
coherent" and nature as “a patterned reality of intelligible
laws discoverable by human reason" (ibid., 5:359).
3Henry writes of history as being characterized by a
"pattern", "a general coherence" and a "universal plan"
(ibid., 6:460, 470-1).
*This theme can be clearly seen in Henry's doctrines
of providence and eschatology.
See ibid., 6:455— 513.
9 Ibid., 5:388.
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discussed above,
propositions,

includes elements such as truth,

reason or thinking faculty,

laws of logic,

mathematical structures, and design in nature.

These

elements, for Henry, exist in the mind of God as necessary
constituents of and conditions of knowledge.1-

Without them,

Henry maintains that objective knowledge of anything and
communication of that knowledge is impossible.3

If that be

the case, and epistemology is generally defined as an area
of study which deals with the source, nature, and limits of
knowledge,3 it is easy to notice the link between Henry's
concept of rationality and his epistemology.

Accordingly,

to state that God exercises an epistemological sovereignty
means,

in Henry's case, that God is the source and preserver

of all knowledge and the conditions which make that
knowledge possible.
The basic principle which seems to issue from the
above discussion on God's epistemological sovereignty is
that all reality is rationally coherent with God as its
sovereign origin and sustainer.

The implications of this

luGod the creator and sustainer of all gives the
cosmos its intelligibility and meaning and hence its human
knowability" (ibid., 5:3B4).
“ "Valid knowledge is passible only in view of man's
relationship to the divine m i n d ” (ibid.).
In addition,
“Logic is indispensable to human thought and to human
speech.
Without the law of contradiction, no significant
speech is possible, even attempts to refute the law of
contradiction would have to be formulated in intelligible
language that presupposes it" (ibid., 3:390).
3Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinb e r g ,
Introduction to Philosoohv (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1980), 33-35.
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principle an the proposition that "sovereignty is a
presupposition in inerrancy" may be stated as follows:
First, propositional truth is the very structure of God's
mind and, in special revelation, God communicates the
contents of his own mind to man.1

In other words, Henry

seems to identify the propositional truth of Scripture with
the propositions which constitute God's rational mind.
Second, propositional

truth is transmittable interpersonally

throughout reality since, as a rational element,

it

maintains the same intelligibility and objective meaning in
man, in God, and in the world.3

The essence of these

implications is that there are no epistemological barriers
when God communicates propositional truth with man.3

Henry

’’This inference is deducible from the material
surveyed above and from the following statements of Henry:
"Evangelical Christianity . . . acknowledges the cognitive
and propositional nature of divinely revealed truths about
God and his purposes conveyed by the inspired Scripture"
(GRA, 4:332).
The point becomes even clearer in the case of
the New Testament: "The New Testament conveys the mind and
the voice of the incarnate and risen Christ in intelligible
propositional form" (ibid., 3:95).
3For Henry, "by true knowledge it [evangelical
theology] means nothing more or less than truth as God knows
and reveals it and that will include whatever any
philosopher and any scientist says without need of
retraction" (ibid., 1:93).
Truth is eternal, "as timelessly
true as is the truth of the mathematics,” and "above all
human contingency and change” (ibid., 3:474).
3 It is Henry's position that "if revelation is God's
revelation, and God chooses to communicate in human concepts
and words, he is under no obligation to adopt *anti— faith
reason' or to speak in verbal ambiguities. . . . If God is
the sovereign, rational God, . . . and if God desires to
communicate indispensable information, then no modern theory
of linguistics can be considered a roadblock" (ibid.,
3:289).
In addition, "God need not stutter when he
pronounces his own Name nor when uttering any sentence he
will to speak in our language" (ibid., 2:180).
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maintains that "Divine sovereignty can be thus formulated
because it extends also to the sphere of truth.”3’
God's Ontological Sovereignty
After discussing God's sovereignty in the realm of
knowledge,

it now seems appropriate to turn attention to

God's sovereignty in the realm of being.a

By God's

ontological sovereignty, specific reference is hereby made
to the concept of causality.

The basic meaning of this

concept was amply explained in chapter 3 and, therefore,

the

main focus of this discussion is on the application of that
concept to the proposition that "inerrancy presupposes
sovereignty."

As already mentioned, Henry views God as the

agent who is himself the original being,3 the origin of all
other beings in existence'* and the direct cause of every
x Ibid., 4:16.
aThe sequence from epistemology to ontology is not
arbitrary.
It is the same sequence followed in the last two
chapters.
The arrangement is a deliberate effort to follow
Henry's scheme in his treatment of the two subjects in G o d .
Revelation
and Authority, a fact which, in turn, is in
accordance with the logical order of Reformed Confessions.
See "The Second Helvetic Confession" (1566) and "The
Westminster Confession" (1646) in John H. Leith, e d ., Creeds
of the Churches. 3rd ed. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982).
3God "neither became the living God by his creation
of the universe, nor did he become the living Gad at some
point in eternity past; he is the only living God and is so
eternally.
He lives in eternal self-affirmation . . .
He
wills eternally to be himself in the fullness of his
independent vitality, and never ceases to be himself"
(GRA,
5:69).
*God is "the originating principle of the cosmos and
the ultimate foundation of the logical form of the cosmos
and its coherent content" (ibid., 5:335).

f
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event and condition in the universe.1

In other words,

nothing exists or happens without God's direct command.3
The "causal relationship” which God has with the world
seems,

in fact, to be so intimate that it threatens the

balance which Henry wishes to maintain between God's
transcendence and immanence.3

This total causation of every

detail in existence is what I refer to here as God's
ontological sovereignty.
The significance of this concept to our concerns in
this study cannot be overemphasized.

The idea of causality

stands for the principle that divine causality is the
1Henry describes God as ”a divine principle immanent
in all reality, that is, for a spiritual— rational—moral
shaping force at work throughout cosmic existence and all
historical e v e n t s ” (ibid., 3:202).
God is also the
"metaphysical absolute, . . . the independent personal cause
of the universe, . . . the fundamental power of creation,
cause of existence" (ibid., 5:332—3).
He is also "the
ultimate cause of all that is, . . . [and] the ultimate
source of all reality” (ibid., 6:37).
3 It is Henry's contention that “in the Bible
creation is not a mechanistic causal reality; it involves,
rather, a constant reenactment of God's presence and power."
Henry calls this "voluntary" in contrast with “involuntary"
causation (ibid., 6:49).
3Henry discusses the concepts of “God's
Transcendence and Immanence" in ibid., 6:35— 51.
It seems,
however, that despite his efforts to defend two levels of
reality— natural and supernatural— against the tenets of
process theology, he, nonetheless, emphasizes God's
immanence in such ultimate and absolute terms that the
ontological barrier between God and the world is essentially
removed and the coherence of reality is stressed at the
expense of God's transcendence.
It may be improper to call
Henry a panentheist on this basis but his concept of
causality has some features which are easily comparable to
those of panentheism.
In both cases, God is directly
implicated in every detail of existence.
For a brief
summary of the meaning of panentheisic, see Evanoe 1ica 1
Dictionary of Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1 9 Q 4 ) .
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unifying factor in the realm of being (or ontology) which,
in Henry's terms, is meaningful and coherent.

Reality

consists not of several free and independent causal agents
but several elements which are tied together by their
dependence on God as the direct and necessary cause.1

It

seems that it is in this context that the proposition
"sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy” becomes more
evident.

If it may be argued that there is no ontological

barrier between God and man, then the idea that Gad caused
the existence of inerrant autographs is within the limits of
real possibility.3
The Divine Logos
Henry's doctrine of the divine Logos is so
comprehensive that, to do justice to it,

the discussion here

must be limited to those aspects which have a direct bearing
on our present concern— the proposition that “sovereignty is
a presupposition in inerrancy."3

In the previous two sub

sections, an attempt has been made to show how Henry
U n d o u b t e d l y , Henry states that God is not “the sole
volitional agent that pantheism projects" (G R A . 6:82).
He
even mentions the existence of “secondary causes" and causal
agency of the creatures.
Man is especially endowed with a
capacity for moral freedom (ibid., 6:49, 84).
Yet, it is
Henry's view that to posit independent causality outside God
(even in the case of evil) is "a kind of incipient dualism
rather than the metaphysical monism of Scripture.
One
problem with such a view is an apparent questioning of God's
sovereignty" (ibid., 6:295).
Italics supplied.
3ftore discussion on this follows below.
3H e n r y 's exposition on the doctrine of divine Logos
is divided into six chapters covering eighty— four pages
(GRA. 3:164-247).
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maintains a unified epistemology and a unified ontology,
both of which structures exhibit God's sovereignty.

It is

not being suggested here that epistemology and ontology are
mutually exclusive, especially given the ontological status
of rational categories in the universe.

However,

it appears

that, in order to fully appreciate Henry's concept of a
"metaphysical m o n i s m , H e n r y ' s

concept of the Logos goes a

long way in elucidating the meaning of that nation.

It

should also be pointed out that since inerrancy of Scripture
is an assertion which impinges on both epistemology and
ontology at one and the same time, a concept such as that of
the Logos is useful in illustrating the unity between realms
of being and knowledge.

Therefore,

to include in this

section a concept which seems to be the integrative
principle in Henry's metaphysics seems to be well within the
scope of the study.
Henry states that his concept of the Logos is
derived from Scripture,
the Gospel of Jjhn.2

particularly the first chapter of

His interpretation of the passage in

John yields five major ideas.3

(1) The word "logos" stands

for “the mind, wisdom, and the truth of God incarnate."'*
For Henry,

the divine Logos is an embodiment of reason and

1 1b id., 6:295.
aHenry devotes two chapters of vol. 3 to a biblical
study of the word "Logos."
See ibid., 3:173— 191, 482—487.
3These ideas seem to be most basic in Henry's
interpretation of the biblical material.
'"G R A . 3:486.
Henry bases this first idea on lexical
meaning of the Greek noun "logos."
See ibid., 3:482—487.
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its attendant propositions of truth.1
eternal.3

(2) The Logos is

He pre-existed with God in e t e r n i t y

he is an ontological personal reality.4

and as God,

(3) The Logos is

the creator and sustainer of the universe.9

(4) As the

incarnate God— man, the Logos is the mediating agent in
creation,

in redemption, and in the coming judgment.4

(5) The Logos, who “lighteth every man," is the agent of
^Ibid.
3Henry seems to base this idea on a phrase in 1 John
1:1— “That which was from the beginning . . ."— and on John
1:1, 2— "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God.
He was with God in the
beginning."
He comments that the Logos "in eternity past
shared the inner life of the Godhead" (ibid., 3:184).
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 3:167.
9This idea is in harmony with John 1:3, 4— "Through
him all things were made; without him nothing was made that
has been made.
In him was life, and that life was the light
of men."
Remarking on the significance of this passage,
Henry writes, "The Logos of God is the source of all the
substance and structures of created reality (John 1:3).
To
deny that the divine Logos originates the structural
relations of the cosmos is to dispute the Creator's
sovereignty" (ibid., 5:384).
4The point here is most likely based on John 1:14—
"The Word became flesh and lived for a while among us."
Referring to Christ as “preincarnate, incarnate, and now
glorified," Henry assigns the Logos the role of the
"mediating agency in creation, redemption and the coming
judgment" (ibid., 3:203).
In this point, Henry's interpretation of the Logos
is reminiscent of Plato's d
ge or divine craftsman who
mediates between the Ideas and concrete world.
See a
characterization of the demiurge in Joseph Owens, A History
of Ancient Western Philosophy (New York: Appleton—Century—
Crofts, 1959), 235— 249.
Henry himself opposes the idea of
Plato's demiurge and accuses Alfred North Whitehead of
reviving it in his process theology (G R A . 6:59).
However,
he seems to be unaware that he himself, in the doctrine of
the Lagos, is not very far from that notion.
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God's self— revelation.1

On the basis of these ideas which

Henry considers to be the key concepts about the Logos in
John, Henry proceeds to assign four fundamental functions to
the Logos: cosmic, e p i s t e m i c , salvific, and judgmental.3
The cosmic and epistemic roles of the Logos are
particularly significant in Henry's view of reality.3
According to Henry,

the cosmic function signifies the Logos

as the creator and sustainer of the universe.-*

In this

case, the Logos is the "source of created existence."3

The

epistemic function signifies the Logos as the "ground of
human knowledge"** and One who gives the universe its
"intelligibility and meaning and, hence,
knowability."7

its human

Henry combines the two functions of the

Logos as follows:
The divine Logos is creative and revelatory.
The ontic
articulation (creation and preservation of the universe)
and the noetic articulation of the cosmos (that is, its
intelligible meaning and purpose) have their common
iThis idea is based on John 1:9.
Henry interprets
the phrase, "light which lighteth every man," to mean that
the Logos confronts "every man in the universal general
revelation given in nature, history, reason, and conscience"
(G R A . 3:171).
2For a list of these roles, see ibid., 3:194.
The
first three roles are also mentioned in terms of the
cosmological Logos, the epistemological Logos, and the
soteriological Logos (ibid., 3:185).
3The other two roles are left out since they are
outside the scope of this study.
Ibid., 3:185.
Ibid., 3:168.
Ibid. , 3:185.
Ibid., 5:384.
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source and ground in the divine Logos. . . . In other
Mords, the creative Logos is at one and the same time
the sole originating principle of the cosmos and the
ultimate foundation of the logical form of the cosmos
and of its coherent content.1
For Henry, the Logos is

his

basis for affirming "the

ultimate meaning and coherence of the universe.“a
essence,

He is,

in

the tie that holds reality together both

epistemically and ontically.3

One may infer from these

observations that, given such a comprehensive concept of the
Logos,

there are no more barriers existing between ontology

and epistemology,

being and knowledge or God, man, and the

world, since all these factors are accounted for by the
existence of one personal being,

the divine Logos.'*

As evidence seems to indicate,

the importance of the

concept of the Logos is

not

any new significations which are

not already included in

the

notions of rationality and

causality previously discussed.

Rather,

the Logos idea

assumes its distinctiveness from its integrative role in
Henry's concept of sovereignty.

Henry writes,

"God's

sovereignty requires the confession that all existence and
all knowledge have their ultimate source in the divine
Mbid.,

5:335.

M b i d . , 3:194.
3This seems to be the meaning of Henry's phrase
"metaphysical monism" in ibid., 6:295.
*Henry states clearly that "the eternal and selfrevealed Logos, incarnate in Jesus Christ, is the foundation
of all meaning, and the transcendent personal source and
support of the rational, moral and purposive order of
created reality" (ibid., 3:195).

r
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L a gos.,>i

In other words,

the divine Logos combines in his

own person both the epistemological and the ontological
aspects of God's sovereignty.3

This appears to be the

essence of Henry's assertion that the divinely revealed
Logos is “the unifying principle of the c osmos.”3
present purposes,

For our

it is of particular significance that

Henry designates the Logos as the agent of revelation.4

It

seems safe to infer from this designation that Henry here
establishes the concept of sovereignty as the epistemic and

antic presupposition in

the nature,

the contents, and the

product of that revelation.3
So far, the focus of discussion has been on
examination of basic issues which underlie the proposition
that “sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy.”
seems that, for Henry,
Mbid.,

It

the concept of sovereignty stands for

5:334.

“Discussion on the relationship between God and the
Logos is not intended here as it involves extended
investigation of Henry's understanding of Trinity, the roles
of the three persons of the Trinity and their relationship
with each other.
Suffice it here to say that Jesus the
Logos has, for Henry, that particular function of being the
“unifying factor” throughout all reality.
3 Ibid.,

5:388.

*See Henry's ideas on the revelatory role of the
Logos (ibid., 3:203-15).
3This conclusion is not far-fetched given the
following views from Henry:
"God in his sovereign
initiative determines the actuality, direction, nature,
content and diversity of his self-disclosure." Henry also
attribute various “non—orthodox“ teachings on the doctrine
of revelation to "a certain reluctance to approve God's
sovereignty in regard to modes of revelation . . .” (ibid.,
2:78,

80).
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the May God t h i n k s and acts and
M i t h the Morld.

the May he r e l a t e s himself

The n e x t section is an at t e m p t to apply

this general M o r k i n g p r i n c i p l e to the p r o p o s i t i o n under
investigation.

It a d d r e s s e s itself to H e n r y ' s d o c t r i n e of

i nspiration as the o c c a s i o n in M h i c h the p resuppositional
pri o rity of s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r i n e rrancy is best illustrated.

Sovereignty and Inerrancy in Inspiration
Henry's doctrine of inspiration provides some of the
most relevant data in the investigation of the proposition
that "sovereignty is a presupposition in inerrancy."1

The

Mhole doctrine is not in vieM here since not all that it
entails is of immediate concern in this study.

But those

aspects Mhich are considered vital are examined for their
potential in illustrating the proposition in question.3
order to streamline the discussion,

In

three main emphases in

Henry's understanding of inspiration have been selected:
divine authorship of Scripture, providential guidance of
Bible writers,

and the Spirit's superintendence of

inscripturation.3

Within the range of these emphases,

it is

^Henry explains “The Meaning of Inspiration" (ibid.,
4:129—69).
That chapter is then followed by two others on
the subject of inerrancy.
That inerrancy is closely tied to
the doctrine of inspiration is an unmistakable fact.
3The limitations mentioned here have more to do with
the depth of analysis rather than the coverage of the
subject.
A wide perspective of the doctrine is what is
viewed here rather than the details of Henry's ideas.
The
reason for this is that Henry's doctrine of inspiration is
so broad that it would require another full study to cover
it thoroughly.
3These topics encompass what in this study is
considered significant in Henry's doctrine of inspiration.
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hoped that the veracity of the proposition,

“sovereignty is

a presupposition in inerrancy," can be shown to be
demonstrable.1
Divine Authorship of Scripture
□n the basis of two main passages— 2 Tim 3:16 and 2
Pet 1:19—21, Henry considers God to be the author of
Scripture.2

The crucial element in the passage from Timothy

is the Greek term theopneustos.3

Far Henry,

this word

expresses “God's relationship to the sacred writings.'"*

It

signifies that the "Scriptures in their written form are a
product of divine spiration,
out."3

that is, are divinely breathed

The word theooneustos raises the inspired writings

above “apostolic oral instruction" to a level where their
“permanent validity and value" is made secure.*

In regard

to the passage from 2 Peter, Henry views it also as
stressing divine authorship of Scripture.
“both negatively and positively."7

This it does

First, Henry interprets

the passage to mean that "Scripture does not have ground in
AThe word "sovereignty" itself hardly appears in
Henry's chapters on inspiration and inerrancy.
But its
absence is no evidence that it has not controlling influence
in Henry's understanding of inspiration and inerrancy.
aGRA. 4:131-3.
3The background that lies behind Henry's
interpretation of this word is given in chapter 2.
*GRA. 4:131.
3 Ibid.
*1 b i d .
7 Ibid . , 4:132.
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human inquiry and investigation or in philosophical
reflection

. . .

or human initiative.,aX

Second, the passage

'•affirms the origin of Scripture to be divine."3
to Henry,

According

“since the context so contrasts divine over

against human origin

. . .

the emphasis on divine

origination is unmistakable."3
Henry's understanding of the two passages as
teaching divine origin of Scripture is indeed commendable.’*
Because of the nature of the case, it seems difficult to
conclude otherwise.9

However, when this scriptural teaching

Mbid.
“ Ibid., 4:132.

Mbid.
*The exegetical basis for asserting the broad
premise of divine origin of Scripture seems to be
conclusively established by Benjamin Warfield, and more
recently by Gordon Clark, Wayne House, and Edward Goadrick.
See citations of their contributions in chapter 2.
Efforts
to evade that general premise through concentration of
attention on the functions of Scripture in 1 Tim 3:17 do not
appear to succeed in doing away with that premise.
The
avoidance of the obvious implication of the two passages
mentioned by Henry is seen sometimes in treatments of Paul's
or New Testament's attitude towards the Old Testament which
totally ignores the contents of the passages.
See Robert M.
Grant, “Paul and the Old Testament" and C. K. Barrett, "The
Interpretation of the Old Testament in the New," in The
Authoritative Word: Essays on the Nature of Scripture, e d .
Donald K. McKim (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1983), 27— 58.
Perhaps the main reason for this is
the critical denial of the authenticity of the epistles of 2
Timothy and 2 Peter.
However, Donald Guthrie has clearly
shown how tentative and inconclusive the arguments adduced
to support that denial are.
See his volume, New Testament
Introduction (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press,
1961), 584-634, 814-63.
9 Ibid.
See also Seventh—day Adventist Bible
Commentary. e d . Francis D. Nichol (Washington, D . C . : Review
and Herald Publishing Association, 1980), 7:344— 5, 601—2.
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is viewed in the context of Henry's concept of sovereignty,
divine authorship of Scripture assumes new meanings.11
one thing, divine authorship means,

For

for Henry, that the

propositions in which scriptural truth is set is a
concretization of the mind of God.2

Consequently, on the

basis of this identity between the mind of God and the
contents of Scripture, propositional truth of the Bible is
logically consistent and coherent.3

For Henry, Scripture is

necessarily inerrant since it is impossible for God to err
x It is possible to be correct on the level of a
general principle and still be incorrect in the application
of that
principle to specific situations.
Divine
authorship of Scripture seems to be clearly established in
2 Tim 3:16 and 2 Pet 1:19-21, but the range of possible
interpretations of what constitutes this authorship is quite
wide.
In the present case, this author thinks that Henry is
right in emphasizing the divine authorship of Scripture but
wrong in the application of that idea to a specific role
which God played in the production of Scripture.
2This is a natural conclusion on the basis of
previous discussion and statements of Henry such as the
following: "Insofar as the being of the Logos is to be
distinguished from his intelligible revelation, and
prophetic-apostolic discourse is to be distinguished from
the teachings of Jesus in his earthly ministry, the contrast
is quite proper.
But insofar as it implies that the
revelational word of prophets and apostles is never
identical with the Word of the Lord, the distinction is not
only confusing but biblically unjustifiable" (GRA, 4:47).
3The identity between God and biblical contents is
an emphasis which Henry considers to be central in his
understanding of inspiration.
For him, "Inspiration is
primarily a statement about God's relationship to Scripture,
and only secondarily about the relationship of God to the
writers" (ibid., 4:143).
He also writes: “The prophets, and
Jesus, and the apostles all held that God had spoken and is
speaking through the Scriptures.
More that this, they
considered Scripture itself to be 'the Word of God,' a
designation that underscores both its origin and nature. . .
. The Word of God came not from the prophets but 'through'
them . . . What Moses said is 'the Word of God' . . .
Scripture is God's Word . . . What Scripture says, God says.
. . ." (ibid., 4:137).
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or to do or say anything that is contradictory to his
rational nature.1
Another perspective from which divine authorship can
be viewed which has a direct relationship with inerrancy is
Henry's distinction between God as "author" and God as
"cause."3

Por Henry, God is the cause of all things, be

they good or evil.3

In that case, God is the cause of

Scripture in the same sense that he is the cause of
everything else.

But if Henry asserted scriptural

on the basis of causality alone,

inerrancy

that would not be

sufficient reason to exclude error from Scripture."*
On the other hand, if God is not only the cause but
also the author of Scripture,

the situation becomes

1Henry views inerrancy as a defense of God's
sovereignty and his logical nature.
In his chapter on
sovereignty, Henry states that "God's will or nature implies
certain limitations on his actions and normatively defines
the very conception of omnipotence in terms of his own
omnipotence.
God will not alter his own nature, he cannot
deny himself, he cannot lie and cannot sin, . . . Any
concept of omnipotence that requires Gad to contradict
himself reflects a conjectural and ridiculous notion of
absolute power. . . . Having willed moral and mathematical
distinctions in the creation of the universe, God will not
affirm vice to be virtue or two times two to be three; he is
faithful to himself and to the relative unity and continuity
he wills for his creation. . . . God himself wills the law
of contradiction as integral to both divine and human
meaning"
(ibid., 5:319).
a Ibid., 6:294.
This distinction was mentioned in
chapter 3 in connection with the problem of evil.
3 Ibid., 5:332-5; 6:292-5.
*One could easily point to several things in the
world which are mistaken, negative, erroneous or evil that
are caused by God, to follow Henry's thought.
To base
inerrancy of Scripture on divine causality alone, therefore,
would be absurd.
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radically different.
sustains the good

As author, God not only originates and

(this he does also for evil), but he also

defends and preserves it.*
author is good and,
kind.*

For Henry,

That Mhich has God for its

hence, free from imperfection of any
"Everything that comes from God,

beginning with his work of creation,

is good” and that

goodness includes not only moral and aesthetic but also
logical perfection.3
"author" of Scripture,

Consequently,

since God is the

it is inconceivable for Henry that

error should be a part of it.

According to Henry,

"The

doctrine that the Bible is divinely inspired is as
^Henry's main passage on this distinction reads:
"The central issue is whether and how Gad can be regarded
both as the cause of factors in the created universe that we
consider evil, and also as the defender and preserver of
what we consider good.
Here a distinction must be preserved
between cause and author" (G R A . 6:294).
Significantly, the
passage occurs in Henry's discussion of the problem of evil.
*Ibid., 6:252.
Henry has a doctrine of "the good."
His ideas on this are in a chapter entitled, "The Goodness
of God" (ibid., 6:251—68).
There are two themes in that
doctrine which have a bearing on our study.
First,
"goodness is an intrinsic perfection [or attribute] of the
living God" (ibid., 6:251).
This designation further
clarifies Henry's distinction between good and evil.
Unlike
goodness, evil is not an attribute of God.
Henry writes,
“God can be an ultimate cause of evil, . . . without himself
being an aspect of evil, or of evil being an aspect of him
as its cause.
God created giraffes, but he is not a
giraffe, nor are giraffes aspects of God" (ibid., 6:294).
Second, Henry defines "the good" as "a comprehensive
correlation of the true, the moral and the beautiful" (ibid.
6:253).
This means that when God declared the world which
he created to be good (before the fall), he underscored
creation's “intelligible order, moral perfection and
aesthetic beauty, in short, its excellence" (ibid., 6:252).
3 Ibid., 6:252—3.
Henry does not use the term
logical, but his mention of “intelligible" and "true" as
necessary ingredients of “the good" strongly suggests this
in view of his understanding of logic.
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incompatible with the notion that God inspired error as it
is with the doctrine that he need not have inspired truth."A
Further, he considers it "simple illogic" to suppose that,
the God of the Bible who himself is truth and who cannot
lie . . . personally inspired error and falsehood.
Would not reason and logic instead side with a denial
that God inspired what is declared false and errant*?3
Providential Guidance of Bible Writers
Despite his emphasis on God's authorship of
Scripture, Henry disowns three views of inspiration which he
considers to be exaggerations of that emphasis.

First, he

rejects the view that human writers of the Bible were some
kind of robots or machines in God's hands.3

He states that

such a view is more compatible with "manticxsm"— where
mediums in the ancient pagan world lost their consciousness
totally at the time of inspiration— than with biblical
teaching.'*

Second, Henry denies that Scripture was revealed

M b i d . , 4:191.
Henry's point here is that the fact
of divine inspiration necessarily excludes error from the
text of Scripture and establishes the truthfulness of what
God inspired.
In other words, God does not inspire error,
he inspires truth.
3 Ibid., 4:193.
3,,The writers of Scripture are not unhistorical
phantoms whom the divine Spirit controls like mechanical
robots” (ibid., 4:13B).
*Henry borrows from Geoffrey W. Bromiley four
characteristics of biblical inspiration which distinguish it
from manticism: "'First, the Bible does not make
unintelligible or sporadic pronouncements.
Secondly, the
divine aspect is not inscrutable providence, fate, or
destiny.
Thirdly, the biblical sayings, though often
oracular in form, are not obscure or devious.
Finally,
there is an ethical quality about God's word and work in
Scripture'" (ibid., 4:142).
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by dictation.1

According to Henry, dictation theory is

faulty because it excludes the "individuality" of the human
writer from the process of inscripturation.3

Third, Henry

is opposed to any suggestion that the Bible came down in
completed form from heaven like the Qur'an or from an angel
like the Book of Mormons.3

It is Henry's contention that

the Bible is an historical book which reflects the culture,
history,

and the personality of those who wrote it."*
For some writers, human involvement in the

production of Scripture indicates at once that, since humans
are fallible, the possibility, and even the presence, of
error in Scripture cannot be completely erased from
Scripture.3

But Henry thinks otherwise.*

For him, the

‘■"Statements that depict inspiration in terms of
supernatural dictation are untrue to the Scriptures,
unrepresentative of evangelical doctrine, and prejudicial
theological understanding" (ibid., 4:138).

to

3Henry stresses that "The Spirit of God made full
use of the human capacities of the chosen writers so that
their writings reflected psychological, biographical, and
even sociohistorical differences" (ibid., 4:148).
Commenting on the fact that "God did not dictate the words,"
Henry continues, "consistent with their differing
personalities and stylistic peculiarities, the inspired
prophets and apostles in fact spoke in the language of their
time and place” (ibid., 4:14*7— 50).
3 Ibid., 4:138.
*Ib i d ., 4:148-50.
“This reminds us of Clark H. Pinnock, for example,
who writes that "God, in giving us literary vehicles of his
Word, accepted a definite limitation upon himself.
He shows
himself willing to speak to us within the limits of human
language and to accept the risks that belong to that
decis i o n ” (The Scripture P r i n c i p l e . 99).
Pinnock does not
spell out the "risks" to be errors but the implication seems
obvious.
For the view that these "risks" consist of actual
errors, see Beegle, Scripture. Tradition, and Infallibility;
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cultural,

historical, and personal ideas which the writers

brought into the Bible were not their own creation.

Long

before Scripture was written, God's providence guided the
personality and the circumstances of each individual writer
so that at the time of writing, his style of writing, his
personality, and other circumstantial factors were exactly
what God had programmed them to be.1

In that case, Henry

proposes that Scripture at one and the same time is written
by real historical persons and is a product of God's
authorship.3

Certainly, Henry does not consider the writers

and Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical T h e o l o g y . vol.

1.

*Henry would rather liken the human aspect of
Scripture to Christ's humanity in incarnation.
For him, the
“authentic human nature of Christ" needed not to share in
human fallibility” (GRA, 4:150).
x It is Henry's view that “divine inspiration did not
occur ex machina but crowned a long period of providential
preparation involving diverse experiences” (ibid., 4:140).
3Henry refers to this joint venture as "special
confluence of divine and human" and "simultaneous agency of
God and m a n ” (ibid., 4:142).
Benjamin Warfield also used
the same language in describing the human and the divine
factors in inscripturation: ". . . the whole Scripture is
the product of divine activities which enter it, however,
not by superseding the activities of human authors, but
confluently with them. . . . The human and divine factors in
inspiration are conceived of as flowing confluently and
harmoniously to the production of a common product”
(Warfield, Shorter Writings. 2:547).
Warfield refers to his
concept of the balance between human and divine in
inspiration as concursus (ibid., 2:547), a term which Henry
also uses (GRA. 4:206) . It seems quite clear that Henry and
Warfield are agreed not only on general concept of divine
authorship but also on the terminology also.
It is noticeable, however, that Henry considers it
incorrect to talk of "dual authorship” or "divine— human
coauthorship" (ibid., 4:142).
Warfield differs from him on
this.
For Warfield, the Bible is "a divine— human book in
which every word is at once divine and human” (Warfield,
Shorter Writings. 2:547).
It appears that this language
would, for Henry, suggest a kind of "synergism” in the
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as infallible persons in their daily lives.1

But how he

maintains human fallibility and the inerrancy of Scripture
at the same time is the subject of the next sub— section.
Meanwhile,

it seems clear that the human factor in Scripture

is itself part of God's providence and, as such, it does not
threaten the inerrancy of what God revealed.
Spirit's Guidance in Inspiration
Despite his view that inspiration has to do with
what was spoken as well as with what was written under
Spirit's superintendence,3 Henry considers inscripturation—
r

— the process of writing the original Scripture— to be the
focal point in inspiration.3

For him,

it is what is written

down that has permanence and durability.1*

Moreover,

it is

writing of Scripture ("synergism” is a term from Greek
svnerg i s m o s . associated particularly with Desiderius Erasmus
in his defense of free will against Martin Luther's concept
of the bondage of the will).
This concept, which is
essentially Pelagian, was refuted by Calvin in Institutes.
Ill, 24.1.
Although Henry does not mention it except in a
quotation from Karl Barth (GRA. 6:93), his doctrines of
election and predestination necessarily preclude it.
That
being the case, the causal part that God played in the
production of Scripture is just as t o t a l , absolute, and
overwhelming as God's irresistible grace in matter of
salvation.
In general, the difference between Henry and
Warfield on the use of some phrases seems to be only
superficial.
The underlying stress on divine causation of
Scripture is the same in both cases.
’-GRA, 4:151.
3 Ibid., 4:31-35, 37-3B.
3 Ibid., 4:37.
'•ibid.
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to the Word of God written that Scripture often attaches the
word inspiration.1
In order to clarify his position on inspiration,
Henry first states what he does not mean by using that word.
For him, biblical inspiration does not refer to a
heightening of man's psychic powers.2

It is not "some

special internal disposition of the chosen writers” or an
experience which results in "manifestation of artistic,
literary or poetic genius."3

Neither does inspiration refer

to God's impartatian of thoughts or concepts into man's
mind, in which case the writer is then left on his own to
translate and communicate those thoughts and concepts in
human language.4

Henry is opposed to that view because it

leaves a lot of room for human error to creep into
Scripture.3

Henry's anthropology,

that man is totally

*Ibid., 4:40.
2 Ibid., 4:142.
3 Ibid.
4Henry refers to this view as “the concept theory of
inspiration" which he associates with A. H. Strong, the
Baptist theologian who wrote Systematic Theology. 3 vols.
(Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1901).
See G R A .
4:143.
“Henry argues that this theory "lies in representing
inspiration as a phenomenon internal to the writers more
than a quality of the writings" (G R A . 4:143.).
Henry's criticism of this view seems to be rather
shallow in the sense that it does not take seriously the
faithfulness of human instruments in communicating to their
best ability what God revealed to them.
Strong's theory
seems to assume, and rightly so, that God chose human
mediums who he knew would faithfully communicate what they
knew to be truth.
In my opinion, this view seems to be much
more compatible with Bible's view of itself, phenomena of
Scripture, and common human experience.
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depraved, is not an irrelevant issue in the evaluation of
his exclusion of human contribution in Scripture.
Henry defines inspiration as "a supernatural
influence upon divinely chosen prophets and apostles whereby
the Spirit of God assures the truth and trustworthiness of
their oral and written proclamation."1

It appears evident

from the definition that, for Henry, inspiration extends to
what is written down.

However,

this point immediately

raises the issue of the exact manner in which the Spirit
assured the "truth and trustworthiness" of various types of
biblical

literature.

The problem involved here may be

illustrated by the difference between the books of Luke and
Revelation. On one hand is Luke the historian who openly
admits that his book is a result of research.3

On the other

is John the prophet who repeatedly assures the reader that
his book is a result of what he saw and heard in visions.3
Differences between the two books on the immediate source of
their contents and the nature of Spirit's action have been
interpreted by some scholars as indicating that there is a
1 1b i d ., 4:129.
aLuke 1:1-4.
Henry also admits that human powers
are employed in this case.
Commenting on Luke, Henry
writes, “Sometimes a long period of providential
preparation, and then an extended period of writing, may
well have entered into the completion of the end product.
Luke writes of including patient sifting of sources"
(ibid., 4:146).
Elsewhere, Henry remarks that Luke is
"completely candid about the use ct human sources" (ibid.,
4:138).
3Every chapter in the book of Revelation has such
phrases as "I saw" or "I heard” which suggest a supernatural
impartation of information.
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variety of inspiration models in Scripture.1

The

implication here is that, even if it Mere possible to assert
inerrancy of the autographs,

the assertion cannot be applied

in a uniform manner throughout Scripture.
Henry's response to this issue is short but
significant.

He readily recognizes that there are at least

two literature types in Scripture.3

One type is the

prophetic while the other is what resulted from exercise of
some human powers.

Henry borrows Warfield's terminology to

express the fact that the two literature types represent two
models of inspiration.

He writes:

Revelation takes at times a form that involves the total
personality of the recipient and communicator of it, a
form which, in distinction from Old Testament prophecy,
Warfield called *concursive operation' ('Revelation,'
4:25SOa).
Here the 'enunciation of divine truth is
attained through the action of the human powers—
historical research, logical reasoning, ethical thought,
religious aspiration . . . in contrast with the
'supercessive action of the revealing Spirit' as in
prophetic revelation."3
In other words,

there is a difference in the way the Spirit

operated in different contexts of inscripturation.

Yet,

in

terms of the extent to which the Spirit superintended all
biblical writers, Henry insists that inspiration was uniform
throughout.'*

That is, in Spirit's role of assuring the

"truth and trustworthiness" of what was inscripturated,

it

xSee William Sanday's views on degrees of
inspiration in Van Bemmelen, Issues in Inspiration. 148— 58.
See also Beegle, The Inspiration of Scripture. 135—9.
aGRA. 4:159.
3 Ibid.
“ Ibid.
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made no difference if the contents were immediately
revealed— as in the case of John's Revelation— or a result
of research or exercise of human capacities— as in the case
of Luke.

Realizing that the latter case is especially

likely to occasion suspicion that the Spirit's role was not
so total, Henry writes that "'the human powers— historical
research,

logical

reasoning, ethical thought,

aspiration'" were "'acting not by themselves,

religious
however,

but

under the prevailing assistance, superintendence, direction,
control of the Divine Spirit.'

. . .“

Furthermore,

'The Spirit is not to be conceived as standing outside
of the human powers employed for the effect in view,
ready to supplement any inadequacies they may show and
to supply any defects they may manifest, but as working
confluently in, with and by them, elevating them,
directing them, controlling them, energizing them, so
that, as His instruments, they rise above themselves and
under His inspiration do His work and reach His aim.
The product . . . attained by their means is His product
through t h e m

.'x

The manner in which Henry describes the Spirit's
role in inscripturation seems to suggest two main ideas.
First, it appears evident that the process of
inscripturation leaves no room for free and "uncaused" human
involvement.3

Whatever personal, cultural, or ideological

characteristics one may find in Scripture,
source is God.

their ultimate

If the human writers were at all free, that

freedom was itself incorporated in God's sovereignty.
^I b i d . , 4:159-60.
3For Henry, “in inscripturation the divine Spirit
selectively superintends fallible and sinful human beings in
the inerrant oral and written proclamation of God's message"
(ibid., 4:160).
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Second, Henry's understanding of the Spirit's role in
inscripturation means that, since the writers were totally
under the control of the Spirit, the possibility of error
was eliminated.

Henry's own statement on this matter reads:

The prevailing evangelical view affirms a special
activity of divine inspiration whereby the Holy Spirit
superintended the scriptural writers in communicating
the biblical message in ways consistent with their
differing personalities, literary styles and cultural
background, while safeguarding them from error.
As J.
Gresham Machen expressed it, the biblical writers were
preserved by a *supernatural guidance and impulsion by
the Spirit of God . . . from the errors that appear in
other books and thus the resulting book, the Bible, is
in all its parts the very Word of God, completely true
in what it says regarding matters of fact and completely
authoritative in its commands.'1
The fact that this passage is a clear illustration of the
decisive role which the concept of sovereignty plays in the
formulation of the doctrine of inerrancy seems to be
unmistakable.
Co n c l u s i o n

The material presented in this chapter is geared
towards an analysis of the proposition,
presupposition in inerrancy."

"sovereignty is a

The basic contention is that,

although that proposition is not explicit in Henry,

there

are strong indications that it is at least implicit.

The

section on "primary considerations" is an attempt to set the
problem which the proposition raises in its wider
philosophical context.

It is argued that Henry's concept of

sovereignty of God stands for a fundamental principle in
which God is the unifying factor in his metaphysics.
^Ibid., 4:166-7.
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other words, divine sovereignty accounts for the objective
intelligibility and coherence of reality.

The main

implications of this fact is that it removes all epistemic
and ontic barriers between various levels and elements of
reality so that it becomes possible for categories of
meaning and existence to be uniformly applicable throughout
the universe.

In this case, divine sovereignty become the

exercise of Gad's freedom,

lordship, power, and causality in

the existence of a unified reality in which Gad himself is
the center.

From this broad concept of reality, Henry

approaches his doctrine of Scripture.
In revealing himself in Scripture, God vindicated
nis sovereignty.

He demonstrates his independence in making

no consultations with anyone else about whether or not he
should reveal himself.

According to Henry, the fact of

revelation is wholly a matter of God's initiative.1

There

was no external necessity that God should reveal himself.
God was also free to reveal himself whenever and in whatever
manner he chose.

Henry expresses this aspect as follows:

“Revelation has its free and independent ground solely in
the divine Redeemer."3

God has also the power and

abilities

that it takes to reveal

himself

he did.

It is Henry's view that

the reason why some theologians fail

to see God as revealing

himself in certain ways is their

in the manner that

reluctance to affirm God's lordship or sovereignty in the
^According to Henry, “God need not have addressed
[his revelation to] the Hebrews or anyone" (GRA, 2:87).
“ Ibid., 2:121.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

universe.1

For him,

The methods and means of divine revelation are not to be
limited by any a priori foreclosing or prescribing of
ways by or in which the God of revelation might reveal
himself. . . God alone in his sovereign initiative
determines the actuality, direction, nature, content and
diversity of his self—disclosure . . . God reveals
himself in his own time and the way when and where he
w i 1 Is.3
Within the perimeters of these statements and other concepts
discussed in this chapter,

it seems evident that in his

doctrine of Scripture, Henry stresses the priory of al]

that

his concept of divine sovereignty signifies.
Henry's understanding of the role that God played in
revealing himself to the Bible writers is best described in
in terms of causality.
this respect:

First,

At least three facts seem clear in
by holding that God is the author of

Scripture, Henry accomplishes two main things.

One is that

he attributes the contents of Scripture— in the form of
propositional truth— to God as their causal origin.

The

other is that he eliminates the presence of error from
original Scripture since,
evil,

like original creation, but unlike

the Bible is something that God desired to actuate.

It, therefore,

reflects God's goodness and perfection.

Second, God so sovereignly controls the lives of
individual writers of Scripture through his providential
guidance that all the thoughts which they brought into
Scripture were exactly the way Gad would have them at the
time of writing the Bible.

This idea seems to be a

1 Ibid., 2:80—81.
a Ibid., 77-79.
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consequence of Henry's view of causality which, when applied
to inerrancy of Scripture has two implications.

One is that

God's decision and act of disclosing himself in Scripture is
“concurrent" with the decisions and acts of the human
writers of the Bible.

In this case,

the autographs which

the human writers produced were at the same time autographs
which God himself also produced.

Another inference is that

God's thoughts, decision and act of disclosing himself in
Scripture logically precede and determine the nature of the
thoughts, decisions and acts of the human writers.
be noted that in Henry's scheme,
not act like robots.

It is to

the human writers needed

Mhen they wrote Scripture,

they were

"free" in the sense that their activity was not
“constrained."

Theirs was a voluntary activity which, as

Henry would argue,

is perfectly compatible with God's

causation of that activity.
Third,

the Holy Spirit so superintended the writers

in the inscripturation process that they were supernaturally
kept from making any error of any kind.

This is the

crowning point in the process of inspiration.
other aspect of God's disclosure,

More than any

inspiration distinguises

the Bible writers from other human beings and also the
thoughts of Scripture from other human thoughts.

As a

result of the superintendence of the scriptural writers,
Henry maintains that the original autographs were without
error.
The significance of the idea that "sovereignty is a
presupposition in inerrancy" cannot be overstated.

The
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proposition implies at least three related conclusions.

One

is that a good grasp o-f the concept of sovereignty is
necessary for a proper understanding and appreciation of
inerrancy.

Another implication is that inerrancy is best

defended in the context of absolute sovereignty.

To detach

inerrancy from sovereignty is to remove from it that which
renders it epistemologically important and to undermine the
ontological base on Mhich it stands.

In other words,

inerrancy is descriptive of effects of a revelational—
inspirational act which God performs in his sovereignty.

In

fact, Henry maintains that "inspiration connects God's
activity with the express truths and words of Scripture."1
Finally, any serious evaluation of the concept of inerrancy
must include also an evaluation of the concept of
sovereignty.

The real issue in inerrancy is not so much the

logistics of what the concept means and what it does not
mean.

These matters are peripheral and incidental

case for inerrancy which Henry presents.
matter, rather,

position,

The heart of the

is the nature and extent of God's action in

man and in the world.
of inerrancy,

to the

Consequently,

to justify a rejection

for those who are uncomfortable with the

requires a concept of sovereignty different from

Henry's since, without this, it is not possible to
systematically formulate a view of inerrancy.
x Ibid., 4:144.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The question which was raised at the beginning of
this study was how inerrancy presupposes a particular
concept of divine sovereignty in the writings of Carl Henry.
Among the points made in the foregoing analysis of that
question, a number of key ideas have emerged which act as
milestones in the development of the study.
Chapter 2 is a descriptive analysis of Henry's
concept of inerrancy,

in the interest of which this

investigation is primarily undertaken.

The analysis has its

focus on those features of inerrancy which are foundational
to a thorough understanding of the concept.
include Henry's sources for the concept,
inerrancy,

These features

the meaning of

the extent or the coverage of the concept, and

the role which inerrancy plays in Henry's theology.
purposes of this study,

For the

it is of particular significance

that Henry attaches the word "inerrancy" only to the
original autographs of the Bible.

According to him,

it is

the fact that the autographs were “inspired" which renders
them inerraot-

Henry does not consider scriotural apographs

to be inspired and, as such,
inerrant.

they are infallible, not

Further investigation reveals that inspiration is

a phenomenon which "connects God's activity with the express
152
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truths and nnords of Scripture."1

In effect, Henry conceives

Inerrancy to be a consequence of God's act of inspiration.
One implication of this observation is that, for Henry,
inerrancy is not a question of the nature of Scripture alone
but one that impinges also on the nature of God's activity
in the world.
In chapter 3, Henry's concept of sovereignty is
analyzed for the purpose of clarifying Henry's understanding
of the nature of God's activity in the world.

This aspect

of the investigation is meant to set the discussion of
inerrancy in the Mider context of Henry's theology.
guiding hypothesis is that,
of God's activity,

The

if inerrancy is an end-product

there must be something in Henry's

understanding of how God acts Mhich illumines how God's
involvement in the production of Scripture results in the
inerrancy of the autographs.
Henry's views,

To avoid a caricature of

the concept of sovereignty is presented not

only to meet the objectives of this study but also to
highlight its main features as an individual concept in its
own right.

Thus, divine sovereignty is examined in terms of

Henry's theological tradition,

the meaning of the term

"sovereignty,■ the scope covered by the concept, and the
place which sovereignty occupies in Henry's theology.
the purposes of this study,

For

however, certain aspect of

Henry's concept of sovereignty are especially important in
their explication of how Henry views the nature of God's
1GRfl. 4:144.

i
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activity in the MorId.

Two of the main aspects may be

summarized as follows:
First, sovereignty is a key attribute in Henry's
doctrine of God.

As "an aspect of God's ontology,*1 divine

sovereignty is the single most important attribute of the
divine nature since "without it all other attributes of God
lose their efficacy."*

Given such a high status of the

concept of sovereignty,

it seems pertinent to conclude that

divine sovereignty is the basis on which God's activities in
the world are grounded.3
Second, Henry's concept of sovereignty entails the
idea of causality.

Undoubtedly, Henry dissociates himself

from notions of causality which depict the universe as an
impersonal

"mechanistic causal r e a l i t y . B u t

he makes it

clear that such interpretations of the term “causality” do
not provide sufficient reason for rejecting some basic
concepts which the term itself represents.

Henry affirms

that God is "the one and the only creative causality in the
world and in history."3

Henry is here not to be understood

as precluding the existence and,
Mbid.,

indeed,

the significance of

6:99.

* I bid., 5:295.

See also ibid.,

5:325.

’Henry states explicitly that this is particularly
so in the case of God's decrees (ibid., 6:99), predesti
nation, and election (ibid., 6:83).
^Ibid., 6:49.
“ Ibid., 6:232.

f
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causality outside God.‘

His contention is that any

causality there is outside God is not original or creative
but secondary, dependent, and concurrent with God's ultimate
causality.3
One significant point that should not be ignored in
respect to Henry's notion of causality is the distinction
which Henry makes between God as “cause" and God as
"author."3

From what Henry writes, it seems that the

difference between "cause" and "author" relates to whether a
given factor or a set of factors in the universe,
nonetheless, caused by God,

though,

is or is not desired by him and,

therefore, reflective of God's goodness and perfection.
With the concept of sovereignty thus explicated,

the

stage is set for a discussion on how inerrancy presupposes
Henry's concept of sovereignty.
chapter 4.

This is the focus of

It is to be noted that due to the complexity of

both concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty and given the
theological distance between them— inerrancy, in this case,
being an attribute of Scripture while sovereignty is an
attribute of God, certain primary considerations need to be
taken into account in order to show the possibility of a
connection between the two concepts in question.
Investigation reveals that this possibility of a connection
between inerrancy and sovereignty lies in Henry's view of
‘ Ibid., 5:311; 6:49.
=*Ibid., 6:48-49.
3 Ibid., 6:294.
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reality in teres of “metaphysical monism."x

For Henry,

reality is a rational complex of related elements in Mhich
God, himself being rational, is both the causal principle
and the unifying factor.

Moreover, since God's causality

accounts for both the ontological and epistemological
factors in the universe, Henry recognizes no barriers in
God's exercise of his sovereignty in the world.

With this

comprehensive view of a unified structure of the universe,
Henry maintains that God can act and speak in the world in a
manner that is direct,

literal, and intelligible to his

creatures.
To be more precise, the case for a connection
between inerrancy and sovereignty which is presented in this
study may be stated as follows.

Henry's concept of

sovereignty provides the theological preconditions which are
necessary to make the inerrancy of Scripture possible.
First,

inerrancy requires that the inerrant truth of

Scripture come from a rational being who is perfect.

This

requirement is met by Henry's view of God's "epistemological
sovereignty."

For Henry, God is a rational being, the only

creative source of knowledge and truth, and one whose
goodness includes logical, moral, and aesthetic perfection.
Second,
in Scripture,
origin.

inerrancy requires that the human elements

to be inerrant,

be themselves of divine

According to Henry, divine sovereignty extends to

the personal and cultural factors which the human writers
xIbid., 6:295.
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brought into Scripture.

As Henry sees it, God Mas

providentially active in the biography of the writers so
that, while their personalities and cultural ideas were
truly human, they were, nonetheless, caused by God.

What

Henry means by a "concurrence" of the divine and the human
in the production of Scripture is that human agency was
“concurrent" with and dependent on God's causality.
Third,

inerrancy requires that the whole process of

inscripturation be totally controlled by God in order to
preclude the possibility of error.

For Henry, Gad,

in his

sovereignty, so pervaded the process of inspiration that in
inscripturation of truth in the autographs by the human
agents,

the possibility of error was totally excluded.

It

must be added here that, for Henry, Scripture is inerrant
not only because Gad is its cause— God is the cause of
everything in the universe, including evil.
importantly,

More

as the sovereign “author" of Scripture, God

"desired" to disclose himself in Scripture and, as such, it
manifests his perfection and goodness.
Implications of the Study
As it is stated at the beginning of the study,

the

purpose of this investigation is to analyze Henry's concepts
of inerrancy and sovereignty for the sake of showing how the
former presupposes the latter.

As investigation seems to

indicate, inerrancy presupposes Henry's concept of
sovereignty in the sense that, as sovereign lord, God was
the causal origin of all the factors that went into the

r
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production of Scripture, thus making the Bible inerrant.
The presuppositional connection thus established seems to be
necessary and logically consistent.

That being the case,

this study has various implications.
First,
sovereignty,

in orienting inerrancy to the concept of

inerrancy is thereby demonstrated to be a

theory whose theological base is found mainly in the
traditions where God's sovereignty is viewed in terms of
causality.

It seems to be commonly accepted that in

Protestantism,

this view, as Henry expresses it, is chiefly

found among those who identify themselves with the
Calvinistic or Reformed traditions.*

It is not surprising,

then, that the most ardent advocates of inerrancy have
consistently been Reformed theologians.

This is true of the

°rinceton theologians who popularized inerrancy in America
the majority of modern advocates of the position.

As

'’According to Ben A. Marburton, "The one rock upon
which Calvinism builds is that of the absolute and unlimited
sovereignty of the eternal and self— existent Jehovah”
(Calvinism; Its History and Basic Principles. Its Fruits and
Its Future, and Its Practical Application to Life CGrand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1955], 63).
See also H. Henry
M e e t e r , Calvinism: An Interpretation of Its Basic Ideas,
vol. I: The Theological and the Political Ideas (Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1939), 31— 38;
William K. B. Stoever,
"The Calvinist Theological Tradition," in Encyclopedia of
the American Religious Experience: Studies of Traditions and
Movements, v o l . I I . e d . Charles H. Lippy and Peter W.
Williams (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 1039;
Arthur W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God (Grand Rapids: Baker
Book House, 1930); James Montgomery Boice, Foundations of
the Christian Faith, vol. 1: The Sovereignty of God (Downers
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1978); and John Murray,
Calvin on Scripture and Divine Sovereignty (Philadelphia:
The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1960), 55—71.
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Leon Hynson states,

“inerrancy has emerged from a largely

Reformed matrix."1
Second, the concept of inerrancy cannot be defended
theologically by those Mho do not subscribe to the concept
of sovereignty.

The point here is not that one cannot

advocate inerrancy for reasons other than theological ones.3
Rather,

it is here argued that unless there are basic

theological grounds for holding inerrancy, such as Henry's
concept of sovereignty, inerrancy is merely a dogmatic
position Mith little, if any,

intellectual significance.

If

the critics mentioned at the beginning of this study wish to
charge that inerrancy is a “theology-less" position,

it is

this concept of inerrancy which is not undergirded by an
appropriate doctrine of God towards which they need to
direct their attacks.

While inerrancy may be a view held by

many conservative evangelicals, a distinction needs to be
maintained between inerrancy as a theological concept and
inerrancy as a fad of conservative evangelicals in general.
Third, the connection between inerrancy and
sovereignty is a warning against general and simplistic
evaluation of the concept of inerrancy.

For Henry,

inerrancy is an end result, a final product, or a surface
effect of a more fundamental

phenomenon, namely,

the

1Leon 0. Hynson, "The Inerrancy Question: A
Misplaced Debate," Evangelical Journal 5 (1987): 30—34.
“One could appeal to a family or church tradition as
a reason for believing in inerrancy.
Another could find
inerrancy a simple and straightforward way of defending the
reliability of Scripture.
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activity of God in his sovereignty.

In this case, a keen

evaluation of the concept is one Mhich considers inerrancy
not as a view of the nature of Scripture only but also as
one part of a larger context in Mhich the doctrine of God
features prominently.
Suggestions for Further Study
The present study has focused its attention on
Henry's concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty and hoM the
former presupposes the latter.

It cannot be claimed that

these subjects have been exhaustively analyzed and, as such,
there remains room for further investigation of Henry's
vieMs to see if there are perhaps other additional data that
could strengthen the case for a connection betMeen inr-rrancy
and sovereignty.
Apart from studying the connection betMeen inerrancy
and sovereignty in Henry,

there exists also a need to make

other case studies to see if the conclusions made in this
study are demonstrable in other theologians.

It Mould be

enlightening to study other conservative evangelical
theologians in the fclloMing categories:

those,

like Henry,

in the Reformed tradition Mho advocate inerrancy;

those in

the Reformed tradition who do not hold inerrancy;

those

outside the Reformed tradition who subscribe to inerrancy;
and those outside the Reformed tradition Mho do not defend
inerrancy.
It is hoped that the material presented in this
study on the concepts of inerrancy and sovereignty

r
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161
contribute toward a clarification of some of the issues
involved the debate over inerrancy.

The subjects of

Scripture and God to which the concepts of inerrancy and
sovereignty are attributes are certainly valuable concerns
far Christianity.

Further investigation of these subj'ects

can only add to the significance which Christianity attaches
to these fundamental doctrines.

r
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